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ABSTRACT 
of the MA Dissertation entitled 
"Modernity and Politics of the Self: An Investigation of the Political 
Project Underlying the Work of Michel Foucault" by Stephen 
Rothgiesser, University of Cape Town, February 1995. 
The central task of this dissertation is to explore · chel Foucault's conception of the human 
\ubject, and its interaction with power. Foucault offers a umque and controversial 
~ . - . . 
description of both the latter. After positing that his work is both coherent and political in 
nature, the dissertation investigates Foucault's books, lectures, interviews and articles 
throughout his three main periods. I have named these his Knowledge, Power, and Ethics 
periods to delineate different theoretical focuses in each period which are nevertheless 
underscored by a singular and continuous concern on Foucault's part with the constitution 
of the modem human subject; in addition, Foucault is interested in problematizing the 
"birth" and existence of this latter construction, which he believes is problematic in terms of 
the epistemological foundation upon which it rests, and the ontological consequences of 
such an entity. 
In the first part of this dissertation, I explore Foucault's first three important texts, 
MadnessandCivilizatian (1961), The Birth a/the Clinic (1963), and The Order a/Things 
(1966), in order to describe his theories around knowledge and the ways in which the birth 
of a modern science concerned with the nature of the human subject gave birth to Man, an 
epistemologically definable entity. 
Part II of this dissertation concerns itself with Foucault's second period in which he 
introduces a theory of power. This compliments his theories of knowledge and the 
constitution of Man, and allows Foucault to explain how it is that knowledge flows within 
society and affects social, political and economic change. In addition, this section 
introduces Foucault's notion of bio-politics, a particular political agenda which focuses on 
/ 
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human life and its maximization. He links the constitution of Man with this political 
agenda, and this gives rise to serious concerns about the nature of modem power. The 
texts which are centrally explored in this section are Discipline and Punish ( 1975), and The-
History of Sexuality (Volume 1) (1976). 
Once Foucault's general theoretical concerns are introduced, two important 
questions emerge. From a liberal perspective, Charles Taylor criticizes what appears to be 
the lack of the ability for the subject to construe meaningful truth as a result of the way in 
which Foucault describes both the human subject and power; his argument is introduced in 
his "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," and I use this article both to critically examine 
Foucault's work from the perspective of a very different philosophical tradition, as well as 
to introduce Foucault's later work. 
The second important criticism introduced in the dissertation is a broadly marxist 
concern, introduced in Martin Jay's Marxism and Totality and supported by other marxist 
theorists. This tradition is primarily concerned with a seeming lack of political agency in 
~. 
Foucault's work, the ability of the human subject to act in a specifically political way 
against forms of exterior oppression. Given Foucault's description of a constituted subject 
and its interaction with power relations, a marxist model of revolution is made impossible. 
The final part of the dissertation explores the final two volumes of The History of 
Sexuality ( 1984). I am centrally concerned here with describing the politics which emerge 
in Foucault's work on ethics. Looking back to ancient Greece and Rome, Foucault uses 
Stoic thought to outline an ethics for modern thought which is innately political. This 
serves the two-fold purpose of defending Foucault's work against the marxist critiques, as 
well as supporting my thesis that his work contains a political agenda, and is primarily 
concerned with the political implications of modern humanism and the resultant constitution 
of the human subject in power-knowledge relations. 
The thesis concludes with describing what the author believes to be an innately 
political theoretical paradigm. Although Foucault's ideas do not support (in fact reject) 
:) 
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traditional conceptions of human nature, rights, and power as sovereignty, he nevertheless 
does take into account the concerns of the humanist tradition as introduced above, and 
supersedes the strength of their models. I conclude that Foucault's oeuvre is both 
coherent, in terms of the uniform emphasis put on the constitution of the human subject and 
its relationship to modem power, as well as innately political. 
As for what motivated me, it is quite simple; I would hope that in the eyes of some people it 
might be sufficient in itself. It was curiosity--the only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is 
worth acting upon with a degree of obstinacy: not the curiosity that seeks to assimilate what 
it is proper for one to know, but that which enables one to get free of oneself. After all, 
what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount 
of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the 
knower's straying afield of himself? There are times in life when the question of knowing 
if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is 
absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all. People will say, 
perhaps, that these games with oneself would better be left backstage; or, at best, that they 
might properly form part of those preliminary exercises that are forgotten once they have 
served their purpose. But, then, what is philosophy today--philosophical activity, I mean--
if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if 
not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think 
differently, instead oflegitimating what is already known? There is always something lu-
dicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the outside, to dictate to others, to tell 
them where their truth is and how to find it, or when it works up a case against them in the 
language of naive positivity. But it is entitled to explore what might be changed, in its own 
thought, through the practice of a knowledge that is foreign to it. The "essay"--which 
should be understood as the assay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes 
changes, and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communica-
tion--is the living substance of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still 
what it was in times past, i.e., an "ascesis," askesis, an exercise of oneself in the activity 
of thought 
The studies that follow, like the others I have done previously, are studies of 
"history" by reason of the domain they deal with and the references they appeal to; but they 
are not the work of a "historian." Which does not mean that they summarize or synthesize 
work done by others. Considered from the standpoint of their "pragmatics," they are the 
record of a long and tentative exercise that needed to be revised and corrected again and 
again. It was a philosophical exercise. The object was to learn to what extent the effort to 
think one's own history can free thought from which it silently thinks, and so enable it to 
think differently. 
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Volume 2) 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION: 
"WHO IS MICHEL FOUCAULT?" 
I think I have in fact been situated in most of the squares 
on the political checkerboard, one after another and 
sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, 
ostentatious or disguised Marxist, nihilist, explicit or 
secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in the service of Gaullism, 
new liberal, etc. An American professor complained that 
acrypto-Marxistlikeme was invited to the U.S.A., and 
I was denounced by the press in Eastern European 
countries for being an accomplice of the dissidents. 
None of these descriptions is important by itself; taken 
together, on the other hand, they mean something. And 
I must admit that I rather like what they mean. 
Michel Foucault, interview April 1983 
I don't feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I 
am. The main interest in life and work is to become 
someone else that you were not in the beginning. If you 
knew when you began a book what you would say at the 
end, do you think that you would have the courage to 
write it? What is true for writing and for a love 
relationship is true also for life. The game is worthwhile 
insofar as we don't know what will be the end. 
Michel Foucault, interview October 1982 
Despite the range of political labels that a motley of persons and persuasions have 
attempted to pin on Michel Foucault, he remains enigmatic. His desire to avoid 
intellectual categorization and retain political anonymity is expressed in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge as the wish to create "a labyrinth into which I can venture, 
in which I can move my discourse .. .in which I can lose myself and appear at last to 
/ 
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eyes that I will never have to meet again."1 Simultaneously, however, Foucault's life 
and work was also marked by a distinctive commitment to the political responsibility 
and consequen~e of being an intellectual: for the purposes of exploring his work and its 
value for contemporary political philosophy, the question, "Who is Michel Foucault?", 
might thus better be construed as follows: "What does Foucault offer us intellectually, 
and equally importantly, politically? Does his work and thought involve a distinct and 
coherent political project, and, if so, what is its nature?" Rather than attempting to label 
Foucault, I wish to bring his intellectual and political project more clearly to light. 
For the purposes of better understanding the underlying concerns of Foucault's 
work, I ask my reader to consider the following quote. I believe that it provides some 
evidence to suggest that, while Foucault shies from being labeled as an adherent to a 
particular political paradigm, his work does involve a peculiar "politics" of his own. In 
his concern with modern subjectivity and human identity, Foucault postulates that 
perhaps 
"the problem of the self is not to discover what it is in its 
positivity, maybe the problem is not to discover a 
positive self or the positive foundation of the self. 
Maybe our problem is now to discover that the self is 
nothing else than the historical correlation of the 
technology built into our history. Maybe the problem is 
to change those technologies. And in this case, one of 
the main political problems would be nowadays, in the 
strict sense of the word, the politics of ourselves. "2 
In this, we see a linking of the self to a particular "technology" and to a kind of 
"politics". Two things are important here. First, that the Foucauldian subject is 
introduced as a constructed entity. I use the word "constructed" to juxtapose 
. Foucault's description of the modern subject with that of the traditional understanding 
of the subject as a unified entity founded on essential properties which are widely 
accepted as constitutive of the human self. Particularly in The Order of Things, 
1 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 17. 
2Foucault, "About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at 




Foucault shows the concept of "the self' to be something which is constituted or 
moulded within discourse and through history, a contingent entity whose birth is 
traceable to a particular time and to particular events within knowledge.3 
The second important point in this passage is Foucault's allusion to a possibility 
that in some way the "technologies" which constitute the self are themselves open to 
"change", and that this process is principally political in riature. If the historical process 
of constituting identity can be shown to be political in nature, then any challenge 
presented to this position must also be inherently political. This is where Foucault's 
political project emerges. Essential for the purpose of this thesis is Foucault's 
description of human bodies caught up in complex relations of modem knowledge and 
power, the latter linked to socio-political and economic practices. Foucault's earliest 
works (Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things) 
investigate the emergence of modem knowledge as initially concerned with naming and 
categorizing the human condition or human experience. From Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault links knowledge and the creation of a normative understanding of Man with 
what he calls "disciplinary techniques", a political practice which imposes acceptable 
forms of behaviour on the human body. These techniques of the bodies are indicative 
of a particular political agenda in modernity, a pervasive concern with population, the 
size and nature of those who make up a particular country's labour force and thus 
economic strength. Foucault links these various techniques which mould the body, 
(and thus produce the self as a constructed entity), with the economic necessity in 
· modernity to maximize human economic utility, and simultaneously ensure sufficient 
political docility. In a scathing attack on modern liberalism, Foucault's "politics of 
ourselves" is a rejection of the ontological limitations on the subject and the knowledge 
structures which force identity upon the modem. His politics is thus an investigation 
into, and a subsequent desire to overturn, the limits of modern thought around the 
human subject. It is a politics which operates on the liminal frontiers of the 
3Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. xiii-xiv. 
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knowledges which define our reality, and a project which encourages the modern to 
transgress these restrictive boundaries. 
Given the scope of Foucault's intellectual thought, and the formulation of some 
of his ideas, (particularly around knowledge, power, and their interaction in the 
creation of Man), there has been a great deal of controversy over how to define his 
work. I propose to show that Foucault's work is progressively consolidated over his 
career around a central and lasting concern: the human subject. I contend that 
Foucault's oeuvre is coherent, and further, that intrinsic to his philosophic concerns is a 
discernible political project. I use the word "coherent" to mean that while Foucault's 
work can be divided into three distinct periods, it can similarly be related to a central 
goal or theme which provides structure and focus throughout his oeuvre. Before 
expanding on the task presented for this dissertation, I think it important to clarify 
Foucault's central philosophic concerns, which will expand on his reference to the 
subject, identity, and "the politics of ourselves" in the quote above. 
We find guidance to his central philosophic concerns in an article written quite 
late in his career, "The Subject and Power": "The goal of my work ... has been to create 
a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made 
subjects."4 Foucault is centrally interested in historicizing the constitution of the 
modern subject; such a process, begun with early modern investigations into the 
"nature" of Man, produced epistemological and ontological knowledge of human 
beings and facilitated a process of naming and identity-formation. A central concern 
running throughout his works is a description of how it is that "Man" has come to exist 
as a known and empirically definable entity within knowledge formations that have the 
human species as their principle source of interest. Foucault problematizes these 
human sciences on two levels: first, in terms of the modem episteme, 5 or knowledge 
foundation, which unproblematically has elevated these bodies of knowledge to the 
4Foucault, 'The Subject and Power," (Afterword), in Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, p. 208. C 
5Foucault 'uses the word 1' episteme'" to d scribe a primary knowledge structure which 
determines for a particulai- age what is med "truthful", scientific, or correct. We will 
spend a good deal of tim discussing 1s concept later in the dissertation. 
5 
status of sciences. Second, he undermines the widely-held humanist perception of Man 
as an entity which has a stable and scientifically discernible nature. On the one hand, 
his philosophical project thus involves an investigation into the emergence of the 
modern human sciences as knowledges which claim to scientifically discern and 
describe a grounded human interior; on the other, it involves an undermining of the 
( 
principle of Man itself. For these reasons, the notion of the subject is central to both 
Foucault's work, and to this dissertation, in terms of ways in which human subjects 
might problematize both epistemological truths imposed on them by the human 
sciences, as well as the ontological limits which result from a totalized theory of the 
subject and its nature. To provide the necessary theory in addressing these problems, 
Foucault introduces his methods of archaeology and genealogy: archaeology as method 
seeks to define the epistemological structure of knowledge in a particular age; ge-
nealogy uses this archaeological knowledge to investigate the ways in which 
knowledge of the human subject affects social practice, i.e., the ways in which 
discourse and action intersect to create reality. 
In "The Subject and Power", Foucault summarizes his concern with the 
historical constitution of the subject in an important passage worth quoting in length. 
In this, he makes reference to, and thus distinguishes, three ways in which "human 
beings are made subjects," "three modes of objectification which transform human 
beings into subjects."6 Of these modes, he writes 
"The first is the modes of inquiry which try to give them-
selves the status of sciences [the human sciences as men-
tioned above]; for example, the objectivizing of the 
speaking subject in grammaire generale, philology, and 
linguistics. Or again, in this first mode, the objectivizing 
of the productive subject, the subject who labors, in the 
analysis of wealth and economics. Or, a third example, 
the objectivizing of the sheer fact of being alive in natural 
history or biology. In the second part of my work, I 
have studied the objectivizing of the subject in what I 
shall call 'dividing practices.' The subject is either 
divided inside himself or divided from others. This 
process objectivizes him. Examples are the mad and the 
6'The Subject and Power," p. 208. 
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sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the 
'good boys.' Finally, I have sought to study ... the way a 
human being turns him- or herself into a subject. For 
example, I have chosen the domain of sexuality--how 
men have learned to recognize themselves as subjects of 
'sexuality' ."7 
Foucault thus outlines three creative techniques, or operations of thought, which bring 
about what we refer to as the modem "subject". The first of these processes concerns 
itself with defining an objective epistemology of the human being, the latter empirically 
observed in the formation of various treatises on the "human condition". Here Foucault 
is concerned with understanding the process through which, and parameters within 
which, thought has come to investigate Man, and then recorded these observations 
within discourse. Further, he will seek to understand the process whereby these 
various knowledges, concerned with a wide range of human experiences (from speech, 
through labour, to Man as a living organism), acquired the status of sciences. 
Second, Foucault concerns himself with ways in which this knowledge has 
been used to define human subjects ontologically. Once known within discourse, 
Foucault seeks to discover how knowledge of the human condition is applied to human 
bodies in a process of dividing the Self from his Other. The "Self' would be that 
which is considered a normal condition for the human species in terms of a particular 
discourse; that which violates such a definition would thus be considered Other, 
normality's anomalous twin. Foucault begins such investigations with inquiries into 
I 
modem penality and human sexuality, and hereby plots the various modern methods 
used to divide bodies and spaces which are perceived ~s either useful or a threat to 
society. 
Third, Foucault investigates practices which human beings bring to bear upon 
their own bodies in a process of transformation or self-definition. He is interested here 
in the process by which a person comes to recognize himself as constitutive of a 




Man, and his epistemological instability as a result of this, as well as with the 
possibility, (perhaps even the necessity), of overcoming this humanist creation. 
In his second, genealogical phase, Foucault writes histories of particular social 
institutions, to illustrate how- ifis thafknowledg"e is translated into social practice: 
Foucault's central works during this-phase, (Discipline and Pu.nish and The History of 
Sexuality, Volume 1), introduce his theory of power to illustrate how knowledge 
garnered by the human sciences work to define Man's identity and consciousness, and 
are thus innately oppressive and ontologically limiting. During this stage of his work, 
Foucault is increasingly concerned to show how knowledge overlaps and intersects 
with power relations, hereby linking discursive formations with social practices. 
Because of the direct link which Foucault makes between knowledge and the 
manipulation of bodies within social space, he is also able to suggest a possible 
transformation of these practices through a problematization of intellectual truths which 
are taken for granted as universal and scientific in nature. 
However, given his rejection of a unified subject and his definition of power as 
uninvested in bodies, Foucault cannot provide a traditional account of political or onto-
logical liberation. This is a particularly controversial political thesis: Foucault rejects 
both marxist and liberal causal interpretations of ways in which oppression can be 
accounted for. On the marxist account, oppression is to be understood by the 
oppressive link between workers and capitalist bosses; in the liberal view oppression is 
understood as the negation or stifling of inherently owned political and social rights 
which are enshrined in law. In bo* accounts oppression is assumed to be a negation 
of some deep human essence or truth. Marxists concern themselves with the doing 
away of economic and social alienation which is brought about by the imposition of an 
exploitative capitalist system on the majority of the worlds population (the workers); 
liberals are primarily concerned 'with the protection of human rights and a justice which 
they perceive to be the inherent right of every human being. Foucault rejects both on 
the grounds that they remain steadfastly rooted in the humanist tradition, with Man 
·conceived as the sole entity constitutive of reality. Because Foucault rejects any notion 
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of an inherent human consciousness or rights, oppression for Foucault is simply the 
process whereby limits are placed upon the ontological choices open to the modem hu-
man subject; the degree to which epistemological limits to thought impede a thinking 
Other than the norm. 
Foucault's final ethics period is concerned both with the history and practice of 
self-construction as a reinforcemenJ of techniques of modern power and discipline, as 
well as with the ways in which identity and self-understanding might be manipulated 
for the purpose of strategizing resistance against such inhibiting disciplines. It is here 
that we find his politics emerging more explicitly. In fact, this has been part of his 
project all along. First Foucault undermined modem knowledge at an epistemological 
level; second, he problematized the theories of Man which emerged from these 
knowledges, and thus challenged "who we are" as moderns, the ways in which we 
have come to understand identity and difference, Self and Others, the normal and 
pathological, and the deviant anomalies which threaten our vested interest in a grounded 
human nature. The full force of Foucault's project emerges in this final stage as a 
radical critique not only of our systems of knowledge, but the very names we give 
ourselves, and the identities which we are forced to accept in modernity. 
For our present purposes, three central problems emerge as critical areas to be 
investigated vis-a-vis Foucault's political project: first, his archaeological account of the 
discovery of the Man within the human sciences; second, his genealogical investigation 
into the construction of the self within particular "discursive practices", as well as 
within "technologies" of power, involving a conception of power radically opposed to a 
traditional (liberal) understanding of power as sovereignty and the ability to coerce with 
force; third, and perhaps most important for the purposes of this dissertation, the way 
in which Foucault describes the subject as problematizing the interaction between 
power/knowledge relations and Being, hereby overturning "technologies" intrinsic to 
this process. I wish to explore each of these problems in turn, and thus provide an 




The first problem is that of Foucault's archaeological account of the creation of 
the self, i.e., of the "birth" of modern Man. Foucault will describe this entity as being 
created within knowledge structures. The central problem which he seeks to explain in 
his first texts is how it is that bodies of knowledge, such as psychology and medicine, ---- - · --
came to be formulated through complex interactions between doctors and patients, · 
tradition and changing technologies, and history and the present. In Madness and · 
Civilization, Foucault asks how it was that, in the eighteenth century, madness 
suddenly took the place of leprosy as a symbol of that which Europe sought to exclude, 
punish, reject, and cleanse from society. In The Binh of the Clinic he inquires into 
how it was that conceptions of the human body changed so fundamentally from the 
early eighteenth century with the opening up of corpses. Finally, in The Order of 
Things, Foucault seeks to understand how it was that epistemology changed in terms of 
its structure and central problems with the advent of modernity. In this archaeology of 
the human sciences, Foucault sought to discover how it was that modern knowledge, 
with specific reference to the human subject, came about within history. In addition, 
and adjacent to this question, Foucault sought to understand if the subject was 
conceived differently in modern thought as opposed to earlier epochs, if in fact such an 
entity existed at all before the eighteenth century. Thus the first problem which this 
dissertation seeks to resolve is concerned with the nature and history of knowledge 
concerned with Man. 
The second question which this dissertation seeks to resolve is how it is that 
knowledge finds actuality within a social setting, i.e., how it is that a knowledge of 
Man is imposed upon society. In his genealogical period, and to begin answering this 
question, Foucault introduces his theory of power and its relationship with knowledge. 
In exploring this relationship between knowledge and power, we are primarily 
concerned with the effects of this on the human subject, and how this leads to a critique 
of Foucault's work as nihilistic. During his early archaeological phase, Foucault's 
work is primarily interested in uncovering the epistemic structure of modernity, lurking 
beneath all discursive practices, and which, by its very nature, determines what is 
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"knowable", "true", and "examinable" in a particular epoch of human existence. After 
~oucault' s archaeological investigations into the forms and central interests of modern 
knowledge, qe begins to explore the ways in which knowledge and power intersect, 
overlap, reinforce and modify one another. His later genealogical work, building on 
his earlier archaeological discoveries, suggests more generally that there is a complex 
interplay between knowledge (or discourse), and power: 
" ... (i]n a society such as ours, but basically in any 
society, there are manifold relations of power which 
permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and 
these relations of power cannot themselves be 
established, consolidated nor implemented without the 
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of 
a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power 
without a certain economy of discourses of truth which 
operates through and on the basis of this association. 
We are subjected to the production of truth through 
power and we cannot exercise power except through the 
production of truth. "8 
In effect, Foucault makes clear reference to the fact that power and truth imply and even 
"produce" one another. There are serious questions which emerge around Foucault's 
conception of power, which he describes as a mediating force anterior to social 
institutions, and not something to be understood in legal terms. Because this notion is 
so central to Foucault's work, and so controversial, I believe it important to investigate 
it in some depth here in order to thresh out central questions which this dissertation will 
seek to answer. 
Foucauldian power is described as action upon bodies which is positive in its 
ability to transform attitudes, gestures, and thoughts. This is a definition of power 
which is productive, the effect of knowledge upon the field of possible actions or 
choices, "a way in which certain actions may structure the field of other possible 
actions. What therefore would be proper to a relationship of power is that it be a mode 
of action upon actions."9 Foucault conceives of power as something which "circulates" 
8Foucault, 'Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge, p. 93. My emphasis. 
9'The Subject and Power," p. 222. 
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and moulds bodies, working on actions towards desired goals. Rather than as 
something "appropriated" or singularly possessed, power works as a mediating agent, 
a force which serves to direct actions and thoughts. In addition, this process does not 
take place within a model of power as sovereignty; power circulates within and between 
bodies, never possessed or intrinsically "owned": 
"Power must be analysed as something which circulates, 
or rather as something which only functions in the form 
of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in 
anybody's hands ... not only do individuals circulate 
between its threads; they are always in the position of 
simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. 
They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are 
always also the elements of its articulation. In other 
words, individuals are the vehicles ofpower, not its 
points ofapplication ... This non-sovereign power, which 
lies outside the form of sovereignty, is disciplinary 
power."10 
The modern disciplines, which are a result of the complex interaction between 
knowledge of human bodies and their social manipulation, are grounded first in various 
bodies of knowledge (psychology, criminology, sexology, demography), concerned 
with the human subject both as an individual and as a member of a population at large. 
Second, they are grounded in particular socio-political and economic techniques which 
produce a particular conception of the human subject. It is precisely this notion of a 
manipulation or construction of the subject, this realization of "disciplinary power", that 
increasingly forms the core of Foucault's concerns around the modern subject. 
I wish to show the way in which for Foucault this conception of power is 
linked to the constitution of the modem subject, and how this emerges as problematic in 
his work. As discussed above, Foucault conceives of power as intersecting or 
"circulating" with knowledge in the form of creative technologies. These technologies 
define modern human Being, and allow for the formation of the ''hermeneutical 
sciences" which have as their chief concern the exploration of human interiority. 
Important here, however, is the fact that this triad of knowledge, power and truth 
1 O•'Two Lectures," pp. 98, 105. My emphasis. 
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works to categorize human experience, and is creative of a norm to which all human 
beings are made subject. Disciplinary power is not only constitutive of social reality, 
but in addition, in the process of naming and categorizing, works to limit experience 
and emerges as oppressive. Further than a force which dictates and mediates a field of 
options, Foucault's disciplinary power applies itself to the human body and soul, to 
"immediate everyday life which categorizes the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches 
him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him 
which he must recognize and which others have to 
recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes 
individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the 
word subject: subject to someone else by control and 
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience 
or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of 
power which subjugates and makes subject to."11 
Given the nature of modem epistemology, and its intense concern with naming and 
ordering reality, knowledge is thus implicated in a process of subjection, this directly 
tied to the way in which identity is construed and adopted in modernity. A paradigm of 
behaviour and identity which is delineated within discourse, and monitored by power, 
(as being either normal or pathological), imposes inherent limits upon modern reason 
and experience. Foucault links these ontological questions to a new form of power in 
modernity: bio-politics. Bio-politics is the way in which modern individuals and in-
deed whole nations are conceived of in terms of the need for economic productivity and 
political docility. The politics of modernity, as we shall see, is one based on life, not 
only in economic terms, but also within juridical, social, political, and personal 
spheres. 
With Foucauldian power unfounded within a sovereign human subject or 
institution, and with the mutually reinforcing relationship which knowledge enjoys with 
power described as a process of subjection, Foucault appears at his most disconcerting. 
A serious question emerges: If power indeed flows between, rather than within, 
institutions and persons, how might subjects ever liberate themselves from such an 




force? How might battles be fought, and concessions won by particular interest 
groups? In his "ethics" period, Foucault offers us theoretical guidelines to avoid a 
seemingly powerless situation on the part of the human being, and this link between 
Power/Knowledge relations,· the subject; -and· the latter's ability to -contest power 
relations, is central to this thesis. On this question of a seemingly nihilistic situation, he 
writes: 
"It seems to me that power is 'always already there', that 
one is never 'outside' it, that there are no 'margins' for 
those who break with the system to gambol in. But this 
does not entail the necessity of accepting an inescapable 
form of domination or an absolute privilege on the side 
of the law. To say that one can never be 'outside' power 
does not mean that one is trapped and condemned to 
defeat no matter what."12 
In his final, or "ethics", period Foucault offers us tools to begin conceiving of 
new ways to define power in the future. In the struggle against the epistemological 
limitations of modem discourse, and the subjecting constraints of disciplinary power, 
Foucault hints at the "possibility" of new systems that might emerge to take the place of 
the present knowledge and power structures which dominate modernity. While 
rejecting the "ancient right of sovereignty," or traditional humanist conceptions of 
struggle centred around the smashing of a present system and its replacement with a 
possible utopia, he looks "towards the possibility of a new form of right, one which 
must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from the principle of 
sovereignty. "13 
This brings us to the third and final problem to be resolved in this dissertation, 
the question of whether Foucault's human subject is free to act in a specifically political 
way against bio-power. His later work intimates the possibility of an "ethos" which 
. might guide a "strategy" against disciplinary power, and help establish an "anti-
disciplinarian" conception of politics.14 He offers us a "toolkit" of ideas from which to 
12foucault, "Power and Strategies," in Power/Knowledge, pp. 141-142. 
l31wo Lectures," p. 108. · · 
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critique modern society, and hereby engage in more effective struggles towards 
overturning disciplinary impositions on the subject.15 Foucault describes critique "as 
toolkit" to mean that 
"(i) The theory to be constructed is not a system but an 
instrument, a logic of the specificity of power relations 
and the struggles around them; (ii) That this investigation 
can only be carried out step by step on the basis of 
reflection (which will necessarily be historical in some of 
its aspects) on given situations."16 
Through such critical "reflection" a new politics can be embarked upon; Foucault calls 
this resistance to power-knowledge relations, or bio-power in its political and economic 
form, a "strategy". In rejecting power in a juridical sense, he critiques disciplinary 
power in terms of strategies through which it might be problematized and undermined, 
rather than as a system to be broken and destroyed completely: "Rather than analyzing 
power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analyzing power 
relations through the antagonism of strategies."17 
With these words, a conscious project for Foucault emerges. In part this 
implies a rejection of a politics based on "liberation", understood as bringing an end to 
particular forms .of oppression in human experience. On the other hand, this "new 
politics" might best be described as centred around human subjectivity and as a 
rejection of the normalized ontological limits within which the modern subject is 
expected to find meaning. In place of current ideologies which centre their concerns 
around a negative freedom or the prospect of liberation, Foucault is interested in 
coming up with new ways of doing politics; "political analysis and criticism have in 
large measure still to be invented,"18 
"so too have the strategies which will make it possible to 
modify the relations of force, to co-ordinate them in such 
15"Power and Strategies," p. 145. 
16ibid. ' 
17'The Subject and Power," p. 211. 




a way that such a modification is possible and can be 
inscribed in reality ... the problem is not so much that of 
defining a political 'position' (which is to choose from a 
pre-existing set of possibilities) but to imagine and to 
bring into being new schemas of politicisation ... To the 
vast new techniques of power correlated with 
multinational economics and bureaucratic States, one 
must oppose a politicisation which will take new 
forms."19 
His final works, then, concentrate on understanding the practices of "self-making" 
which human beings came to bear upon themselves as ethical agents in Ancient Greece 
and Rome, and which now serve his philosophic concerns in modernity. He uncovers 
ways in which subjects can combat imposed societal norms and remake themselves as 
Other. Just as the notion of strategy is extremely important when defining actions 
outside the body, or within groups, the question of self-reflection, and self-making, is 
of essential importance in this Ethics period. Ultimately, what we are left with by 
Foucault is an ever-lasting contestation, a perpetual struggle for hegemony, with both 
sides mutually dependent on one another for definition. In Foucault's words: "In' 
effect, between a relationship of power and a strategy of struggle there is a reciprocal 
appeal, a perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal."20 
It is important to note that this is a retrospective study of Foucault's work. 
When he passed away suddenly in 1984, his project on sexuality incomplete, Foucault 
had not exhausted his enormous intellectual potential; neither had he fully explained his 
understanding of contemporary politics. I wish to piece together the nature of this 
underlying and incomplete political project, and do this on the assumption that Michel 
Foucault has left us with enough material to, first, make coherent sense of his work, 
and second, to enable us to construct a political programme from his intellectual 
concerns. I believe that this political project can be put into real use in strategizing 
against the knowledges which are presently constitutive of human experience, and 
against what he perceived to be the central bio-political concerns of the modem state. 
19jbid. My emphasis. 
20'The Subject and Power," p. 226. 
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In his work, I will argue, we see the distinct unfolding of a sustained political project: 
in the early phase of Foucault's career we find a general concern with discursive 
practices and the way in which knowledge applies itself to bodies and spaces; in his 
second phase, Foucault introduces a link between discourse (knowledge) and praxis 
(power), in the constitution of the human subject; in his final phase, with his concern 
for Ethics, Foucault explores ways in which subjects make themselves. Within these 
boundaries, Foucault's concerns around the subject and ways in which the subject is 
constituted will be explored. 
While most Foucauldian scholars divide Foucault's work into the three broad 
periods as I have proposed in the paragraph above, what I have introduced as the 
central thesis for this dissertation does stray from what is contained in much of the 
secondary literature on Foucault. Simultaneously, it should be stressed that given the 
amount of interest his work has generated in the past decade, new books are constantly 
being published and it is extremely difficult to keep up to date while writing. In the 
following paragraphs I propose to introduce some of the more important texts that have 
been published on Foucault, both to give my reader some idea of what is available on 
his oeuvre, but more importantly, to justify my choice of using only primary sources 
for this dissertation. 
There are two central reasons for choosing to work almost solely from 
Foucault's texts: first, most of the literature does not provide a retrospective study of 
his work which I believe is imperative in order to produce an informed and holistic 
understanding of his political project. I don't believe that Foucault can be fully 
understood without a full knowledge of his final period which focuses on ethics. In 
other words, what I propose as a central part of this dissertation's thesis is that 
Foucault set up a theory of the subject and its constitution in his first two periods, and 
then outlined a political project in order to take this subject into account in his third 
period. Foucault's work is thus only introduced in his works up until The History of 
Sexuality (Volume 1). In line with this argument, any secondary literature published 
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before 1984 is deficient to varying degrees with an absence of his final books, 
interviews, and lectures. 
The second and more serious problem which the secondary literature presents is 
the formulation of very different problems to the one which I present in this 
dissertation. While there is general agreement over dividing Foucault's work into three 
broad areas, and many scholars do link the Foucauldian subject to power/knowledge 
relations, there has been little work done on tying Foucault's work on the subject 
directly to a politics of the self. This linking of the subject and its constitution within 
power-knowledge relations is rarely found in work on Foucault, as is the exploration of 
a politics inherent to Foucault's ethics. The latter, an exploration of the critkal task of 
philosophy as a political practice, and tied to the transformation of social structures and 
practices, has attracted little direct attention in the literature; the only source which I 
have found to be very close to my thesis is James Bemauer's Michel Foucault's Force 
of Flight: Towards an Ethics for Thought. As far as my research has revealed, he is the 
only theorist who directly ties Foucault's work on ethics and a critical Post-
Enlightenment conception of reason to a political practice, the task of transforming both 
the human body and social practices and institutions. 
Mark Poster stands out as a contemporary theorist who does use Foucault's 
work towards political ends, but not to the same ends as I have presented the latter's 
work in this dissertation. In Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a 
Context, Poster affirms the three central periods in Foucault's work, but does not give 
credence to Foucault's oeuvre representing a coherent project around the subject. He 
posits Foucault's work as containing "three positions'', in line with the three periods 
which I outline in this introduction as descriptive of Foucault's theoretical and 
methodological maturity' but links these with distinctly different ends from myself.21 
In Critical Theory and Poststructuralism, Poster seeks to link Foucault and Sartre's 
work on the subject in order to explore the obvious differences in their approaches, and 
21 Mark Poster, Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context, p. 54. 
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the intellectual traditions out of which each man emerged in pre- and post-1968 France. 
More importantly, Poster seeks to link Foucault's general project with that of the 
Frankfurt School and other European social theorists, especially Sartre. Ultimately, he 
seeks to comprehend a new "school" of social theory which might combine certain 
aspects of these various positions, and produce a critical theory which takes the late 
modern context into account. While Poster does link Foucault's work to a social 
critique, he does not invoke the same concerns which I believe are foremost in the 
latter's work, nor does he affirm Foucault's work as a coherent and unified project 
around the subject. 
John Rajchman, on the other hand, explores Foucault's work on philosophy as 
critique, but does not directly link this to a political project around the subject. In his 
Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, he presents a case for Foucault as a 
skeptic, and explores his work as an "endless questioning of constituted experience."22 
In this way, he argues very much as I do for the critical capacity of philosophy and the 
degree to which freedom is inherently a part of this critical experience. Where this 
work falls short in my opinion is Rajchman's inability to tie this critical task of thought 
to a politics of the self; in other words, Rajchman does not stipulate an inherently 
political task for thought, especially in relation to the subject. As with Poster, while he 
does explore questions which are close to politics, Rajchman does not make the direct 
and necessary link between the politics and the philosophy which he describes in his 
book. 
Two authors who fall within the first category of problematic literature above 
are Alan Sheridan (Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth) and Karlis Racevskis (Michel 
Foucault and the Subversion of Intellect). Both of these books, published in 1980 and 
1983, respectively, are surpassed in critical scope with the publishing of Foucault's late 
work, and thus are of little use in informing my central thesis vis a vis the political 
nature of Foucault's project. Racevskis' work is chiefly concerned with Foucault's 
22John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, pp. 2, 7. 
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first two periods. It investigates Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methods, 
linking these in an important way to. "Foucault's critical project as an effective 
instrument of change."23 In this way, he certainly recognizes the political quality 
inherent in Foucault's work, but ties this directly only to the methods which Foucault 
presents as critical of modern knowledge structures and social practices. Racevskis 
falls short in his work by not linking Foucault's work on philosophy as critique to the 
latter's central concerns on the constitution of the human subject. While Racevskis 
moves in the right direction, his work does not contain all of Foucault's theory, and 
thus presents an uncompleted picture in this particular book. He leaves us with an 
interesting and helpful thesis, but does not probe to the heart of Foucault's political 
concern. 
In a similar way, Sheridan, in his early Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth, 
concerns himself with key theoretical and methodological problems in Foucault's work, 
but does not have the necessary material available to present a cogent synopsis of 
Foucault's entire oeuvre. His work is primarily concerned with the Foucauldian 
relationship between knowledge and power, but also explores archaeology and 
genealogy as methods. Sheridan completes a book that is more a study of Foucault's 
individual texts up to The History of Sexuality (Volume 1), rather than a critical thesis 
on a particular aspect of Foucault oeuvre. Ultimately, this book offers little support for 
my central thesis, and could not be sufficiently accommodated within literature I might 
refer to in the pages ahead. 
I decided to work directly from Foucault's texts in order to provide proof for 
what I believe to be a controversial thesis, and also in order to prove a direct link 
between Foucauldian ethics and a political project centred on the modern human 
subject. While some authors explore the relationship between philosophy and history 
in Foucault's work (Clare O'Farrell, Foucault: Historian or Philosopher?), or the 
relationship between truth and Foucauldian power (Barry Cooper, Michel Foucault, an 
23Karlis Racevskis, Michel Foucault and the Subversion of Intellect, p. 19. 
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Introduction to the Study of His Thought), most theorists do not argue for a direct link 
between the constitution of the modern subject, philosophy, and a Foucauldian politics 
of the self. Most theorists do engage with the theories of archaeology and genealogy, 
but no-one except (in my experience) Bernauer directly links the constitution of the 
human subject to an Foucauldian ethics for philosophy which serves as both a political 
tool and a catalyst for change. This explains the decision I have taken vis a vis 
secondary texts and my sole use in this dissertation of primary Foucault texts, 
interviews, and articles. The only exception to this are those places in which I present 
critiques of his work by liberals and marxists. 
In line with the allusion here to Part III of this dissertation, which provides the 
space for the introduction of a broadly liberal and marxist critique of Foucault's work, I 
think it important to explain why I have taken such a step and not used other works, 
which ultimately might have been more sympathetic to his oeuvre. In this dissertation, 
a key element of the way in which I present Foucault's work is a positioning of his 
theory of the subject against that of the humanist tradition. In the chapters which 
follow the word "humanist" itself will be more carefully defined by Foucault and 
myself; for now let it be understood as a particular conception of the human subject as 
vested with a grounded and uniform nature. This is in direct contradistinction to 
Foucault's understanding and description of the subject. As a result, and because I 
place the human subject at the centre of Foucault's political concerns, I felt it important 
to have critiques directed at his work which either rejected his conception of the subject 
or his definition of power. In this way, I sought to set up the sharp contradiction 
which exists between these two traditions, and in this way add more weight to 
Foucault's work when his position is (hopefully) vindicated against that of the 
humanists. While there might be criticisms of the way in which I present Foucault's 
theories and even the emphasis I put on his work being unified, I feel the central task 
for this dissertation remains to compare, contrast and defend Foucault's work against 




might be presented as indicative of a new politics for late modernity, and affirmed as in-
nately political. 
In order to explore Foucault's conception of the subject, and to answer the 
central question guiding this paper, I have divided this dissertation into four main parts, 
each then further divided into chapters with the following sequence: Part I, 
"Knowledge", will investigate Foucault's first three books, Madness and CivilizaJ.ion, 
The Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of Things, in order to thresh out their major 
concerns. Of central concern will be a critical examination of the theory and method 
which is introduced in Foucault's early writing. Most important here is Foucault's 
introduction of archaeology, the method of excavating the foundation upon which 
knowledge rests. 
Part II, "Power", will deal with Foucault's "middle period", the period in which 
he introduces his definition of power in Discipline and Punish, and The History of 
Sexuality (Volume 1). In this section of the dissertation, I will primarily focus on the 
process of the norm, which is hinted at in The Order of Things, and which is expanded 
on in these later books. Probably most important in this phase, however, is Foucault's 
introduction of bio-power, his definition of the modem political technology which cen-
tres itself on the efficient and effective control, maximization, and utilization oflife. 
Part III, "Foucault's Critics", introduces two critiques of his work. My central 
concern in this section is to answer two questions posed to the heart of Foucault's 
work, squarely centred on his controversial conception of power, and the way in which 
he describes the intersection of modern power and knowledge. The first question 
relates to questions of being: given Foucault's conception of the constructed subject, 
how does he account for human truth and identity? Posing this question, I will use a 
valuable text by Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth" .24 The second 
critique relates to Foucault's conception of an uninvested power: given the way in 
which he defines power in Discipline and Punish, and The History of Sexuality 
24'fhis article can be found in Taylor's Philosophy and the Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers 2. 
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(Volume 1), how does Foucault accounffor political action and the possibility of 
revolution, something central to marxist thought? Martin Jay, in his Marxism a d 
Totality, poses a powerful argument against Foucault's conception of power. Jay, and 
other prominent marxist writers who will be introduced in the section, accuse Foucault 
of denying human agency, as well as the innate human ability to overcome external 
power impositions.25 Liberals and marxists alike present important challenges to 
Foucault's work, and yet I feel that his ideas stand up to such criticism. 
The purpose of Part IV of this dissertation is to reply in Foucault's favour to the 
criticisms above, and to simultaneously outline Foucault's concerns in his final Ethics 
phase. It is here that we find a coherent and powerful political project within 
Foucault's work which can be used to inform and explain modern struggles. In 
conclusion, I will affirm Foucault's work as not only of essential value to 
contemporary philosophy, but also containing within it an inherently political project. 
If we accept his central thesis concerning the history and existence of modem Man, and 
his place within systems of thought, then it is difficult to reject his political vision. 
Once humanist political projects (primary examples being marxism and liberalism) are 
problematized at their core, at the very foundation upon which they stand, and are thus 
rejected, it is difficult not to place greater value on the academic and political work now 
emerging around the name of Foucault. 
In this dissertation I wish neither to label nor categorize Michel Foucault, 
hereby restricting him. Rather, I wish to be true to his wish: "Do not ask me who I am 
and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see 
that our papers are in order. All least spare us their morality when we write."26 
Simultaneously, however, given the power and relevance of his work for contemporary 
political problems, I feel that extensive work on his oeuvre is not only desirable, but 
imperative. I believe increasing numbers of scholars throughout the world would 
concur. 
25Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality. 





FOUCAULT'S CRITIQUE OF :{{ANTIAN REASON 
These inquiries ... have their theoretical coherence in the 
definition of the historically unique forms in which the gen-
eralities of our relations to things, to others, to ourselves, 
have been problematized. They have their practical coher-
ence in the care brought to the process of putting historico-
critical reflection to the test of concrete practices ... this task 
requires work on our limits [of thought], that is, a patient la-
bor giving form to our impatience for liberty. 
Foucault, "What is Enlightenment" 
On the basis of Foucault's early texts and related articles, Part I of this dissertation will ex-
plore his notion of the human subject problematized within thought systems and set up as a 
site of knowledge creation in the development of a modern science of Man, the human sci-
ences. In the following three chapters, I seek to define the way in which Foucault de-
scribes the creation of the human subject through history and within discourse; this process 
implies the application of reason and rationalized "technologies" on the body and soul of 
the individual, rendering an ontological and epistemological "truth" of Man. Foucault's ac-
count of the practices which objectify and thus label human beings sought to show how the 
latter were part of the creation of individual identity or ontological being. In this way 
Foucault established both the notion of Man and of an innately human consc.iousness (a 
definable and stable human interior) as contingent and problematic historical constructions. 
25 
The problem of Man as an object of science and scientific investigation, and the creation of 
Man's subjectivity, or the rendering of the human being as subject, are co-extensive with, 
and mutually reinforcing of, one another. Knowledge of the human subject, and the ere-
ation of a hermeneutical space within this entity, are thus part of the same process which 
created Man with essential characteristics marking his existence and ontological self-under-
standing. 
Closely linked to this, and indeed the basis of Foucault's "politics of the self', is 
the relationship between reason, consciousness, and subjectivity, and the point at which 
these three concepts merge in relations of subjection. A central objective oft.he following 
chapters will be to provide an account of Foucault's investigation into those bodies of 
knowledge (the human sciences) that have as their chief concern the human being, his de-
sires and his inner world of meaning; with these discourses a particular conception of the 
human subject was invented with modernity, and thereby Man was bom. 1 In Part I of this 
I 
dissertation, and as a starting point for the proceeding investigations, I wish to describe the 
ways in which Foucault began tracing the history of the relationship between Truth, Power 
and the Self through an exploration of the birth of the medical and psycho-sciences. At this 
stage, we will be primarily concerned with the human body objectified, as described within 
"The Subject and Power". In other words, in this part of the dissertation, I wish to trace 
Foucault's historiography of how Man was brought within the realm of critical investiga-
tion, and realized within epistemology as a constant and discernible object.2 
Two things are important to note here: first, that Foucault's first three books are in 
effect studies of the history of the creation of modem knowledge systems; second, that his 
investigations are closely linked with a particular conception of reason. In order to better 
frame these questions related to rational thought, its function, and its historical growth, in 
1 I use the words "hermeneutical" or "hermeneutics" to describe investigations by modern 
knowledge into an human interior which is deemed constitutive of all human beings. Human 
ontological meaning and a hermeneutics of the human condition are thus interchangeable as 
essential theoretical constructs used in modern studies into the nature and consciousness of 
the human subject. 
2Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power," p. 208. 
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the introductory section of Part I, I would like to look at two important articles. First, 
Immanuel Kant's famous.text on "What is Enlightenment"; second, Foucault's own article 
by the same name. The latter is actually a response to Kant, and outlines in clear terms 
where Foucault stands in relation to reason, and how he links reason to a political project 
which problematizes the liminal boundaries which border the modern sciences of Man, 
hereby stifling him. 
In 1784, in response to the question "Was ist Au.fkltirung?'', Kant described the re-
lationship between man and reason as something peculiar to the modern age: the modern 
quest for Enlightenment implied the affirmation of reason, and thereby the pursuit of per-
sonal and thus universal truth.3 For Kant, Enlightenment is a process of attaining auton-
omy as an individual; in addition, it is man's duty to use reason in a particular way so as to 
will a universal truth. In short, Enlightenment, as a particular set of obligations or tasks, 
requires the correct application of reason on the part of the individual in terms of willing 
both the categorical imperative for himself, and for all men. An important part of this pro-
cess is the necessity for all individuals to think rationally (critically), as a personal credo 
and as a political ethos. Enlightenment thus implies a dual will to knowledge: first, as a 
tool of self-actualization, a way to break free of the inability to think critically for oneself; 
secondly, as a critical stance of reason which wills a political and moral reality for all men. 
On the one hand, Enlightenment represents an ontological process, a will to free oneself of 
ignorance and dependence on internal mis-truths; on the other, the Enlightenment inculcates 
a political ethos, a will to promulgate a system of moral and political law which is binding 
on all men by virtue of their general participation in the formation of such a system. 
Two hundred years after Kant, Foucault responds to the same question with much 
of his predecessor's concern for the correct and meaningful application of the rational fac-
3Kant writes "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklarung?" in response to this question 
posed in the German periodical Berlinische Monatschrift. Kant finished his response on 30 
September 1784, and it was first published on 12 December 1784. Interesting to note here is 
Foucault's (incorrect) reference (in his "What is Enlightenment?") to the article first being 
published in November 1784. 
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ulty, and yet reconceptualizes thought in an important way. Fascinating is the way in 
which Foucault uses this short article by Kant, and the important ideas presented therein, to 
produce an article which I believe occupies a seminal position within his oeuvre. I will ar-
gue that, like Kant, Foucault ties reason and the pursuit of truth very closely to his study of 
the advent of modern forms of subjectivization and subjection. However, unlike Kant 
Foucault, while he affirms reason, also problematizes thought as contingent, created within 
history, and open to change. This notion of thought as historically and discursively con-
structed, as well as the role of reason in the process of overturning problematic bodies of 
knowledge and their effects on human bodies, will emerge as central to his politics. 
Reason here must be understood as the ontological condition inherent to humankind, the 
ability to think critically with the use of the rational faculty. Thought, on the other hand, is 
the accumulation of knowledge structures as the result of a particular application of reason. 
Thought is thus the process to which reason is employed within a particular epoch, and 
leads to the formation of knowledge unique to that epoch. The Foucauldian notion of the 
politics of the human self is a problematizing of the relationship between truth and the 
constitution of human bodies as suNected subjects, a critical reading of modern ontology 
and the creation of identity. However, the ability for thought to rethink itself, or to work 
upon itself in a critical manner, opens up the opportunity for reworking modes of subjec-
tion which find their epicentre or birth within particular knowledge structures--the human 
and psycho-sciences. I will argue that it is precisely Foucault's ability to show us this 
possibility of transgressing, reformulating, and thus transcending present epistemological 
limits that informs the political project inherent to his work. Before we can move into this 
discussion, however, it is important to further investigate Kant's initial text, and Foucault's 
response to this. 
KANT AND "ENLIGHTENMENT" 
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Kant defined Enlightenment as a process of self-working, "man's emergence from his self-
incurred immaturity."4 "Immaturity" in this sense is the inappropriate, (or inadequate), use 
of the rational faculty, that which for Kant defines human beings above the rest of nature, 
and which constitutes the critical centre of our ability to will universal laws. More imper-
tantly, "immaturity" refers to the condition of being unable to think for oneself as an inde-
pendent agent, or "without the guidance of another."5 Immaturity is thus the inability to 
think for oneself and lead a critically examined life. In addition, underlying this 
"condition" is the emotional insecurity of being both lazy and cowardly. In Kant's view 
immaturity is self-imposed, and requires courage to overturn: "Dogmas and formulas, 
those mechanical instruments for rational use (or rather misuse) of his natural endowments, 
are the ball and chain of [man's] permanent immaturity."6 Kant, however, saves little 
sympathy for those who do not accept the challenge to think for themselves: he condemns 
the latter as "domesticated animals", "docile creatures", in the total political care of others 
who, for a price, will think on their behalf, and prevent these yoked beasts from "daring to 
take a single step without the leading-strings to which they are tied."7 Kant thus empha-
sized critical rationality as the necessary credo for modernity, a courage to will for oneself, 
outside the "convenience" of immaturity: Sapere aude, "have courage to use you own un-
derstanding," dare to know !8 Rational courage is thus the ontological imperative of 
modernity. 
The process of Enlightenment, however, requires an essential element in addition to 
courage: the political necessity of freedom. The political project inherent in Kant's work is 
a challenge to dogmatism on the part of state and governors: only upon a social foundation 
which reveres freedom as the most basic social ideal might a rational basis for political au-
thority be built. As important as Kant's challenge to the lazy and afraid in "Was ist 
41mmanuel Kant, ''What is Enlightenment," in Kant's Political Writings, p. 54. 
5ibid. 
6ibid., pp. 54-55. 
7ibid., p. 54. 
8ibid. 
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Aujkliirung ?"is the political message central to this text: his rejection of the absolutism and 
dogmatism inherent in the eighteenth century German monarchy. Having defined the pa-
rameters within which he understands and affirms the Enlightenment as both a positive and 
indeed a necessary event within history; Kant goes on to describe two areas of life in which 
the rational faculty must, of necessity, be used in tWo different, and yet mutually reinforc-
ing, ways: the public and private use of reason. Kant gave a specific, though rather unfa-
miliar, and even paradoxical sense to the public/private distinction. For Kant, the private 
use of reason pertains to men working within bureaucracies, the civil service, or in service 
of the state, when they are "part of the [social or political] machine. "9 "What I [sf. Kant] 
term the private use of reason is that which a person may make of it in a particular civil post 
or office with which he is entrusted."10 When men are responsible to others, and are dele-
gated specific tasks which service or reinforce the state, they work as servants, and are 
subject to a law to which they must be obedient. The public use of reason, on the other 
hand, is the critical questioning of forms of government or morality when one is considered 
a member of the community of men, without direct responsibility to state or government: 
"by the public use of one's own reason I [sf. Kant] mean that use which anyone may make 
of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public."11 
This begins to define the public use of reason: the place where men are able to 
question laws, decisions, and the very structures of governance themselves. In this, we 
see a clear distinction between two separate realms of thought, and yet the emergence of a 
clearly defined and mutually reinforcing relationship: obey within the private realm, and be 
assured the freedom to question unrestrained in the public.12 Kant, however, questions the 
degree to which, or the manner in which, obedience is required. Public· rationality is the 
9ibid., p. 56. 
lOibid., p. 55. 
llibid .. 
l2Jnteresting to note here is Kant's apparent inversion of the commonly accepted definition of the 
"private" versus "public" spheres in modernity. This might in some sense have been linked to his 
desire to protect and nurture the right to public criticism, and yet to not simultaneously offend the 
GeIIllan monarch. · 
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reaching of political "maturity" for Kant; paraphrasing him on this point, Foucault writes, 
"Humanity will reach maturity when it is no longer required to obey, but when men are 
told: 'Obey, and you will be able to reason as much as you like'."13 Kant thus proposed a 
-- .. ·two-fold process: first, a check on sovereignty, and the ability to rule in an arbitrary fash- - ·- -- . - -. 
ion; second, the ensuring of rational laws, based on reason, that all citizens have the oppor-
tunity to promulgate. 
Of most importance, it seems to me, is that Kant's text delineates both an ontologi-
cal condition of reason, and the implications for its political application and practice. To 
reach a stage of consciousness which exists as commensurate with the understanding of 
one's innate ability to reason is to understand one's responsibility and challenge as a mod-
ern individual, someone who has inherited the Enlightenment tradition. Second, once the 
modern individual has affirmed this duty, he has the political ability to practice this reason 
in his actions. Consider the following: 
" ... once the germ on which nature has lavished most care--
man's inclination and duty to thinkfreely--has developed .. .it 
gradually reacts upon the mentality of the people, who thus 
gradually become increasingly able to actfreely."14 
This is the critical political side of Kant's text, and a veiled message to dogmatic rulers 
urging the space and freedom for political expression. For Kant, the Enlightenment is thus 
a two-fold process: first an interrogation of an ontological necessity--the will to reason; 
second, a political right, namely that of willing a political order in which.men are free to 
reason freely, and thus ensure their personal freedom. On the one hand, a freedom of con-
sciousness; on the other, a freedom of action. 
FOUCAULT, THOUGHT AND HISTORY 
13Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?," p. 36. 
14Kant, "What is Enlightenment?," p. 59. 
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As an introduction to his own concerns, Foucault's elaborates on Kant's work in a decep-
tively important article given its size; an article, I believe, which captures Foucault's general 
project, and specifically his relationship to knowledge and the use of reason. Foucault af-
firms Kant's stance vis-a-vis the Enlightenment, and yet extends his argument in important 
ways. In the way that Foucault achieves this definition of enlightened reason and its bear-
ing on our lives as modems, he will define his own stance in relation to the historically-
constituted technologies within which the modern subject is caught, and off er a glimpse at 
ways in which we might use a particular approach to reason in problematising and over-
turning this paradigm of subjection. 
Crucial to Foucault's understanding of Kant's text is the distinction between a pub-
lie and private use of reason. While Kant writes that in the private sphere reason should be 
subordinated to the wishes and needs of the greater and more important community which 
private reason serves, in public it must be affirmed and assured as a free and active agent; 
to think reasonably and for oneself is part of the Enlightenment's great responsibility for 
the modern. However, in investigating Kant's rendition of the responsibility of rationally . 
willing moral conduct, and, through the categorical imperative, formulating moral princi-
ples .for all men, Foucault seeks to distinguish two important factors bound up in this rela-
tionship between the'individual and humanity as a collectivity. Foucault seeks to delineate 
an important difference between reason as a political right, a right which Kant sought to 
have affirmed and ensured by the sovereign Frederick, and reason as an ethical tool, a 
means of critiquing the world and systems of knowledge which are passed down to us. 
Kant states very clearly in his text that a state official in whatever capacity is bound to re-
main within generally accepted political boundaries while practicing in this "private" func-
tion. As a critical member of the general public, however, the free man of the 
Enlightenment not only has the freedom, but an important responsibility to further knowl-
edge, to "comment publicly ... on the inadequacies of current institutions."15 This is the 
15jbid., 57. 
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application of reason upon thought, a theoretical paradigm which Foucault introduces as 
part of his investigation of Kant's text on Enlightenment, but which he will later extend into 
his genealogical method. This paradigm introduces the modern responsibility of reason in 
critiquing knowledge structures, the historical space in which they are created, and the lim-
its within which thought is forced to operate as a result of this history. The political project 
inherent in this task is the challenge to overturn oppressive knowledge systems where they 
intersect with human bodies and render them subjected. 
Foucault finds in Kant's text an important reflection on history and the way in 
which human beings perceive themselves and events around themselves: "The hypothesis I 
should like to propose is that this little text is located in a sense at the crossroads of critical 
reflection and reflection on history."16 I believe this to be important to Foucault for two 
reasons. The first is that he is concerned with a critical analysis of thought in relation to the 
way in which modernity writes about, and conceives of, a truth of the human subject. The 
second is that Foucault would like to make manifest the way in which we "make" ourselves 
through such discourse, a discourse which the first point raises in terms of the historical 
contingency of thought. I believe that these two ideas bracket Foucault's own thought, and 
set the parameters for his entire oeuvre. In taking this particular stance towards reason as a 
critical tool to analyze the ontological condition of modern man, Foucault affirms both the 
Kantian tradition, within which I have placed him (at least as far as his approach to the use 
of reason is concerned), as well as the modern responsibility and duty to think critically on 
thought systems which are held as self-evident and unproblematic in modernity. 
Two central ideas emerge from this sense of critical history proposed by Foucault. 
The first is the notion of the limits of thought, the constraints imposed upon what might or 
might not be said, and upon the way in which Man conceives of things, limits to thought 
which work as boundaries or parameters enclosing thought. I believe that Foucault's cri-
tique of discursive limits and their effects on the subject is the central principle guiding the 
16Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?," p. 38. 
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texts we will be most interested in during the first part of this dissertation. In Foucault's 
early works Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of Things, 
we are taken through an archaeology of the epistemological and ontological limits of mod-
em thought, the parameters within which thought and the subject are forced to conceive of 
truth. In the following chapters we will be particularly interested in the emergence of 
knowledge structures that, within such limits, define the nature or ontological condition of 
Man, and thus "create" him within discourse. 
The second Foucauldian idea linked to critical history is the notion of modernity as 
ethos, a particular stance taken by the modem in relation to reason: the ability to challenge 
and critique the limits of thought as mentioned above.17 The process of critique is dy-
namic, tied directly to the degree to which humankind can understand the historical founda-
tion upon which knowledge rests. Foucault's work is thus firstly an archaeology of the 
limits imposed upon thought through history, and secondly, a genealogical investigation of 
the ways in which certain knowledge structures are imposed upon society, this again a 
historical inquiry. Foucault's ethics of thought delineates the responsibility and power of 
thought to think differently, and thereby to problematize historically constituted bodies--
J 
whether social bodies (a political problem), knowledge bodies (an epistemological prob-/ 
lem), and most importantly of all, human bodies or "souls" (an ontological problem)--
which are taken for granted by moderns, or accepted as normative and natural. Together, 
these three points define the triangle within which Foucault's thought operates, and consti-
tute the core of his work: the "politics of ourselves" is the points at which the three prob-
I ems above merge in a relationship of subjection, and are recognized as such. 
What I have referred to as the "limits of thought" might be described as the liminal 
"frontiers" of knowledge, which exist both in terms of the way thought defines the parame-
ters of truth within frameworks which are accepted as epistemologically sound, as well as 
the way in which people are limited in terms of experiences recognized. These epistemo-
17jbid., p. 39. 
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logical limits to thought set the boundaries within which subjects are conceived in moder-
nity, named in "The Subject and Power" by Foucault as the "objectifying sciences", or the 
sciences of Man. Ontological limits to ways in which the human subject can be conceived 
is what Foucault calls the "dividing practices", in which people are divided from one an-
other and themselves according to ways in which they have been labeled or identified 
within the human sciences. In the three chapter which follow, I seek to outline the ways in 
which the notion of the "limit" plays itself out, both within knowledge structures, and 
within social practices and political institutions. 
MODERNITY AS ETHOS 
The second central idea which emanates from "What is Enlightenment" is that of a particu-
lar ethos inherent in Foucault's understanding of modernity. He takes this idea from the 
Kantian imperative, which finds credence in a particular stance that the modern, out of a 
sense of duty, is necessarily bound to commit himself to. Foucault comments that 
"[t]hinking back on Kant's text, I wonder whether we may 
not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than as a period 
of history. And by 'attitude,' I mean a mode of relating to 
contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain 
people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, 
of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a 
relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no 
doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos. "18 
Foucault's thus understands modernity essentially as an "ethos'', an attitude towards reason 
and the way in which one might create the self within this age. Modernity, then, is not just 
a new epoch but a specific attitude, an ethos, or an approach to reason. Yet, in describing 
reason as the facilitator of a fight against our present quandary, Foucault takes care to add a 
specific tag to the type of reason which he envisages, and this he takes directly from Kant: 
reason must be free. Reason must exist to think for itself and against itself, outside of what 
Kant calls the private sphere. 
l 8jbid. My emphasis. 
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It is this ethics of critical thought, which entails a particular relationship between 
reason and thought, which I believe is the most crucial contribution that Foucault has made 
to philosophy. His work provides for an epistemological and ontological critique of 
modernity, centred around the constitution of the modern subject and yet suspicious of all -
truth formations which define our modern reality. In this way, he seeks to investigate the 
limits which enclose both the modern subject and its ability to think critically: "There is a 
history of the subject just as there is a history of reason; but we can never demand that the 
history of reason unfold as a first and founding act of the rationalist subject."19 In this 
way, Foucault wishes to describe both the human subject and the way in which knowledge 
is constructed as open to historical inquiry and change. Foucault is interested in affirming a 
particular task for reason: that of being critical of modern thought or what can be equally 
understood as the various bodies of knowledge which inform our understanding of the 
world. This ability to critically question and overturn modern systems of knowledge are 
central to Foucault's political project, and this will be increasingly demonstrated in the 
chapters which follow. 
Foucault insists on a description of modernity as an ethos or an "attitude," a particu-
lar stance both towards reason and, much more importantly, who we are as moderns.20 
Modernity as ethos is concerned with how it is we define ourselves, not only epistemologi-
cally, but politically and ontologically. Foucault wishes to bridge the gap between these 
three areas by showing how closely they combine together in creating consciousness for 
the human subject, and thus establishing a modern understanding of Man. Modernity as 
ethos is thus a process much more than a mere historical epoch, even though the historical 
factor is essential when attempting to understand this present within which we find our-
-selves, and the ways in which this "present" describes our being. 
19foucault, "Critical Theory/Intellectual History," interview by Gerard Raulet, in Politics, -
Philosophy, Culture, p. 23. 
20foucault, "What is Enlightenment," p. 39. 
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What follows in this dissertation, then, is an exploration of a Foucauldian stance 
towards reason, and his problematization of systems of thought in terms of their historical 
creation. Our "patient labour" is the desire to free ourselves of the epistemological and, as 
far as the human subject is concerned, the ontological constraints which formalized knowl-
edge structures impose upon the modem subject.21 Simultaneously, Foucault provides an 
affirmation of the Enlightenment project, and a critique of the way in which knowledge of 
the human subject, both in terms of his body and his being, has ossified around him in a 
process of subjection, in the process through which this entity is born as Man. Foucault is 
essentially a modem thinker, who remains within the Kantian tradition because of the em-
phasis he places upon human freedom; in addition, he affirms the Enlightenment respon-
sibility to apply critical reason to systems of thought which might hinder or prevent this 
good, in "our impatience for liberty."22 Paradoxically though, while I have placed 
Foucault firmly within this thought lineage, he was also committed to a very different goal 
to that of Kant, ultimately seeking to overturn Kant's categorical imperative in being highly 
suspicious of universal appeals to the good or the right. Foucault seeks to map the histori-
cal emergence of our modem concepts of justice and morality, showing these to be intrinsi-
cally caught up within complex relations between knowledge and power. Because of his 
description of the human sciences, Foucault is thus unwilling and unable to affirm the re-
sult of the Kantian imperative: a willing of universal law, justice and morality. Foucault 
will reject both a universal totalized conception of the good and any notion of a history in-
formed by teleological growth. Instead, he will describe history as constituted in the same 
way as the human subject: through complex relations between knowledge and power. 
While Foucault is interested in a different use for reason, and has a political project 
centred on quite different concerns from Kant, he applies the same approach to dogmatism 
21ibid., p. 50. 
22ibid. 
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and irrationality that Kant does in "What is Enlightenment", as the following quote indi-
cates: 
"A revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism 
and to rapacious or power-seeking oppression, but it will 
never produce a true reform in ways of thinking. Instead, 
new prejudices, like the ones they replaced, will serve as a 
leash to control the great unthinking mass."23 
While Kant is primarily concerned with a political freedom and the space necessary to ade-
quately express oneself within the community of men, Foucault is more concerned with the 
knowledge structures underlying social and political practices; he sets out to show how 
knowledge intersects with power renders particular conceptions of the subject. Rather than 
affirming a rational process which works towards a "scientific" knowledge of Man, and 
which supports a stifling universality that is deemed applicable to all men, Foucault seeks 
to affirm an approach to reason as critique, the application of the rational faculty in contin-
ually pushing the limits of thought, and rendering the relationship between power and 
knowledge a political one, a politics of who we are as modems centred on the constitution 
of the human subject. 
The three chapters which follow will provide an account of the ways in which · 
Foucault first began to explore knowledge as creative of a discourse on Man: the task of 
Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of Things was to ac-
complish a critique of various bodies of knowledge which have been accorded the status of 
universal science, and yet whose roots and foundations are highly problematic and tentative 
in the history of ideas. This critique, and the work that is required in rendering a new de-
scription of modem knowledge, Foucault would call "work on our limits", a critical exami-
nation of the boundaries within which modern knowledge and conceptions of the human 
self are enclosed. Foucault finds this paradigm problematic, and invokes as a central task 
of philosophy the "care brought to the process of historico-critical reflection," that this dis-
23Kant, "What is Enlightenment," p. 55. 
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cipline provides.24 Philosophy has the fundamental task of critical analysis of knowledge 
and thought systems, this handed down to the modern thought process by the 
Enlightenment. The modern imperative to think critically is directly related to our need to 
carefully problematize bodies of knowledge which have been accorded scientific status; this 
ethics of a critical thought process is work which Foucault describes as indicative only of 
"our impatience for liberty," the desire to reject knowledge which constricts and oppresses 
the Enlightenmenttradition.25 It is the latter which stands alone as the ultimate affirmation 
of the need to ensure the expression and the freedom of thought, and is the very tradition 
which Foucault turns to in order to provide a ethical model for modern thought.26 





THE DIVIDING PRACTICES 
The madman's voyage [upon the "Ships of Fools"] is at 
once a rigorous division and an absolute Passage. In one 
sense, it simply develops, across a half-real, half-imaginary 
geography, the madman's liminal position on the horizon of 
medieval concern--a position symbolized and made real at 
the same time by the madman's privilege of being confined 
within the city gates: his exclusion must enclose him; if he 
cannot and must not have another prison than the threshold 
itself, he is kept at the point of passage ... A highly symbolic 
position, which will doubtless remain his until our own day, 
if we are willing to admit that what was formerly a visible 
fortress of order has now become the castle of our con-
science. 
Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization 
... Gova's Idiot who shrieks and twists his shoulder to es-
cape from the nothingness that imprisons him--is this the 
birth of the first man and his first movement towards liberty, 
or the last convulsion of the last dying man? 
Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization 
In Michel Foucault's first major work, Madness and Civilization (1961), he describes a 
history of the insane individual brought within the concern or scope of science, what we 
might call the scientifically objectified individual. His book is thus both a history, subtitled 
A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, as well as an exploration of madness, but with 
specific reference to the way in which insanity came to be constituted within modernity as a 
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definable, empirically known, and observable human condition. In this work, Foucault 
shows how "madness" came to be understood as a particular epistemological construct, and 
thus ontological condition, for the first time with the advent of modernity; Madness and 
Civilization might also be described as the history of how the mad were constituted through 
history as insane human subjects. This book will show that madness was problematized in 
two ways with the advent of modernity: first, Madness and Civilization describes the 
growth of an epistemological identity for insanity within particular discursive formations, 
addressed specifically to the problem of insanity, and which, under the rubric of psycho!-
ogy and psychiatry, were presented to society as sciences. Second, Madness and 
Civilization is also a study of the ways in which Europe restructured its social space from 
the seventeenth century in order to accommodate and deal with the problem of insanity .1 
Thus, in Madness and Civilization, Foucault is interested in showing how the accumulation 
of knowledge around madness, and the subsequent establishment of insanity as the medical 
condition of madness, are unique and historical events. Furthermore, Foucault will show 
that this history is describable by studying the various practices which formed its existence, 
these both within discursive and social formations. The central task of this chapter, then, is 
to investigate Foucault's description of the modern concern to restructure social and epis-
temological space vis-a-vis the insane . 
. MADNESS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 
Until the classical age of early modernity in the seventeenth century, madness had enjoyed 
a relationship of dialogue with reason. Madness was accepted as a natural part of human 
existence, and the mad were revered as connectors to an "otherworldly" realm, the sublime 
or Godly. The madman, in the work of Shakespeare and the great Elizabethan literary 
artists, was depicted as possessing a truth that might be revealed for the benefit of society at 
large. This truth was presented in the form of a riddle, hereby hinting at the great knowl-
1 This division Foucault refers to as the "dividing practices", practices which delimit and 
demarcate social, ontological and epistemological space~ and structures. This concept is more 
fully explained in 'The Subject and Power," and the Introduction to this dissertation. 
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edge and power that these deranged men and women retained--the mad served as an exte-
rior voice of wisdom, of genius and insight. By the end of the Middle Ages, in 
"farces and soties, the character of the Madman, the Fool, or 
the Simpleton assumes more and more importance. He is no 
longer simply a ridiculous and familiar silhouette in the 
wings; he stands center stage as the guardian of truth .. .If 
folly leads each man into a blindness where he is lost, the 
madman, on the contrary, reminds each man of his truth ... "2 
The acceptance and reverence of madness by the Middle Ages was to change radically by 
the end of the seventeenth century with the advent of the Enlightenment. In pre-modernity, 
the mad were seen to possess valuable qualities from which the non-mad might learn; the 
privilege accorded to reason from the time of Descartes, and the Rationalists of 
Enlightenment philosophy, lead to a negative distinction being made between the reason-
able and the unreasonable, and changed the relationship of madness and sanity forever. 
Far more'importantly, however, was the passing of a value judgement on this distinction. 
Those deemed unreasonable or mad were now discarded as useless, immoral and unworthy 
of societal sympathy or support. With modernity, and in an unique event, for the first time 
the mad were separated from other "degenerates" or deviants and placed in special institu-
tions that sought to correct their transgressions, these defined in Judeo-Christian moral 
terms. This was the beginning of a history which differentiated between madness and rea-
son, and later upon which a psychological model was built for the first time, a paradigm 
upon which a normative understanding of Man as a subject in possession of a psyche could 
be built. Whether in terms of a general confinement within the H8pital General in 1657, or 
a humanitarian liberation of the insane in 1794 by Pinel and Tuke at Bicetre, the history of 
madness is one concerned with knowledge of, and the social ordering of, a disorder, an 
Other. What concerns Foucault are the various social and intellectual practices which 
2Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, p. 14. 
.. 
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brought this distinction into being in the first place, and how these practices imposed them-
selves upon human subjectivity. 
Foucault targets the eradication of leprosy, a widespread European scourge, as the 
turning point in the relationship between madness and sanity, the "zero point in the course 
of madness at which madness is [still] an undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided ex-
perience of division itself," the moment at which the relationship between reason and un-
reason began to change.3 "As leprosy vanished, in part because of segregation, a void was 
created and the moral values attached to the leper had to find another scapegoat."4 
"Leprosy disappeared, the leper vanished, or almost, from 
memory; these structures [of exclusion] remained. Often, in 
these same place.s, the formulas of exclusion would be re-
peated, strangely similar two or three centuries later. Poor 
vagabonds, criminals, and 'deranged minds' would take the 
part played by the leper ... With an altogether new meaning 
and in a very different culture, the forms would remain--es-
sentially that major form of a rigorous division which is so-
cial exclusion but spiritual reintegration."5 
This process of exclusion seemed to rest not only upon the "social" or moral exclusion; 
Foucault strongly suggests that economic motives were clearly behind the exclusion of the 
mad. While in Madness and Civilization, Foucault is less explicit than what follows in his 
later works, he makes the clear suggestion here that modem populations are subject to a ra-
tional and scientifically-imposed assessment of their health and physical utility, this vis-a-
vis the capitalist economy which emerged in Europe from the seventeenth century. 
Accompanying this economic reordering of society, modified social systems ensured co-
hesiveness and efficiency in the managing of resources. Of principle importance in this 
process was the human being, objectified and imprinted with power relations which sought 
to render him or her of maximum use. In Foucault's words: "Throughout Europe, con-
3'b'd . 1 1 ., p. IX. 
4ibid., p. vi. This quote is taken from the introduction to Madness and Civilization, written 
by Jose Barchilon. 
5jbid., p. 7 . 
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finement...constituted one of the answers the seventeenth century gave to an economic cri-
sis that affected the entire Western world: reduction of wages, unemployment, scarcity of 
coin ... "6 In juxtaposition to madness as poetry or spiritual truth, from the seventeenth 
century madness was defined as an economic and moral problem--idleness, an essential 
symptom of madness in the eyes of this new age, was explained in moral terms to ensure 
the needs of an emerging capitalism. Foucault describes this process of rendering idleness 
a moral lapse as the result of an overlap between religious principles, and an emerging 
work ethic tied to capitalist production. 
We find two important notions at work in seventeenth century Europe: first that of 
exclusion of those deemed dirty or impure, for medical reasons; and second, the notion of 
medical rehabilitation and social reintegration. These two concepts, exclusion and integra-
tion, are explored in Madness and Civilization as central questions. Foucault shows these 
principles, upon which modem psychology was built, as having worked to redefine mod-
em man's relationship to himself as a rational animal and, more importantly, his relation-
ship to the mad. Qualitatively, however, and a significant difference which separates pre-
modem and modem conceptions of madness, is that the therapeutics of madness took on a 
very different form. Modem exclusion and treatment of the mad is to effect a moral, (rather 
than a physical), cure; a cure that involves impositions on the mind and soul of the mad, no 
longer seen as treatable on the Narrenshiffen, or with the holy sanctity of water, but 
through the gaze of the rational faculty. Madness known and defined will set in motion a 
chain of medical events and the writing of scientific texts which will remain with us up until 
the present day, and invent an entity central to our epistemic realm: homo psychologicus, 
mm:~ as the subject of psychology, a science based on the premiss of a discernible human 
interior vis-a-vis his emotions, desires, and needs. What were the forms of discourse that 
allowed, urged, and created this change? How was the madman as poetic genius trans-
formed into a medical case study in the growth and propagation of psychology? Most im-
6jbid., p. 49. 
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portantly, how, for the first time with modernity, was the creation of human interiority 
linked to ontological questions related to a differentiation between reason and insanity, its 
pathological and degenerate Other? These are central questions which Foucault se~ks to 
answer in Madness and Civilization. As he alludes to in the preface to this book, he is not 
concerned with a history of medical practice with regards madness, but rather with discern-
ing the events within the history of ideas which engendered, and were responsible for, en-
suing social events and institutions.7 
HOMO PSYCHOLOGICUS: REASON AND TRUTH 
The central shift with which we are presently concerned is the way in which madness, as a 
"twin" or partner of reason, and its mysterious counter-part, came to be relegated to a lesser 
realm and medicalized. In short we wish "to define the moment of this conspiracy [of the 
confinement and medicalization of madness] before it was permanently established in the 
realm of truth ... "8 This notion of "truth" is a powerful metaphor throughout Foucault's 
work, and central to his conceptual repertoire as he problematizes the way in which knowl-
edge structures impose themselves on society, and the way in which knowledge and power 
intersect to create su~jects, or define a subjective "essence" to which Man is tied. 
"Truth" is defined by Foucault as a body of knowledge which is imposed on indi-
viduals and society because it is considered normative and desirable. As far as the episte-
mological and ontological divide which separates madness and reason, Foucault wished to 
move away from "the convenience of terminal truths," and looked instead at "the act of 
scission" that defined this relationship.9 In this way, he is not interested in the rules which 
psychotherapy as a science has imposed upon insanity, but rather with epistemological and 
social actions that between two mental experiences: 
7·b·d . l l ., p. XI. 
8·b·d . I I ., p. IX. 
9·b·d . I I ., pp. IX, X. 
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"What is constitutive [of the space between madness and 
reason] is the action that divides madness, and not the sci-
ence elaborated once this division is made and calm restored. 
What is originative is the caesura that establishes the distance 
between reason and non-reason; reason's subjugation of 
non-reason, wrestling from it its truth as madness, crime, or 
disease, derives explicitly from this point...we shall have to 
speak of this act of scission, of this distance set, of this void 
instituted between reason and what is not reason, without 
ever relying upon the fulfillment of what it claims to be." 1 O 
What Foucault is thus most interested in is the way in which a truth of madness is created 
within a space that has been established as the line of demarcation between them. This line 
exists as a limit, a boundary within thought and knowledge, what Foucault will call "the 
limits rather than the identity of [European] culture."11 In this way, epistemological 
boundaries merge with social divisions, and form the limits of thought and society which 
result in practices of human subjectiori--together these divisions form the "dividing prac-
tices". 
Throughout the history of madness and its alienation from reason, a pattern can be 
observed. Foucault points to two central events within this history, both of which seem 
foreign and unconnected, (perhaps even contradictory), to one another and yet which form 
part of a similar continuum of thought and action around insanity. The first major event 
which Foucault makes reference to is the establishment of the H8pital General in mid-sev-
enteenth century Paris, as an institution centrally involved in the exclusion of madness. 
This hospital served as the formative historical event which lead to the insane being incar-
cerated. The second event which Foucault refers to as important in the history of insanity's 
silenced voice, is the creation of insane asylums by the great "humanitarians" Pinel and 
Tuke. These men are credited with liberating the mad from the immoral and unhealthy 
conditions in which they were found within institutions like the H8pital General. On the 
one hand, an incarceration, a limiting of freedom; on the other, a freeing of the captured. 
1 Ojbid., pp. ix-x. My emphasis. 
1 libid., p. xi. 
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Two events which seem markedly different and distanced from one another, and yet two 
events which Foucault places firmly within a medical tradition which seeks first to divide 
the mad from their sane counterparts, and second, to normalize these people within medical 
ins ti tu ti ons. 
From a pre-modem approach to madness as delusion to a modem definition of un-
reason or insanity as a medical disorder, certain notions seem to remain constant within, 
and definitive of, this process. The first is the approach to work and economic productivity 
as previously discussed; second, and the more important of these, is the reformulation of 
madness as a moral, and later, as a physical anomaly. This is the move from pre-modern 
conceptions of Reason and Madness which were separated by a spiritual divide, towards a 
modem and normative definition of Reason and Insanity, defined in pathological terms. 
From the seventeenth century, unreason was deemed as no longer having instructive value, 
was then described in the language of psychopathology, and was relegeted apart from so-
ciety and placed within institutions which were specifically established for the care and ob-
servation of such medical disorders. It is with this move that madness was forever deni-
grated beneath the sovereign presence of Reason, an event "[a]fter which, silence could 
reign, and madness disappear in the--always withdrawn--presence of unreason." 12 
Ultimately, unreason would be understood solely as a medical condition to be listened to 
(after the Freudian revolution in psychology), then objectified within discourse, and, in a 
process of ontological subjectification, purged from an "ill" mind. 
THE MODERN THERAPY OF MADNESS 
Early modernity conceived of madness as a spiritual deficiency and a delusion of the mind. 
At this early point in the history of unreason, or insanity, it was not the internal soul or 
mind of a patient that became the target of a therapeutics or thermaturgical process, but 
rather the body as a manifestation of desire and unrealistic understandings of the world. 
12ibid., p. 115. 
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Within mental institutions like the H8pital General, "cures" were designed to mend a 
morally ill constitution, "a secret weakness, an essential lack of resistance." 13 Still defined 
in terms of a body in need of therapy, early modern therapeutics sought a cure within the 
body, and ignored the violent rage which was its external manifestation; instead they con-
centrated on providing the necessary "resistance" to the body's fibers so that the latter 
might stave off lunatic attacks.1 4 In this way, a cure was sought which would "give the 
spirits or the fibers ... a calm vigor, a strength no disorder [could] mobilize ... " 15 It was be-
lieved that in strengthening apparently weak inner fibers, the patient would be cured of 
madness. After such treatment, "[m]ore than the image of vivacity and vigor, it is one of 
robustness that prevail[ed], enveloping the theme in a new resistance ... A force ... to rein-
force nature itself."16 A series of 'treatments" were used to cure this physical disorder: the 
consumption of iron to "fortify" the body; 17 blood transfusions; 18 inoculations, particularly 
of scabies to flush out the body; 19 various immersion techniques, with water from the end 
of the eighteenth century again seen as an agent of cleanliness and purification;20 and regu-
lations of movement, to restore the madman's conception of reality back to normalcy. 21 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, given the relationship of Man to Nature, 
there was no sense of a psychological element to Man's being. Foucault writes that the 
field of modern psychology was born only in the nineteenth century, with a therapeutics 
that moved away from cures of the body, to cures of the soul, "by inventing its famous 
'moral methods,' [and bringing] madness and its cure into the domain of guilt."22 With 
modern psychology placing the cause and responsibility for insane behaviour on the pa-




17ibid., p. 161. 
18jbid., p. 162. 
19jbid., p. 164. 
20ibid., p. 167. 
21jbid., p. 172. 
22jbid., p. 182. 
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tients themselves, this was to have profound effects on the human subject caught. The 
"discovery" of human interiority, and the linking of an external morality with an internal 
and responsible human will, formed the foundation of a science of the soul of man; this 
area of the human sciences sought to investigate man and his innermost, most intimate se-
crets, desires, and needs. Foucault describes this consciousness of an internal self as the 
emergence for the first time in history of Man conscious of himself as a psychological sub-
ject. 
Knowledge of an essential human interior would serve as the basis of a modern 
knowledge of Man, universalized to encompass and explain all men. For Foucault, the 
modern dividing practices serve to divide human beings from one another in institutions of 
guilt, both those institutions made of bricks and mortar, and those which will delimit man's 
experience and understanding of himself internally, his essence in psychological terms. 
Foucault makes an important distinction between psychology as a science of human emo-
tion and feeling, and the merging with psychology of a morality which attaches responsi-
bility for actions to the patient. No longer described as a physical illness, Foucault con-
ceives modem madness as a condition which is sought within the moral fibre of the patient. 
Out of the "depth" which modem Man finds within his interior, a truth of himself in onto-
logical terms emerges: 
"The distinction between the physical and the moral becomes 
a practical concept in the medicine of the mind only when the 
problematics of madness shifts to an interrogation of the 
subject responsible. The purely moral space, which is then 
defined, gives the exact measurements of that psychological 
inwardness where modem man seeks both his depth and his 
truth."23 
This entirely new conception of madness which emerges with modernity, as well as the 
humanist entity which serves as the object of its discovery, and the resulting subject of this 
23ibid. 
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investigation, is what Foucault finds problematic and sought to problematize in his initial 
texts. 
FOUCAULT'S THEORY OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY 
With the "freeing" of madness from the bondage of the great institutions of confinement, of 
which the H8pital General was the epitomizing image, madness became couched in medical 
terms, now as "insanity". A new system of therapeutics was set in motion from the nine-
teenth century, a move from a therapeutics of bodily fibres to a concern with the various el-
ements which embrace and define the soul. Until the emergence of modern psychology 
and the hermeneutical sciences (which concern themselves with understanding human 
meaning or consciousness), reason and unreason existed as flip sides of a similar coin: they 
reinforced one another in a relationship that was not necessarily hostile. In a reversal of 
this relationship, Foucault describes modern reason as dominating unreason and relegating 
it to a pathological and inferior position both epistemologically and ontologically. In other 
words, with modernity, madness 
"will be entirely enclosed within a pathology. A transforma-
tion which later periods have received as a positive acquisi-
tion, the accession, if not of a truth, at least of what would 
make the recognition of the truth possible; but which in the 
eyes of history must appear as what it was: that is, the re-
duction of the classical experience of unreason to a strictly 
moral perception of madness, which would secretly serve as 
a nucleus for all the concepts that the nineteenth century 
would subsequently vindicate as scientific, positive, and ex-
perimental. "24 · 
Modern investigations into insanity, and the new knowledge structures which resulted from 
such investigations, lead to the constitution of a subject conscious of his or her psyche as 
the place from whence knowledge of the self might be garnered. The historical emergence 
of psychology as a human science can be linked to the second of the great events with cir-
24ibid., p. 197. My emphasis. 
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I 
cumscribe the history of insanity: the "freeing" of the mad from the great houses of con-
finement. 
The two men responsible for removing the mad from institutions of confinement, 
and who today are hailed as the forefathers of modern psychology, are Philippe Pineland 
Samuel Tuke. These men became famous because not only did they change the institu-
tional setting of modern mental therapeutics, but additionally they approached madness 
from a very different theoretical perspective: they engaged in a process of uncovering some 
"essential" level at which madness lurks, an internal cluster of relations from which mad-
ness springs forth. These historical developments within modern medicine of the mind can 
be defined by two central ideas: first, the move to interiorize the source of mental illness, 
rather than seeking physical disorders or moral lapses as causal factors; second, the discov-
ery of new techniques, these centred on medical principles, which sought to cure madness 
and to protect the "healthy" population from the "depraved". 
If we take the above to distinguish modern practices around mental health, then the 
insane subject within this epoch is caught up within relations of reverse domination, this 
' for the first time in the history of madness. Up until modernity, unreason was either an 
entity to be held in awe from afar, the link to another world, or a bestiality which was im-
possible to hold in check and which the sane had reason to fear. With modernity, how-
ever, both of these relations are reversed: madness is no longer seen as having a relation-
ship to reason, but rather as a pathological anomaly that must be addressed in its essential 
- . 
malady; second, modern reason applied itself to thi's illness with new methods of treatment 
which cured through emotional constraint and manipulation. On the work farms of Pinel 
and Tuke, regardless of the differences in their respective approaches to treatment, three el-
ements described a singular concern in their respective work: first, the insane patient was 
subjected to a rigorous work programme, in line with the moral and religious emphasis on 
· economic activity as central to a sane and healthy life; second, the patient was to be con-
stantly observed in his interactions with others; third, and perhaps most important, the 
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subject was to be held personally accountable for transgressions of the rules laid down at 
the respective asylums. Mental patients would equally have to accept responsibility for any 
punishment which ensued as a result of such deviations. 
Not only were the mad made responsible for their illness and the internalization of 
reasonable modes of conduct, but additionally for unlearning the vice of madness (moral ir-
rectitude ). This process was intrinsically caught up in the emphasis put on work and the 
Christian responsibility to partake in the welfare of one's environment. Observation be-
came a powerful tool of monitoring this situation, with the application of reason upon the 
actions of the insane, to monitor and check progress. Deviations from expectations were 
subject to punishment, with the subject responsible for the punishment, and the internaliza-
tion of guilt, which ensued. No longer is madness held in reverence, no longer is this an 
entity of fear or awe, but rather is subjected to the cruel reign of Reason, its mediator and 
fateful Judge in the modem process of normalization. 
This process of normalization centred on restructuring the internal space of the pa-
tient, in such as way that the individual came to be constituted as an insane subject through 
the medical discourse which concerned itself with his particular case, and which rendered 
the patient aware of such a definition. Responsibility for, and recognition of, the modem's 
constitution and definition as mad was closely linked to an interiorization of the anomalous 
condition which labeled the subject as having to necessarily undergo a process of rehabili-
tation. The process of assigning responsibility subjected the insane patient ontologically, 
and tied a particular form of consciousness to his or her condition: one of guilt through ac-
cepting responsibility for a discourse which constructed insanity in the first place. 
The insane patient is thus rendered as subject to this discourse; subjected under the 
power of its knowledge to judge, rectify, and manipulate Being. In this way, guilt is im-
posed on the subject from without: the asylum and the doctor are the vehicles in a process 
of subjection and the manipulation of consciousness. Rather than punishing the transgres-
sions of the madmen in his delirious frenzies, the asylum "organized that guilt...as a con-
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sciousness of himself, and as a non-reciprocal relation to the keeper."25 As the patient 
came to understand himself as insane, his consciousness as Other next to the man of reason 
was created in light of his acceptance of norms applicable to all reasonable men--as a mad-
man he had to relate and comply with these external limits, while still feeling alienated and 
constituted by the very act of this compliance. This was directly linke~ to the primary task 
of the asylums of both Pinel and Tuke, who assumed a pathology in the subjects before 
them, and engaged in a process of rectification, hereby modifying behaviour. This 
"process of rectification" was accorded a scientific status not because of its grounding in 
medical principles, but through a process of assimilation into a discourse that was rapidly 
emerging within the human sciences: that of psychology. The mad subject had arrived 
within the discourse of insanity, recorded through empirical observation, and prescribed 
with a particular series of treatments. Central to this project was a sense that there existed a 
"normal" type of nature or series of actions that was deemed to be moral, "right", and so-
cially acceptable, versus the anomalous behaviour displayed by the mad. 
Unreason, or insanity, is thus constituted as a medical condition, an entity Other 
than Reason, and the target of the latter towards ensuring normalcy. This has profound ef-
fects for the constitution of the subject of Unreason, and the consolidation of a newly-
emerging science of mental pathology. Madness and Civilization serves as an archaeology 
of the silence which pervades this relationship of Otherness as Reason has come to domi-
nate Unreason within modem epistemology. In this text, Foucault provides a history of 
psychology and the birth of insanity as a medical condition, showing an obvious distaste 
for the negative dialectic which exists between modern reason and insanity. It should be 
noted, however, that it will only be in his later works when these ideas reach clarity, and 
are incorporated within a theoretical paradigm that takes cognizance of knowledge struc-
tures which are constitutive of modern social practices. At this early stage, Foucault seems 
25ibid., p. 247. 
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more interested, or able, to write a history of a particular field of knowledge which we to-
day take for granted as self-evidently scientific and epistemologically unproblematic .. 
The "dividing practices" work on two levels then: first, as a social division between 
segments of the population, the mad and the sane; secondly, as an ontological division that 
is experienced within the human subject, between a group of behaviours that are considered 
~ 
normative, and types of behaviours deemed anomalous, and which necessarily require rec-
tifying or normalizing. Madness and Civilization is only an archaeology of a modem 
knowledge structure which is responsible for madness being defined as insanity from the 
late seventeenth century. It will be some time before Foucault begins exploring the rela-
tionship between these knowledge structures and social practices, this in his genealogical 
phase. I think it important to engage with some of the central methodological constructs 
found within Madness and Civilization, both as a book on its own, and with reference to 
later critiques which Foucault himself has brought to bear on this text. The investigation of 
both his methodological strengths and weaknesses will close this chapter, and serve two 
purposes: first, to provide a more thorough investigation into the method presented in 
Madness and Civilization and the ideas presented therein; second, to show these weak-
nesses for what they are, and to explain why Foucault found it important to address these 
and begin working on new theoretical models in his later work. 
ARCHAEOLOGY AS METHOD AND THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 
In the preface to Madness and Civilization, Foucault makes two seemingly trivial remarks 
which I believe to be crucial in understanding this text, and much of his later work. The 
first is his mentioning of "archaeology" as method; the second is his reference to the limit-
experience, discussed in the Introduction to Part I, and a central concern within Foucault's 
first book. I would like to deal with each of these ideas in tum, starting with his archaeo-
logical method. In Madness and Civilization, Foucault writes of his desire to present an 
exploration of madness as a pathological condition which has been created within the mod-
em context. He is not, however, interested in the language of the science of psychiatry, 
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but rather in the lacunae which envelopes madness with the advent of modernity and which 
works to oppressively stifle the latter from speaking: "I have not tried to write the history of 
that language, but rather the archaeology of that silence."26 This is perhaps the first time 
that Foucault ever uses the word "archaeology", and it would not be until the publishing in 
1969 of The Archaeology of Knowledge that this method was carefully explained. While 
The Archaeology of Knowledge is a complex and diffuse text, and it is difficult to find a 
single, all-encompassing passage in which Foucault clearly outlines his method, I believe 
the following passage serves our purpose here: 
"Archaeology defines the rules of formation of a group of 
statements. In this way it shows how a succession of events 
may, in the same order in which it is presented, become an 
object of discourse, be recorded, described, explained, elab-
orated into concepts, and provide the opportunity for a theo-
retical choice. Archaeology analyses the degree and form of 
permeability of a discourse: it provides the principle of its 
articulation over a chain of successive events; it defines the 
operators by which the events are transcribed into state-
ments. "27 
Of central importance here is the notion that archaeology works below the structure of 
texts. In opposition to hermeneutics, archaeology is concerned with the conditions of exis-
tence of particular statements, not with what is actually hidden in meaning. Where 
hermeneutical investigations within literature would principally seek to uncover a deep un-
derstanding which is caught below the characters of a text, archaeology does not concern 
itself with human intention and agency, but rather with objective rules of discursive forma-
tion which make truth statements possible. Foucault, in his early writings, is interested in 
understanding how particular things are said or written at a particular point in history. His 
thesis on discourse, in which he links knowledge to power (through his genealogies), is 
that thought is ~ontingent, based on the construction and rules of formation which govern 
an episteme at a particular point in history. 
26ibid., pp. x. 
27Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 167. My emphasis. 
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Archaeology as method is intrinsically linked to the notion of the limit, the bound-
aries or parameters placed arc:mnd thought, or from which thought operates. In The Order 
of Things, as we shall see, Foucault spends a great deal of time on this concept; for now let 
us investigate the way in which limits are placed on the relationship between Reason and 
Unreason, the way in which Madness became Insanity, with Reason the sole arbiter in this 
relationship, characterized as it is by domination and silence. It should be noted that the 
concept of limits is exactly the same as the concept operative in the paradigm of the dividing 
practices referred to in this chapter. The limits or boundaries that operate around knowl-
edge or discourse might easily be used to describe the parameters which limit social action. 
"The dividing practices" divides human beings from one another, both socially and episte-
mologically; further, this process divides individuals within themselves, ontologically. It 
should be remembered, however, that Madness and Civilization, as is true of all three texts 
which constitute Foucault's first period, is primarily concerned with the formation of par-
ticular modern knowledges which alter discursive systems and thus the ontological and so-
cial conditions within which the modern subject operates. He does not, however, explore 
the ways in which knowledge and social institutions intersect with one another. In the dis-
cussion ahead, I wish first to investigate Foucault's critique of his work in Madness and 
Civilization, and then go on to look at the theoretical constructs introduced in this book vis-
a-vis the limits of thought, or, alternatively, that which is considered truth within the mod-
em context. 
FOUCAULT'S CRITICISM OF MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION 
Foucault, when looking back on his first major work, saw significant structural and theo-
retical weaknesses with Madness and Civilization. When questioned in an interview on his 
posing of "power" as a conceptual tool, he answered: 
" .. .I'm struck by the difficulty I had in formulating it. When 
I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was 
talking about, in Madness and Civilization or The Birth of 
the Clinic, but power? Yet I'm perfectly aware that I 
56 
scarcely ever used the word and never had such a field of 
analyses at my disposal. "28 
I think that it is important not to look for allusions to "power" in this first book, or to off er 
Foucault the benefit of the doubt Regardless of whether his first three works were con-
ceived around concerns other than power, I believe we can begin to trace significant theo-
retical concerns that will provide a foundation for his later work. The reason that I call this 
first period his Knowledge period, is because I believe Foucault's first three books were 
primarily concerned with the relationship between the way in which Man was newly con-
ceived in modern discourse, and the creation of new histories, new medicines, and new 
forms of knowledge. This is a period in which Foucault problematized bodies and spaces, 
not with reference to a specific political project, but in relation to Man's conception of him-
self as a subject of psychology (homo psychologus), as a subject of medicine (homo medi-
cus ), and as a subject of knowledge itself. After Foucault had done an archaeology of the 
human sciences, he was then in an intellectual position to go beyond the creation of Truth, 
and look at the way in which truth circulates with power, and creates subjects. We will 
spend a considerable amount of time on these ideas in Chapter 3. 
Madness and Civilization is an important text for this thesis because in it Foucault 
introduces his concern with the way in which modern subjects are constituted, in this case 
within a discourse which emerges in the eighteenth century with the mind of Man as its 
central interest. Through this process, human subjects came to know themselves as either 
mad or sane, rational or irrational, and thereby, either acceptable to society or otherwise. 
This interplay between sanity and madness is the crude dualism which Foucault refers to in 
the following passage. He is answering a question related to what appears to be a descrip-
ti on of madness as repressed in Madness and Civilization, this compared to his subsequent 
28Foucault, 'Truth and Power," interview by Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino, in 
The Foucault Reader, p. 57. My emphasis. 
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thoughts when writing The History of Sexuality (Volume 1), where he outlined a very dif-
ferent process when describing his Repressive Hypothesis: 
" .. .I was thinking of a whole series of binary oppositions 
which had each in its own way fed on the great opposition · 
between reason and unreason that I had tried to re-constitute 
apropos of madness. But I don't think that will do ... The 
technology of madness changed from negative to positive, 
from being binary to being complex and multiform. There 
came into being a vast technology of the psyche, which be-
came a characteristic feature of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries."29 
We have begun to explore certain central ideas in Foucault's project around the subject: the 
formation of objectifying discourses, the "dividing practices"; power; and games of truth, 
the formation of "true" knowledges through the intersection of knowledge and power. At 
this stage, Foucault remains singularly concerned with knowledge, and with the way in 
which institutions of knowledge interact with human experience and consciousness. To 
continue with our study of knowledge structures, and Foucault's early archaeologies into 
modern discursive formations, let us tum our attention to The Birth of the Clinic. This is 
an important text for our purposes because in it Foucault offers a more extensive definition 
of archaeology, and begins to bridge the gap between the formation of knowledge struc-
tures and the influence of knowledge in determining institutional and social practices. 
29Foucault, 'The History of Sexuality," interview by Lucette Finas, in Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1977-1984, p. 185. 
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Chapter Two: 
THE SUBJECT OF DEATH 
No doubt there is no society which does not practice some 
kind of 'noso-politics': the eighteenth century didn't invent 
this.I But it prescribed new rules, and above all transposed 
the practice onto an explicit, concerted level of analysis such 
as had been previously unknown. At this point the age is 
entered not so much of social medicine as of a considered 
noso-politics ... The hospital, a therapeutic instrument for the 
patients who occupy it, contributes at the same time, through 
its clinical teaching and the quality of the medical knowledge 
acquired there, to the improvement of the population's health 
asa whole. 
Michel Foucault, "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century" 
In The Birth of the Clinic (1963), Foucault begins to bridge the gap between his work on 
the historical constitution of the insane subject, introduced in Madness and Civilization, and 
what will later be introduced in his Power phase, with investigations into the ways in 
which knowledge is distributed through social space. What is of great importance to 
Foucault in The Birth of the Clinic is to show how knowledge (in this case of the ill body) 
intersects with practices which are political in nature and which work to define modern 
lwebster describes nosology as "A systematic classification or description of diseases; the 
branch of medical science concerned with the classification of diseases." (The Living 
Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, 1981 ed., s.v. "nosology~") 
Foucault relates this medical and scientific practice to the ordering and classification of 
society in medical terms. "Noso-politics" is a Foucauldian construct which describes the 
concern of modem medicine and governments with the health of the nation, as well as the 
individual. 
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subjects as either well or sick, normal or pathological. This book is thus an investigation 
into the birth of the modern subject of medicine, not only as an individual patient, but as a 
member of a population whose existence as part of a demographic mass has political and 
economic ramifications. On the one hand, Foucault will investigate a new medical percep-
tion of the individual in modernity; on the other, and more importantly for the purpose of 
this dissertation, Foucault will show in this book how a new politics of the body and its 
health ("noso-politics," or what he will later call "bio-politics") has come to create a subject 
of medicine, who holds the capacity to carry sickness that not only affects himself, but the 
group which surrounds him, and ultimately the state. 
Two theoretical concepts are most important in The Birth of the Clinic: first, the no-
tion of the gaze, a technique used for investigating at the body which Foucault describes as 
fundamentally different in modernity; second, Foucault's ability to link discursive forma-
tions more closely with social institutions than he had done in his previous book. Linked 
to this second point, in The Birth of the Clinic Foucault begins to show how the modern 
subject of medicine came to be constituted through complex relations between discourse 
and social practices, and within particular "technologies" imposed upon the self. On the 
one hand Foucault continues his investigations into formations of knowledge as was the 
central focus of Madness and Civilization; on the other, and a significant theoretical ad-
vancement on Foucault's part, we are introduced to the overlap between this knowledge 
and social practices and institutions. In the interaction which transpires between knowl-
edge formations and social practice, the human being is constituted as a subject, with a par-
ticular consciousness of himself as an entity discernible within medical knowledge. As 
with Madness and Civilization, we can situate this book within a continuum of thought in 
works which have as their central focus the relationship between knowledge and subjectiv-
ity. It should be stressed, however, that while Foucault does begin to link discourse and 
society more closely from The Birth of the Clinic, he has not yet conceived of his later 
definition of power which is necessary to comprehensively do so. 
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According to Foucault, the invention of the modern clinic, as a space created for the 
practice of a modern form of investigative medicine, represents a fundamental shift from a 
medicine of purely empirical observation, to a science of medicine based on nosological 
analysis, a modern chart of pathological symptoms and signs: medicine and its problem 
was not altered, but the method of accumulating knowledge changed dramatically.2 What 
emerged with modernity was a new interpretation of old presumptions in relation to the 
body, a new understanding of the organs and the way in which they interact. Within the 
confines of the clinic, knowledge of the human body was compiled through various medi-
cal processes and bound within a positive discourse which sought to explain the body in its 
universality. This process Foucault calls the "positive accumulation" of knowledge:3 
"it was this constant gaze upon the patient, this age-old, yet 
ever renewed attention that enabled medicine not to disappear 
entirely with each new speculation, but to preserve itself, to 
assume little by little the figure of a truth that is definitive, if 
not completed, in short, to develop, between the revel of the 
noisy episodes of its history, in a continuous historicity."4 
A new method which developed a new knowledge. Between these two newly created enti-
ties, The Birth of the Clinic seeks to understand the creation of a new Man: Man aware of 
himself within medical discourse as a medicalized object. This entity emerged in modernity 
as an object of medical knowledge, and yet inextricably caught up in various knowledge 
and power relations which defined him as a medical subject. 
The Birth of the Clinic is not so much concerned with the practice of medicine it-
self, as with the conditions necessary for establishing a new foundation for the thought and 
practice of a distinctly modern medicine. Foucault is primarily interested in the effects of a 
specifically modern medical knowledge that concerns itself with understanding the internal 
workings of the human body. The Birth of the Clinic is an important text in Foucault's 
2Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, p. xii. 
3jbid., p. 54. 
4jbid., pp. 54-55. 
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work on subjectivity; it should be noted, however, that this chapter will seek to ask 
more questions than might be answered, seeking to elucidate a theoretical trajectory 
which is introduced in this Knowledge phase, but which will only be theoretically 
matured in Foucault's second period. The central concern which he poses in this text, 
and which I believe is important for us . to investigate in this chapter, is the 
epistemological inventions that were necessary to permit a new form of thinking around 
the human body and disease. 
In addition to epistemological concerns around the constitution of modem 
medical knowledge, Foucault addressed himself, in philosophic terms, to ways in 
which this new understanding of pathology and immunology linked up with Man's 
consciousness of himself as a finite being, and yet a being capable of projecting a 
universal positivity in relation to his existence as an object of knowledge. In short, 
Foucault is interested in this text in investigating the way in which a purely medical 
investigation of the body affected modem philosophic concerns connected with the 
human body and its consciousness. Coupled to the epistemological concerns 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, Foucault is equally interested in how a modem 
epistemological foundation for medicine set the parameters for a distinctly modern 
thought process around the ontological existence of man, and allowed for new 
definitions of his sense of identity and experiential potential. In The Binh of the Clinic, 
Foucault expressed a desire to explain the formation of the epistemological and on-
tological parameters within which a truth of the pe~ect modem man might be defined; 
secondly, he wished to explore what mechanisms allow for a comparison of this being 
with his pathological double. 
How might Foucault link a modern episteme to illness, illness to death, and 
death to a newly-conceived ontological understanding of Man? To begin answering 
these questions, he writes that his book is 
"an attempt to apply a method in the confused, under-struc-
tured, and ill-structured domain of the history of ideas. Its 
historical support is limited since it deals, on the whole, with 
the development and methods of medical observation over 
less than half a century. Yet it concerns one of those periods 
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that mark an ineradicable chronological threshold: the period 
in which illness, counter-nature, death, in short, the whole 
dark underside of disease came to light, at the same time il-
luminating and eliminating itself like night, in the deep, vis-
ible, solid, enclosed, but accessible space of the human 
body."5 
Central to The Birth of the Clinic is Foucault's wish to explain the relationship between the 
uncovering of "depth" within the body and disease, and the relationship between death and 
a discovery of a human consciousness within the body. In opening up corpses, Man sud-
denly gained access to knowledge about the essence of disease, and the new-found ability 
to describe this positively, with scientific certainty; simultaneously, this medical exploration 
opened up the possibility for Man finding a hermeneutical space within himself that could 
be used to define his Being. Within the body, Man discovered his nature, both epistemo-
logically (in medicine), and ontologically (in philosophy). 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE MEDICAL PATIENT 
The Birth of the Clinic opens with the description of medical procedures undertaken by two 
doctors, one in the eighteenth century, and one in the nineteenth century. They are held 
apart by a mere century, and yet are distinguished by a methodological difference which is, 
for Foucault, "both tiny and totaI."6 ''Total" describes the level at which these two investi-
gations are posed: both in terms of the theoretical depth of the investigation at hand, and in 
terms of the level, or depth, within the human corpse at which the investigation was di-
rected and which facilitated the accumulation of medical knowledge. Between Pomme and 
Bayle, separated by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a fundamental schism in the 
level of medical perception occurred: "For us, it is total [the difference between the descrip-
tions given], because each of Bayle's words, with its qualitative precision, directs our gaze 
into a world of constant visibility, while Pomme (a pre-modem doctor), lacking any per-
5ibid., p. 195. 
6-b·d I I ., p. X. 
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ceptual base, speaks to us in the language of fantasy."7 In other words, with this particu-
lar example, Foucault wished to illustrate the enormous difference in medical perception 
that existed between a mere century. As medicine entered modernity, it fundamentally al-
tered its perceptual and conceptual tools, and hereby redefined itself almosnotally. -
Foucault's concern, however, was hardly with the world of Pomme, and scarcely 
with that of Bayle's either; instead, what he sought to understand were the practices which 
enabled the modem doctor to render a positive medical knowledge of the human subject, 
and the space within which this entity was subsequently forced to negotiate within. In The 
Binh of the Clinic, he is interested in the fundamental schism in thought and practice that 
occurred at the end of the eighteenth century to bring the medicine practiced for thousands 
of years into the domain of uncertainty, and, in negating and rejecting this pre-modern 
medical discourse, ushered in a modem medicine, resplendent in its clarity and precision. 
Two things are most important to note here: first, we need to investigate Foucault's 
description of the relationship between the body of the doctor and that of the patient; sec-
ond, we need to understand Foucault's description of a new methodological tool (the 
"gaze"), which was fundamental in determining this relationship between doctor and pa-
tient This modem doctor-patient relationship Foucault describes as 
"caught up in an ever-greater proximity, bound together, the 
doctor by an ever-more attentive, more insistent, more pene-
trating gaze, the patient by all the silent, irreplaceable quali-
ties that, in him, betray--that is, reveal and conceal--the 
clearly ordered forms of the disease."8 
The modem relationship between the doctor and patient is entirely different to that of the 
pre-modem, both in terms of how these two individuals relate to one another, and in terms 
of the way in which the patient and his or her ills are situated within pathology. The mod-
em doctor acts as a mediator between the object of knowledge (the subject objectified), and 
7ibid. 
8ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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the discourse against which information rendered in this modern doctor-patent relationship 
will be compared and analysed. The practice in itself was not something new; what did 
change with modernity, however, 
"was the very grid according to which this experience was 
given, was articulated into analysable elements, and found a 
discursive formulation. Not only the names of diseases, not 
only the grouping of systems were not the same; but the 
fundamental perceptual codes that were applied to patients' 
bodies, the field of objects to which observation addressed 
itself, the surfaces and depths traversed by the doctor's gaze, 
the whole system of orientation of this gaze also varied." 9 
Foucault writes that an explosion occurs within medical discourse in the early nineteenth 
century with the application of old, perhaps even ancient, techniques on the human body. 
However, the application of such techniques were conceived in an entirely new way with 
modernity, as was the way in which illness was defined and placed within medical episte-
mology. Through this process, medicine and its understanding of the body was altered, as 
well as the ontological conditions which these modern discoveries thrust upon the human 
subject. As a result of modem medicine, Man became aware of himself both as a subject of 
medical discourse and knowledge, and as objectively defined within scientific discourse 
which gave itself the central task of explaining and conceptualizing the human condition; 
within knowledge and discourse, an awareness of Man's consciousness was born; he thus 
emerged as an ontologically definable being, with a particular conception of himself in 
medical and ontological terms. 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF MODERN MEDICINE AS A SCIENCE 
Through the new technique of gazing within the body instead of merely at. it, modern medi-
cal discourse aspired to being accepted as a science. The clinic set itself the task of absorb-
ing knowledge of the human body and its ills; as a result, Foucault writes that this structure 
9ibid., p. 54. My emphasis. 
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"was thought to be the element of [modern medicine's] posi-
tive accumulation: it was this constant gaze upon the patient, 
this age-old, yet ever renewed attention that enabled 
medicine not to disappear entirely with each new specula-
tion, but to preserve itself, to assume little by little the figure 
of a truth that is definitive, if not completed, in short, to de-
velop, between the revel of the noisy episodes of its history, 
in a continuous historicity." 1 O 
The clinic served as the locus for the development of a science of the body and its function-
ing, a site of knowledge creation, historical in nature, and, by virtue of this fact, contingent 
in form. According to Foucault, the establishment of the clinic as the site for modern medi-
cal practice was a profound event that, coupled with the epistemological developments 
within medicine, would change the profession forever: medicine became institutionalized, 
vested in the brick of hospitals and the body of the Doctor. This event heralded the dawn 
of the expert, a time when parochial medicine lost its legitimacy, (in fact was outlawed 
from practice), and institutions like the clinic and the hospital were vested with the respon-
sibility of administering health. No longer would men have direct, personal relationships 
with their bodies, bodies they understood subjectively; no longer would they have access to 
local medicines and remain responsible for their everyday health: these tasks were dis-
charged elsewhere, along with the accumulation of a corpus of knowledge which redefined 
the body and its cure within the sciences of immunology and pathology. Away from the 
common man, medicine as a positive science was being invented, thus wrestling control 
that people had over their bodies and ailments away from them. The ontological con-
sciousness people had of their bodies was to radically change once silence and profes-
sionalism enveloped the medical practice, when 
"writing and secrecy were introduced, that is, the concentra-
tion of this knowledge in a privileged group, and the disso-
ciation of the immediate relationship, which had neither ob-
stacle nor limits between Gaze and Speech ... what was 
1 Oibid., pp. 54-5. 
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known was no longer communicated to others and put to 
practical use ... "11 
According to Foucault, the clinic and its personnel played important roles in the lives of pa-
tients. The nineteenth century doctor within a recognized medical institution like the clinic 
attained a two-fold status: as a medical doctor, responsible for objective research; and asa 
philosopher, responsible for the daily needs and spiritual and otherwise ills of his brethren. 
This doctor as "paternal authority" served the individual or subjective needs of his patients 
who would tum to him for advice and counseling.12 In this way, not only did the modem 
doctor play a purely medical role, but he was expected to intervene in the spiritual and emo-
tional lives of his patients, to manipulate minds, as well as bodies; he practiced within a 
medical discourse which encouraged the doctor to 
"make [himself] master of [his] patients and their affections; 
assuage their pains; calm their anxieties; anticipate their 
needs; bear with their whims; make the most of their charac-
ters and command their will, not as a cruel tyrant reigns over 
his slaves, but as a kind father who watches over the destiny 
of his children ... so many forms in which the sovereignty of 
the gaze gradually establishes itself--the eye that knows and 
decides, the eye that govems."13 
It is this process of governance that is of most interest to us as far as The Binh of the Clinic 
is concerned. Foucault shows that the establishment of modem -medicine had a much 
greater task than establishing a positive method and a universal body of knowledge around 
the individual human body. The chief concern of medical practitioners, and, as Foucault 
I 
lucidly reveals, political and economic figures, was the eradication of social ill-health and 
the administration of populations in doing this. This process had a positive mandate, per-
haps even more important than that of prevention; modem medicine became intrinsically 
interested in the medical condition of Man, both as an individual subject and as an objective 
llibid., p. 55. My emphasis. 
12ibid., p. 89. 
13ibid., pp. 88. My emphasis. 
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population mass, projected in terms of its capacity for work, and the need to ensure maxi-
mum economic utility. Modem medicine, and the medical knowledge of the state, serves a 
political function: 
"no longer ... [solely] confined to a body of techniques for 
curing ills and of the knowledge that they require; it will also 
embrace a knowledge of healthy man, that is, a study of 
non-sick man and a definition of the model man. In the or-
dering of human existence it assumes a normative posture, 
which authorizes it not only to distribute advice as to healthy 
life, but also to dictate the standards for physical and moral 
relations of the individual and the society in which he 
lives ... medicine will be what it must be, the knowledge of 
natural and social man ... "14 
Modem medicine, concerned as it is with populations and their health, becomes caught up 
in relations with the state, and its various political and economic responsibilities. 
THE POLITICAL UTILITY OF MODERN MEDICINE 
In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault describes the medical gaze as having dual concern: 
first, with individual and ill bodies, caught up within the social spaces of the family and the 
clinic; second, with the social body at large--the body of the population--within institutional 
spaces: families, communities, hospitals, and schools. In short, medicine, as it emerged in 
the nineteenth century, began its work with consolidating a epistemological foundation for 
medical practice within the institution of the newly-conceived clinic, and then extended its 
interest in individual health to that of the population. Foucault writes that modem medicine 
has an interest in more that just individual health; it' is "linked to the destiny of states": mod-
em medicine thus takes on a profoundly political function.15 In concerning itself with the 
health of populations, the task of modem medicine is to allow for the 
"formation of an accurate, exhaustive, permanent corpus of 
knowledge about the health of a population ... a spontaneous 
and deeply rooted convergence between the requirements of 
14ibid., pp. 34-35. My emphasis. 
l5"b"d 3 I I ., p. 4. 
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political ideology and those of medical technology. In a 
concerted effort, doctors and statesmen demand, in a differ-
ent vocabulary but for essentially identical reasons, the sup-
pression of every obstacle to the constitution of this new 
space: the hospitals, which alter the special laws governing 
disease and which disturb those no less rigorous laws that 
define the relations between property and wealth, poverty 
and work .. .''16 
This passage heralds Foucault's work in his Power period around the concept of a new 
type of politics conducted in the modem age: bio-politics, the concern with the health, wel-
fare, utility and docility of populations. It is here that we find the heart of his political in-
quiry, his critique of modernity at its most radical and revealing. 
The Birth of the Clinic is fundamental reading in Foucault's first period because it 
begins to investigate the overlap between discursive formations and social practices. In this 
book he shows how knowledge of the human body gathered within the 9linic, a newly-de-
fined social space for the accumulation of medical knowledge, is linked to the innately 
political concerns of social ill-health and disease encapsulated within the art of government; 
here Foucault outlines the modern state's concern with a populat.ion that functions at the 
peak of its potential and yet places minimum demands upon the state itself. Centrally, 
Foucault's work is interested in the ontological consequences of new bodies of knowledge 
which were conceived with the advent of modernity, in this case related to sickness and 
health. At the core of his work, Foucault is interested in investigating the" games of truth", 
as he calls them, that forces a human being to identify him- or herself with a particular 
persona, as sane or insane, or as a subject or object of medical discourse. 
Besides the notion of bio-power which is tentatively introduced in this text, 
Foucault begins to elaborate on what he will later call the process of normalization, a mea-
sure against which behaviour can be registered and compared, a sort of human average 
which is established after extensive investigations into the bodie·s and minds of individuals. 
Through this process, knowledge is collected and collated in order to produce an "ideal 
16jbid., pp. 38-39. 
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condition": the norm. This is connected with Foucault's primary concerns in the next book 
for investigation in this dissertation: The Order of Things. Centrally, the modern human 
sciences seek to explain Man in his Truth and produce an epistemology of Man with which 
to explain and identify hini. A normative position, or a norm, is thus created in the space 
between a pure science of Man (such as physiology), and a "science" which seeks to un-
derstand human consciousness (such as psychology). 
In The Order of Things, Foucault will investigate the growth of the human sciences 
from the eighteenth century, and provide a theoretical base from which this body of knowl-
edge can now be problernatized. From the subject of insanity, to the subject of pathology, 
let us now concern ourselves with the subject of knowledge. In the following chapter, we 
will explore Foucault's description of the "birth of Man", how this entity came to be prob-
lematised and portrayed in modem discourse, and which fundamentally altered Man's rela-
tionship with himself as an object of knowledge. These are the central questions which 
concern The Order a/Things, Foucault's third and perhaps most singularly brilliant work, 
the subject of the following chapter. 
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Chapter Three: 
THE BIRTH OF MAN 
It is comforting ... and a source of profound relief to think 
that man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two cen-
turies old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will 
disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a 
new form. 
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things 
In the preceding chapters of this dissertation, we have explored Foucault's archaeologies of 
illness and insanity within modernity, and the way in which these anomalies of the human 
body and mind have been investigated within specifically defined institutions of learning 
and inquiry: the medical clinic and the mental asylum. In Chapter Three of this disserta-
tion, we will critically examine The Order of Things (1966), perhaps Foucault's most 
important text in relation to his work on the human subject. A primary task of this chapter 
will be uncovering Foucault's description of the knowledge systems which had as their 
central focus the human condition, the essential qualities and traits which, with modernity, 
have come to characterize Man as an epistemologically discernible entity. In addition, we 
wish to understand how it is that Fouc.ault makes the assertions he does in the quote which 
heads this chapter. If Man is an "invention" and might be "replaced" by other forms of 
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knowledge with different concerns, then how is it that this process might come about? If 
we seek to encourage knowledge finding a "new form", which would thus cause Man to 
"disappear", then how is this process achieved? 
The purpose of this chapter is thus two-fold: first to inquire into the modern theoret-
ical and philosophical understanding of Man, which Foucault provides in The Order of 
Things; and second, to investigate the possibility of Man's epistemological demise, the way 
in which Foucault describes how Man might cease to exist within knowledge structures, as 
least in his present form. Understood in light of these questions which I will pose to The 
Order of Things, it is easy to understand why this book occupies a central position for this 
dissertation. In it, Foucault writes an archaeology of the constitution of the human subject 
within discourse, (the birth of Man), and perhaps most importantly, suggests that this sub-
ject might disappear from history. In addition to the two broad areas outlined above (the 
constitution of the subject and the prospect of his demise), I wish to outline three central 
questions which will provide us with a philosophical and ontological understanding of the 
modern subject, and a working foundation from which to derive Foucault's central political 
concerns in his later works. Ultimately, I seek to provide a detailed account of Foucault's 
description of the modern subject, and the reasons he gives for this entity existing within an 
epistemological and ontological space which is open to significant change. Once we have a 
clear definition of the Foucauldian subject, and the possibilities of its demise, we will be in 
a good position to draw out the political implications of such a theoretical stance, which is 
the central task of this dissertation. 
In The Order of Things, Foucault is primarily concerned with an archaeology of the 
human sciences, the bodies of knowledge which appear self-evident within our conceptual 
frameworks and are thus accepted as valid sciences. He differentiates between two differ-/ 
ent types of "sciences": on the one hand, what we might generally refer to as "pure" sci-
ences (physics, mathematics, etc.), thos~ bodies of scientific knowledge which Foucault 
refers to as "noble sciences, rigorous sciences, sciences of the necessary, all close to phi-
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losophy." 1 He does not have a problem with these because each has a tradition based on 
the research into, and the analysis of, concrete "laws of nature" which have lead to "the al-
most uninterrupted emergence of truth and pure reason."2 These are sciences of discovery 
and of certainty, vested with sound methods and postulates upon which an understanding 
of the natural world is built. 
On the other hand, Foucault notes the emergence, with modernity, of a second 
body of knowledge, which also aspires to scientific status, but with which he does have a 
fundamental problem. These disciplines, concerned as they are with Man and his nature, 
are generally considered to rest on shaky methodological and philosophic ground, "too 
tinged with empirical thought, too exposed to the vagaries of chance or imagery, to age-old 
traditions and external events, for it to be supposed that their history could be anything 
other than irregular."3 Foucault offers these words as a rhetorical instrument rather than 
with serious application, as he attempts to set up his primary concern with this group of 
knowledge, the human sciences. He wishes to show that, while we generally take for 
granted that the human sciences are ungrounded in scientific certainty and truth, the models 
and theories of Man and his "nature" have acquired such a scientific status and, as a result 
of this, have had a profound effect on the modem individual. Foucault thus wishes to pose 
the question "What if, in fact, these groups of discursive formations did obey particular 
rules and regulatory principles which allowed them to forward a particular knowledge 
within history?" He asks: "[W]hat if empirical knowledge, at a given time and in a given 
culture, did possess a well-defined regularity?"4 
The Order of Things is thus a book written to investigate not so much the forms of 
knowledge which made up the human sciences from the emergence of modernity, but 
rather the internal rules which governed this body of knowledge and which at least gave 





them the semblence of being sciences. Rather than concerning himself with the human sci-
ences in terms of the content of their investigations and subsequent treatises on Man, 
I 
Foucault inquired into the rules which governed the emergence of the human sciences and 
their formation as bodies of knowledge with a particular and historically unique object in 
terms of their research. In addition, and equally important, Foucault sought to understand 
the result of such knowledge; how these knowledge structures, with Man as their object, 
produced a particular conception of his nature and consciousness. 
In The Order of Things, Foucault's "initial hypothesis" is that "the history of non- ~ 
formal knowledge had itself a system," in other words, a system particularly relevant to it-
self and which can be traced historically.5 Important to note is that The Order of Things 
concerns itself with uncovering the way in which epistemological systems, or structures, 
(which have as their specific concern knowledge of human being and the various ways and 
forms in which this entity exists), change over a period of time, as rules are reinvented, 
truths newly recovered, or old truths scrapped altogether. This book has as its central con-
cem a description of changes in knowledge structures from the Renaissance through the 
Classical period and into Modernity. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, it 
should be stressed that we are not so much concerned with the changes in pre-modem 
knowledge systems, or how this process came to be. Instead, we will look solely at 
Foucault's description of modern knowledge of the human being, and the resultant consti-
tution of Man in a process which he specifically links to modernity. 
In the way that Foucault introduces his two central premises in the Preface to The 
Order of Things, (first, that knowledge might have a particular structure and configuration 
at a particular time in history, and second, that this formation might in fact change over time 
and through history), a number of difficult questions emerge. First, if Foucault concerns 
himself with ruptures in thought, the historical breaks and caesuras that he believes have 
occurred since the sixteenth century, how does he explain such an unconventional hypoth-
5·b"d I I ., p. X. 
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es1s. Second, how does he explain Man being able to move beyond the epistemological 
constraints which place him firmly as the centre of knowledge? A third important question 
relates to the effects of any move to destroy our present epistemological framework and 
replace it with some other form of knowledge which is no longer anthropocentric. 
Foucault anticipates these very questions, and he begins The Order a/Things by ~mtlining 
three problems related to an archaeology of modern Man: first, that of causality; second, 
that of change; and third, the problem of the subject, the area of most interest to this disser-
tation. I wish to look at each of these in turn, and relate them to the work under way here. 
THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY 
·"'" Causality, understood in this context as the factors responsible for ch~ itf or the cre-
ation of, a particular phenomenon, is an extremely complex question to work on, and 
Foucault himself admits he has little to help matters. In fact, he admits to "embarrassment" 
in attempting to provide a guideline for his readers around the question of causality, or 
when attempting to investigate causal factors which influence any of the sciences; 
"embarrassment," however, 
"probably reaches its highest point in the case of the empiri-
cal sciences: for the role of instruments, techniques, institu-
tions, events, ideologies, and interests is very much in evi-
dence; but one does not know how an articulation so com-
plex and so diverse in composition actually operates. It 
seemed to me that it would not be prudent for a moment to 
force a solution I felt incapable, I admit, of offering ... "6 
While Foucault does admit to being "incapable" of providing us with a causal history of the 
human sciences, he does, however, off er a method of exploring the forms of knowledge 
which affect modem Being, rather than exact answers to the origin and causation of these 
discursive formations. Thus, in The Order of Things, Foucault's task is to uncover the 
history of epistemological change. While he does not off er an immediate understanding~ 
6ibid., p. xiii. My emphasis. 
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what brings about change in thought, I believe these ideas became clearer to him later in his 
life. However, I simultaneously don't believe it is ever extremely important for Foucault to 
provide an explanation for the historical events or factors which one could point to as re-
sponsible for, or constitutive of, the human sciences. More important is whether or not 
Foucault can provide a coherent theoretical model to explain how such change might come 
about, evidence to back up his hypothesis that change itself is possible, particularly in rela-
ti on to knowledge of the modem subject. 
THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE 
The second question which Foucault raises in the introduction to The Order a/Things, is 
that of the human capacity for action and revolt. This is a particularly important question, 
because it relates centrally to the possibility for, and efficacy of, any political project which 
I claim in this dissertation is contained within Foucault's work. The need to answer this 
question is made more acute because Foucault describes knowledge structures (and thus 
social structures which form as a result of discursive formations) to be determined outside 
of the agency and will of man.7 Foucault takes cognizance of the arguments levelled at his 
work, however, and defends himself in the following manner: 
"It has been said that this work denies the very possibility of 
change. Any yet my main concern has been with changes. 
In fact, two things in particular struck me: the suddenness 
and thoroughness with which certain sciences were some-
times reorganized; and the fact that at the same time similar 
changes occurred in apparently very different disciplines.''8 
In this passage, Foucault defends his position in relation to the way in which he describes 
modern knowledge, and makes reference to the hypothesis which will emerge in The Order 
of Things, and will be strengthened in his later work: the ability for thought to reflect on it-
self and emerge with new propositions on the way that truth and knowledge are defined. 
7This problem of the relation between knowledge and Foucauldian power will be raised in 
Part II as central to the discussion there. 
8The Order of Things, p. xii. 
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Thus knowledge might reflect on itself and reject itself at a particular point in history, 
hereby fundamentally reshuffling or overturning what was previously presumed to be 
"truthful". Thought might emerge as having the .ability to critique this enunciative epistemic 
substructure, and ultimately reverse what hitherto had been defined as a truth statement. 
With the questions of political change and human agency in mind, problems which ulti-
mately concern themselv~s with the existence of human autonomy and freedom, we will 
explore ways in which this paradigm lies at the ce
7
ntre of Foucault's political project. 
THE PROBLEM OF THE SUBJECT 
The third problem Foucault raises in the Preface to The Order of Things, and the one of 
most interest to this dissertation, is that of the human subject. He takes pains to outline his 
understanding of this construct, this for the first time in his oeuvre, and an important mo-
ment. I would like to break Foucault's concerns around the subject into three separate 
parts: first, the link between the subject, history, and science, and the episteme which 
Foucault describes as constitutive of these three notions; second, the effect of this episte-
mological structure on the subject; third, how knowledge is constitutive of forms of human 
consciousness. These three levels operate at an increasingly more complex theoretical 
level, and in an increasingly unconventional way, and I have distinguished between them to 
show how Foucault ties the formation of the subject and his consciousness to particular 
knowledge formations. 
For Foucault the problem of the subject is related to the formation of the human sci-
ences as a particular set of discursive formations which have as their central concern the 
human being, and whose growth can be plotted in the history of ideas. In addition, these 
discourses of Man can be linked to the formation of particular bodies of knowledge which 
are socially and epistemologically accepted as sciences. Foucault seeks to problematize this 
relationship between knowledge, history, and the constitution of modern Man as a scientif-
ically discernible entity. In 9ther words, Foucault is interested in problematizing the com-




knowledge, instead linking the causal factors of this paradigm to a far more complex theory 
of knowledge involving the epistemic foundation upon which this knowledge rests. 
Episteme is the word Foucault uses to describe particular rules, enunciative and 
functional9 in nature, which exist below systems of thought and bodies of knowledge, and 
which are responsible for the form which knowledge in a particular epoch adopts. These 
are what Foucault will refer to as "systems of regularities" in the quote below, as he prob-
lematizes the role of the human being as scientist, and as the central agent in the discovery 
of particular forms of knowledge. He writes: 
"I do not wish to deny the validity of inteilectual biogra-
phies, or the possibility of a history of theories, concepts, or 
themes. It is simply that I wonder whether such descriptions 
are themselves enough, whether they do justice to the im-
mense density of scientific discourse, whether there do not 
exist, outside their customary boundaries, systems of regu-
larities that have a decisive role in the history of the sci-
ences." 10 
Foucault thus calls into question the degree to which a "history of theories, concepts, or 
themes" might be understood as existing within an autonomous space, or an area of knowl-
edge which might be conceived as existing independently of prior constructions or concep-
tions of truth, and as the result of particular work on the part of scientists, who are socially 
accepted as discovering truth about the world. This is not a particularly unconventional 
concept, even though it is unique within Foucault's work. He explores knowledge forma-
tions which acquire the status of "sciences", "not from the point of view of the individuals 
who are speaking, nor from the point of view of the formal structures of what they are 
saying, but from the point of view of the rules that come into play in the very existence of 
9cf. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Part III. The words "enunciative" and 
"functional" refer to the properties which Foucault gives to the various operational 
statements that exist below modem knowledge structures, and which determine the form 
which the latter takes; in other words, Foucault links the creation of truth not to Man as the 
central perceptive being in the universe, or to Man as the central agent in uncovering 
objective truth, but to the ruling statements of a particular epistemic era which determine the 
form which knowledge will take. 
1 Oibid. pp. xiii-xiv. 
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such discourse ... " 11 Foucault thus seeks to understand the "archaeological" structure of 
discourse which, by its very nature and construction, will determine the form and shape of 
knowledge which such a discourse enunciates as truth. Archaeology as method thus works 
below the surf ace of texts to understand the creative and historically constituted and thus 
vulnerable rules which determine a particular knowledge at a particular time in history. 
In the second part of his problematization of the human subject, Foucault focuses 
on the role of the human being as scientist, usually regarded as performing normative func-
tions within a laboratory or some other controlled environment, and who is thereby capable 
of establishing accurate and universal laws regarding the nature of things. Foucault rejects 
this, at least as far as the human sciences are concerned, and problematizes the usually ac-
cepted notion of the scientist as objective. Further, he questions the degree to which a sci-
entist is even capable of engaging in practical and meaningful work which is ground-
breaking in some sense. Foucault, in problematizing the very notion of science itself, ex-
presses a desire "to know whether the subjects responsible for scientific discourse are not 
determined in their situation, their function, their perceptive capacity, and in their practical 
possibilities by conditions that dominate and even overwhelm them."1 2 In this, Foucault 
not only questions the status of knowledge and its legitimacy, but also calls into question 
the role of the scientist creative of, or responsible for, such work. Here we begin to see the 
most important contribution of Foucault to modern philosophy, and the essence of which 
this chapter seeks to address: the intersection of discourse or knowledge on the process of 
subjectivity or identity-building, and the way in which Foucault describes subjectivity and 
identity being comtructed and existing as contingent within history. 
Foucault rejects what he writes might "broadly" be referred to as "the phenomeno-
logical approach," or any philosophy which places Man as the privileged centre of reason 
and agency in the realm of knowledge creation. This rejection of the proactive role of the 
1 libid., p. xiv. 
12ibid. 
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subject in the formation of knowledge, and the de facto reversal of this relationship by 
Foucault, is his third and most unconventional and controversial position. Foucault rejects 
the subject as the centre of knowledge systems, or any philosophy "which gives absolute 
priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, which places 
its own point of view at the origin of all historicity--which, in short, leads to a transcenden-
tal consciousness."13 It emerges that the subject for Foucault is very clearly not only not 
the agent within the history of ideas, but further, is in fact the result of such knowledge. 
Foucault thus rejects the scientist and his knowledge as independently existing entities, but 
rather understands both these entities as being determined in their very existence by under-
1 ying epistemic configurations, an archaeological foundation which structures knowledge in 
a particular way. 
Discourse is not the result of objective investigations on the part of human agents, 
but rather of the formative bodies within which this latter entity is in fact subjectified. It is 
this historic emergence of a set of discursive practices producing knowledges of human 
subjectivity which Foucault describes as the creation of "Man". Man is not only the result 
of knowledge, but oppressed by it; Man is not only not the agent responsible for the pro-
cess of knowledge formation, but is paradoxically at a certain point "excluded" from the 
formation of his very own consciousness, something we will discuss in greater detail be-
low. What should be stressed at this point, however, is that this third way in which 
Foucault problematizes the subject in relation to knowledge connects his interest in the 
constitution of the human subject, with the questions of change and human agency. If it is 
true that the subject is the result and not the causal agent in the construction of knowledge 
systems and his own consciousness, then how might this first be explained; and second, 
how might such an limiting or oppressive system be overcome? These will be the most 
challenging question's that Foucault's work and this dissertation will be forced to answer in 
order to affirm the political project inherent in his oeuvre. 
13jbid. My emphasis. 
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Foucault's three central problems at this stage of The Order of Things serve only as 
an introduction to the major themes in this dissertation. What is important for our purposes 
is to understand Foucault's conception of the subject: an entity enmeshed in discursive 
formations both as objective practitioner in the process of collecting empirical data on the 
human condition, and as subjective receptacle of a discourse on Man which is imposed as 
truth. Within the complex tripartite division in Foucault's work between discourse, sub-
jectivity and truth, I wish to provide a structure for this chapter, and look at three central 
problems. 
First, I think it important fo investigate the debate over whether Foucault might le-
gitimately be called a "structuralist," and what this might imply for his overall project. 
Within this central problem I wish first to resolve the question presented above, but, more 
importantly, to describe the fundamental methodological difference, if any, between ar-
chaeology and structuralism. The structuralist tradition seems to reject the question of hu-
man agency and causality, and it is important to distinguish the difference between 
Foucault's archaeology and this earlier method. I also wish to explore whether or not ar-
chaeology is itself a systematic method much like structuralism. 
The second investigation which is fundamental to this chapter is that which de-
scribes the process of Man having come to occupy a simultaneously privileged and sub-
jected position within modern epistemology. Here we will uncover Foucault's central 
problematization of the subject, the way in which ·this being is objectified within knowl-
edge. In this, and if he is correct in his formulations, Foucault reveals an interesting and 
perhaps irresolvable paradox within modern epistemology: Man as a willing agent in his 
own subjection. 
Third, I wish to explore the way in which Foucault describes the "limits" of 
thought, an investigation into the parameters within which modern thought is forced to 
function, given the fact that the modern subject is the source and product of his own 
knowledge. Part of this investigation will be to discover how this paradox impinges itself 
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upon the way in which human subjects have been constituted, and the ways in which this 
epistemology of Man inhibits or restrains thought from thinking Other than itself.14 ln 
other words, if it has been established that Foucault provides a system for uncovering the 
foundation from which knowledge achieves meaning and cogency, and if it is established 
that Man in fact grew out of particular discursive practices, how might thought rethink itself 
as something different, something that takes into account the limitations placed upon the 
subject within the modem epistemological configuration? 
FOUCAULT: A STRUCTURALIST? 
While Foucault rejects all philosophies caught within the humanist tradition (in which Man 
is placed at the centre of knowledge), and he would include structuralism as part of this 
genre, the question relating to a difference that might be distinguished between archaeology 
and structuralism is important. Throughout his career, Foucault categorically denied hav-
ing any allegiance to the structuralistproject. ln The Archaeology of Knowledge, his work 
which proceeded The Order of Things, he explains his methodological concerns at the time: 
"My aim is to uncover the principles and consequences of an 
autochthonous transformation that is taking place in the field 
of historical knowledge. It may well be that this transforma-
tion, the problems that it raises, the tools that it uses, the 
concepts that emerge from it, and the results that is obtains 
are not entirely foreign to what is called structural analysis. 
But this kind of analysis is not specifically used."15 
While Foucault is surprisingly ambivalent in this passage, and seems to align structuralism 
and archaeology as similar methods with similar goals, I believe that these two systems are 
very different from one another, both methodologically in terms of the object of their in-
vestigations, as well as in their political consequences. First I will provide a general un-
14foucault links the human sciences, which have epistemologically described Man, to the 
ontological constitution of his Being. Thus modem knowledge is constitutive of Man's 
ontological understanding of himself--there is a direct connection between epistemological 
knowledge Man has of himself and the way in which this exists to create his consciousness or 
Being. 
I 5The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 15. My emphasis. 
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derstanding of structuralism, not in an attempt to definitively describe this school of 
thought, itself subject to debate, but for the purposes of being able to compare what critics 
or commentators might refer to when calling Foucault as a philosopher of history a 
"structuralist". After this, I will explain Foucault's concerns in more detail and make the 
difference between archaeology as method, and structuralism as system, quite clear. 
Born through the work of De Saussure (linguistics), Levi-Strauss (anthropology), 
and Lacan (psycho-analysis), structuralism at its core defines the task of elucidating an in-
nate structure within a particular social system. Whether in terms of myth, language, or 
social structure, as examples, a structuralist approach would seek to define essential and 
underlying rules that determine the way in which a particular act is carried out. To make 
reference to Chomsky's work in linguistics, the central premiss guiding his work is that an 
innate language capacity exists within the human subject, this the product of genetics and 
merely facilitated in its application through a process of socialization and nurturing. For 
Chomsky, the faculty of language is an inherent human quality, not only in terms of poten-
tial, but more radically, in terms of the capacity for grammatical construction being natu-
ralZv prevalent in the human species: language is an essential and implicit human attribute. 
For the linguistic structuralist, there exists as an essential element of human nature a "mass 
of schematisms, innate governing principles, which guide our social and intellectual and 
individual behavior ... there is something biologically given, unchangeable, a foundation for 
whatever it is that we do with our mental capacities."16 Chomsky links his work in lin-
guistics with a particular political project of his own, a programme of intellectual and politi-
cal action which seeks to actualize an essential human self through the implementation of an 
anarcho-syndicalistjustice; Foucault rejects the very basis of Chomsky's argument, placing 
him squarely within the humanist tradition as will become obvious in the quotes which 
follow. Foucault, in debate with Chomsky over the subjects of human nature, essential 
16Noam Chomsky, quoted in the Introduction, The Foucault Reader, p. 3. My emphasis. 
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truth, and justice on a Dutch television show, displays the fundamental traits of his theory 
that negate any possibility of his having embarked upon a structuralist project.17 
Foucault fundamentally rejects any appeal to a totalizing sense of truth or governing 
structure that takes on a universally-acceptable moral position, and is based on an essential 
human nature. This stands at the very heart of all his work and is probably the point least 
understood by his critics. While Chomsky believes that a justice might be uncovered once 
the self and its needs are properly understood, Foucault takes up a very different position 
entirely. Compare the following: 
Chomsky, on being asked about his interest in politics, ex-
presses his interest in: "[trying] to create the vision of a fu-
ture just society; that is to create, if you like, a humanistic 
social theory that is based, if possible, on some firm and 
humane concept of the human essence or human nature."18 
Foucault: "I will be a little bit Nietzschean about this .. .it 
seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which 
in effect has been invented and put to work in different types 
of societies as an instrument of a certain political and eco-
nomic power or as a weapon against that power. .. one can't, 
however regrettable it may be, put these notions forward to 
justify a fight which should ... overthrow the very funda-
ments of our society."19 
In this latter statement, we see two essential remarks: first, that truth is something created 
and used as an element of control; two, that in fact the very notions for which we have been 
fighting up until this point are not only false, but useless in tackling the real problems at 
hand. We see the two most important elements of the critique against Foucault which we 
will have to explore later coming to the fore: there is no innate essence, truth is created; out 
of this, there exists no essential meaning in the lives of individuals sans that which they 
create for themselves as works of art. 
l 7The details of this debate, entitled "Human Nature: Justice versus Power," can be found in 
Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind, ed. Fons Elders. 
18·b·d 5 · I I ., p. . 
l 9Foucault, quoted in the Introduction, The Foucault Reader, p. 6. 
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Ironically, The Order of Things was initially going to be sub-titled An Archaeology 
of Structuralism. When looking at archaeology as method, and later at its merger with ge-
nealogical work, we must keep in mind that Foucault is not interested so much in uncover-
ing how knowledge is structured the way it is, but rather is an attempt to, first, understand 
the way in which present knowledge structures affect our conception of reality today, and 
second, to historicize knowledge as a contingent formation of statements that might be al-
tered, in other words, and this is the essential point, to place knowledge within time.20 
Archaeology is a method which reveals a structure, yet in no way affirms this structure as 
truth, except in its historicity. Foucault does not appeal to an innate semblence of order or 
systematicity, but rather reveals how an order was imposed on knowledge of Man at a par-
ticular time in history. 
The power of Foucault's archaeology, especially for the purposes of this disserta-
tion is twofold: first, archaeology allows us to understand the way in which the subject in 
its present epistemological definition was constituted; second, archaeology invites the 
prospect that this present episteme might in fact be overturned as we move into a new epis-
temological understanding of the world, a new age of reason. The Order of Things is thus 
an historical investigation into the world of ideas, not to uncover and consolidate a founda-
tion for knowledge which we have lost along the way or never conceived of, but rather to 
show the serious political and socio-economic effects, as well as the epistemological con-
tingency, of such a structure. Instead of "structure", Foucault uses the word episteme, to 
denote a particular body of knowledge, a particular group of statements which govern Ian-
guage at a particular time. In this way he does not negate science or the ability to move to-
wards a progressively enlightened truth within the hard sciences; rather, he reveals the un-
certainty and contingency of modern knowledge which reveres the human being as the per-
cepti ve and active center of know ledge creation. The method of uncovering the foundation 
of this knowledge system is archaeology. 
20For a highly descriptive analysis of the role of "time" in Foucault's archaeological 
method, see The Order of Things, p. 332. 
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Let us now move on to the more concrete and fundamental questions of how Man 
was "created" as an entity within modem discourse, and why this ontological construction 
disturbs Foucault. In other words, what is the link between the creation of modem subjec-
tivity and the ontological and political subjection implicit inthis process? Most important to 
understanding the way in which the modem subject is constituted within modem knowl-
edge structures, are the "objectivizing sciences", a modem body of "scientific" knowledge 
which radically reorganized Man's epistemological understanding of himself at the end of 
the eighteenth century: the emergence, for the first time in the history of ideas, of the hu-
man sciences. 
THE BIRTH OF MAN IN MODERN KNOWLEDGE 
The emergence of a new and modem structure for knowledge occurred at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. In The Order of Things, Foucault focuses on this epistemic "threshold" 
in order to understand what changed in some radical way with regards to human subjectiv-
ity and self-consciousness, as well as the degree of change compared to structures that ex-
isted prior to it.21 He writes: 
"For an archaeology of knowledge, this profound breach in 
the expanse of continuities, though it must be analyzed, and 
minutely so, cannot be 'explained' or even summed up in a 
single word. It is a radical event that is distributed across the 
entire visible surface of knowledge, and whose signs, 
shocks, and effects it is possible to follow step by 
step ... knowledge takes up residence in a new space."22 
The shift that occurs at the end of the eighteenth century relates directly to the level at which 
knowledge begins to work. According to Foucault, all things in Classical thought were or-
dered on a table and represented as they appeared to knowledge through time; the modem 
break occurs when knowledge begins inquiries into the "profound, interior, and essential 
21 The Order of Things, p. xxiv. 
22jbid., p. 217. My emphasis. 
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space" of each of these entities.23 Instead of a position or a place on a table, modern 
knowledge has a primary interest in distinguishingfanction; with the newly-emerging sci-
ences concerned with wealth, language and biology, we see Western knowledge striving to 
understand a "space" within the human subject, or what is commonly known in modernity 
as human "interimity".24 This move was to have a profound effect: with the level of anal-
ysis and conditions of epistemological existence moving to a "deeper" level, things dis-
cover their nature. Modern identity is thus intrinsically caught up within an epistemological 
definition or tag attached to an entity, binding it to a particular type of action and function. 
In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault describes how knowledge of the human body 
changed fundamentally once corpses were opened and investigated in their dark, interior 
recesses.25 As a result of the gaze of modern medical science, disease was defined in its 
truth, with empirical evidence used to describe the ways in which particular pathologies in-
teracted with, and potentially destroyed, organs. In opening up the human corpse, physi-
cians were able to come face to face with the human body's empirical reality as well as its 
capacity for death, its finitude.26 This knowledge was encoded within an emerging set of 
biological sciences, confident in their ability to diagnose illness of the human body, as well 
as other matters concerning human health generally. With this interest in the organic 
structure of things, the locus of investigation into the body changed: function came to play 
"an essential governing and determining role" in the process of naming organs within a 
nosological hierarchy.27 
More importantly, on a philosophic level, the functions of the body, and the various 
organs which assisted in the primary operations of the body, were placed deep within the 
human frame; in investigating human illness, exterior symptoms were related to an inner 
23ibid., p. 231. 
24ibid., p. 228. 
25rhe investigation of human corpses is well documented by Foucault in Chapter 8 of The 
Birth of the Clinic, "Open up a Few Corpses." 
26The Birth of the Clinic, p. 198. 
27The Order of Things, p. 228. 
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primary depth, in a process of reverse decipherment: doctors would have to "relate the vis-
ible to the invisible, to its deeper cause, as it were, then to rise upwards once more from 
that hidden architecture towards the more obvious signs displayed on the surfaces of bod-
ies."28 Modernity thus heralds a fundamental rearrangement of Man's conception of his 
body and its function; no longer a two-dimensional structure, the human body is found in 
its depth with modernity, and human consciousness finds its primary source of locution 
within. In discovering a depth within the body, Man as a being understood as separate 
from Nature, achieved a hermeneutical (or ontological) consciousness of himself for the 
first time in history. 
The modern human condition is thus linked to a relationship between depth and 
human nature, the two working together in a duet which defines interior Being for modern 
humanity; these factors constitute Man, a living entity whose essential functionings, needs, 
and desires can be investigated, and their submerged causal reality established through 
empirically observed exterior signs and symptoms. In this process of discovering human 
interiority, it became necessary to "explore in depth the space that lies between their super-
ficial organs and their most concealed ones, and between these latter and the broad func-
tions that they perform."29 In the depth of his body, modern Man found both an under-
standing of his physiological functioning; of more importance to Foucault, Man found a 
philosophical basis for the origin of his nature.30 Modem Man is thus born within a 
physical body, and yet constituted for the very first time as an entity with a valuable inte-
ri or. Foucault writes that modern man's "mode of being"3 I rotates on three central axes: 
the origin, the transcendental, and the empiricaJ.32 Within this triad, modern knowledge 
defines modern Being, and captures this within a positive language.33 
28ibid., p. 229. 
29ibid., p. 230. 
30jbid., p. 244. 
3 ljbid., p. 328. 
32while there are a further three concepts which Foucault introduc~s in The Order of Things 
as part of his discussion of modem epistemology, ("finitude", "positivities'', and the 
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THE "ORIGIN" OF HUMAN NATURE 
In describing the modem episteme and its particular concern with Man, Foucault is most 
concerned with the concept of a human "nature", or a point of origin which serves as a 
grounded reference point for investigating human subjects. Foucault defines "origin" as 
the point within the human subject at which scientific certainty or truth exists, the place 
from which Man "articulates himself';34 it should be noted that this place of reference is not 
steadfast within knowledge, and is always vulnerable to an interrogating "return" of 
knowledge which violates its presence and positivity.35 Foucault describes the concept of 
"the origin" "like the virtual tip of a cone in which all differences, all dispersions, all dis-
continuities would be knitted together so as to form no more than a single point of identity, 
the impalpable figure of the Same, yet possessing the power, nevertheless, to burst open 
upon itself and become Other.36 This "point" might be referred to as Man's being, estab-
lished as it is in the "obscure space" between thought as Reason, and its Other, that area of 
thought which thought has not yet captured or rendered in positive terms within epistemol-
ogy.37 If "origin" defines the point at which human nature is defined, Unthought will refer 
to that space outside which modern ontology is suspended, that which has not been re-
vealed to Truth, and yet, by the very dualistic nature of modern epistemology, must exist as 
juxtaposed to Thought and that which is known to be real. The Unthought exists at the 
limits of thought, defining what is both known and that to still be discovered; in other 
words, it is the space within the world of Thought that has not yet been formalized. Man's 
origin is thus the accumulation and formalization of knowledge about himself which exists 
"retreat" of knowledge), these I believe to be secondary to the general discussion at hand 
here, and will be introduced as necessary. 
33When I make reference to "essence" here, I refer to a nature of Man in modernity which 
is understood as concrete and stable; essential features of Man are those which we link 
intrinsically to his nature, his natural condition of Being. Its Other is deviance. 
34The Order of Things, p. 330. 
35fhe concept of a "return" of knowledge will be investigated further in the pages which 
follow. For now, it should be understood as the return of thought to an original truth 
position, and the process whereby this original position might be interrogated and changed or 
reversed if it is found to be lacking. 
36The Order of Things, pp. 329-330. 
37ibid., p. 326. 
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to define his nature; origin is the point at which human nature exists within the human sci-
ences in its truth. 
A constant tension thus exits between reason or that known, on the one hand, and 
unreason or that which is yet to be discovered, on the other, a tension within thought which 
might always lead to "modification", to "reflection", and, most significantly, to 
"transfonnalion of the mode of being of that on which it reflects."38 Crucially important is 
Foucault's description of the ability for thought to alter both its relationship to itself, and 
the relationship which Man thus has with himself as an extension of this: 
"What is essential is that thought, both for itself and in the 
density of its workings, should be both knowledge and a 
modification of what it knows, reflection and a transforma-
tion of the mode of being of that on which it reflects. 
Whatever it touches it immediately causes to move: it cannot 
discover the unthought, or at least move towards it, without 
immediately bringing the unthought nearer to itself--or even, 
perhaps, without pushing it further away, and in any case 
without causing man's own being to undergo a change by 
that very fact, since it is deployed in the distance between 
them."39 
Modern thought thus constantly attempts to provide identity, this now established within 
the depth of the body of the object under review, and not merely a set of signs attached to 
the surface of body as was the case in the Classical age. Once identity is determined in 
terms of an epistemologically definable truth, and related to function and place within a 
system, the nature of a thing is determined. With modernity, for the first time in the history 
of humankind, Man was to appear as having his own essential identity, a bundle of at-
tributes discovered in and by the human sciences which now constitute the consciousness 
of Man. This is an extremely important move for Foucault, and the core of his problemati-
zation both of Man himself as a created entity, as well as of the human sciences and the 
Truths which emerge out of this new body of knowledge. 
38ibid., p. 327. 
39ibid. My emphasis. 
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THE EMPIRICAL METHOD OF STUDYING MAN 
I have devoted some time in this dissertation to the concept of the empirical, but I now wish 
to sketch in more detail the function within modern thought of empirical investigation. In 
addition, and of more importance to our discussion here, I wish to describe the relationship 
between empirical reflection and the formation of a positive knowledge structure which 
Foucault describes as underlying the human sciences. Modern knowledge extraction is 
based upon an emphasis on the empirical, a particular relationship between an expert and 
his or her patient by which knowledge is gleaned from the surface of the human body. 
This is underscored by the modern belief in interior depth and the relationship between hid-
den function and detectable exterior signs; in other words, those symptoms or signs emitted 
from a pathological mass deep within the body and which nonetheless show themselves as 
symptoms on the surface of the body, establish a relationship between a surface appearance 
and a deep nature. As we saw in Birth of the Clinic, an understanding of external signs 
being linked to internal mechanisms and processes is a fundamentally modern conception 
of the body. The empirical gaze is a method of capturing that which lies within the human 
form by applying various techniques, whether physical or oral, to the human body on its 
surface. By the very nature of the relationship between doctor and patient, and the empha-
sis placed on empirical observation as scientific, that which is extracted from bodies forms 
the basis of a system of knowledge which can now be deemed epistemologically sound. 
Kant's practical critique propounded the ability for human reason to search out and 
attain universal truth and morality for all creatures; as a result of this revolution in modern 
philosophy, Man emerged as both that known (within the human sciences) as well as 
Supreme Judge of himself as a species. In this, we see the link between the empirical, the 
transcendental (as empirical knowledge is accorded universal status or validity), the origin 
discovered, and the "return" to origin, the ability for thought to return to the place of 
essence and rework an original position. Bound within an understanding of his conscious-
. ness as a finite or constant place of reference, Man is born with modernity as an entity with 
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a nature that can be discovered, explained and further problematized; his relationship within 
himself is thus temporarily finite, and open to change in the future should the human sci-
ences discover a new knowledge of the human condition. 
A TRANSCENDENTAL THEORY OF MAN 
In the modern epistemology which surrounds Man, and determines his nature in terms of 
knowledge that is available to describe him, we find the emergence of a system or structure 
within which knowledge is obliged to work in order to attain the status of truth. This 
structure is given transcendental status for two reasons: first, in terms of its acceptance as 
universally valid for all beings; and second, because the human sciences are understood to 
employ scientific research methods which render truthful conclusions. The limits of this 
system are the borders which serve to contain thought within the above paradigm, as well 
as protect rationality from the Unthought. This is the space around knowledge which has 
yet to be conquered, examined and coopted, the place from which thought can act "from 
without" the pre-established realm of thought. The "quadrilateral" which Foucault de-
scribes in his work serves to protect thought from Other realities, and constantly attempts to 
normalize these misunderstood anomalies. 40 I would like to use this Foucauldian paradigm 
to investigate the way in which modern thought necessarily moves towards uncovering and 
normalizing the Other. 





the finitude of 
modern knowledge 
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FOUCAULT'S "QUADRILATERAL" OF MODERN THOUGHT, WHICH 
DESCRIBES THE BOUNDARIES WITHIN WHICH THIS THOUGHT 
OPERATES, ITS LIMITS. 
The core concepts here, as we have already discussed, are the "origin" or nature of the hu-
man species, the "empirical" method used in establishing such knowledge, and the 
"transcendental" formalization of such knowledge within discourse. Linked to these core 
ideas is knowledge deemed within modernity as "positive", and "finite" --in other words~ 
that modern knowledge is shrouded in scientific certainty which can describe the human 
condition; second, that such knowledge is complete to the degree that it encloses a "nature" 
within itself: Man is caught up within a system of knowledge which defines his physical 
and ontological nature in its complete and unquestionable truth. 
If it is true that Man enters the realm of knowledge for the first time with modernity, 
and that this system of knowledge is structured as in the diagram above, then this has grave 
implications for the way in which thought might impinge itself upon the lives of individuals 
and nations. Of particular importance is the modern understanding of Man as having a fi-
nite human nature which is epistemologically defined. This origin, once rendered within 
science as a nature of Man, is constantly interrogated towards ensuring that the truth of 
Man is maintained, reclaiming a greater share of this entity from the unknown, Unthought. 
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The Unthought is the dark, murky area of uncertainty which exists outside of the parame-
ters of Thought, or that which is unknown or misunderstood by Reason. Foucault asks as 
a central question the effects of this thought process upon the human subject. In political 
terms, what is most important for this dissertation to describe is the relationship between 
what might be conceived of in thought, or truth, and the construction of the thought pro-
cess of the knowing subject: in other words, what we seek to explore is Foucault's de-
scription of the critical point at which epistemology intersects with consciousness in de-
termining identity and human subjectivity. 
Man in modernity is caught up in an astonishing paradox: both object and subject of 
knowledge; based on this premiss, Foucault describes Man as willing his own subjection 
within thought. The danger involved is that the modem episteme, given its structure, 
moves towards a common goal in all of its work: sameness. 41 Foucault writes that the 
modern episteme is fundamentally concerned with depicting knowledge in relation to a 
norm or to a formalized conception within discourse of that which is deemed to be the true 
nature of a thing. This model naturally results in the emergence of a dialectic between that 
which is known as truth, and that which exists as Other to this truth; the latter might either 
be that which is unknown, (i.e., existing within the space of the Unthought), or that which 
exists in contradistinction to the norm, (i.e., that which exists as deviant). Modem knowl-
edge is thus concerned with bridging and describing the gap between these two realities of 
knowledge, "with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same."42 
It obsesses itself with a process of normalization in terms of the way in which a truth or 
central essence of a particular thing is discovered and then used to classify and describe all 
similar objects. This process of normalization Foucault describes as "a thought of the 
4 J "Sameness" as a concept might simply be defined as the process of comparing all 
knowledge to an original position which is deemed truthful. To the extent that such 
compared knowledge matches this original definition, such an object would be labeled 
normal. Deviance would be determined by the degree to which difference is established 
between an object for examination and its origin, the petfect specimen which is used to define 
that object in its truth. 
42rhe Order of Things, p. 339. 
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Same" and the governing element of the modem thought process:43 "modern thought is one 
that moves no longer towards the never-completed formation of Difference, but towards the 
ever-to-be accomplished unveiling of the Same."44 This dialectic between that known (the 
Same) and that to be discovered (the Other) is a form of subjection for the human individ-
ual, for the very fact that Reason is given precedence and authority in this relationship. As 
we have seen in Madness and Civilization, Reason (the origin) constantly attempts to dis-
cover and interrogate that unknown (the Unthought). The human sciences take as their 
premiss that Man can be empirically observed and graphed, and that this new body of dis-
course might serve to better understand Man as a living, working, speaking subject. Man 
is thus first objectified, as this chapter has sought to outline, and then subjectified when a 
norm or average is imposed on him.45 
THE LIMITS OF MODERN THOUGHT 
The Foucauldian quadrilateral of modern thought describes the limits of the epistemological 
structure within which a finite conception of human nature is described, and the process 
whereby the human sciences have accorded a scientific status to this conception. In other 
words, knowledge of a single human being is readily comparable to knowledge of the 
species as captured within the original or primary understanding of this entity. It is the 
boundaries that enclose modern thought that most trouble Foucault, the process that en-
sures the epistemological ossification of human origin, or the reification in knowledge of 
those qualities related to human function and essence. Modern knowledge "ossifies'' 
around a thing to the degree to which modern discourse solidifies around an object of in-
vestigation and subsumes this entity within a positive description of its nature. Foucault is 
disconcerted by the rise of a set of knowledge structures which have as a particular point of 
reference the human species, a set of discourses which work to categorize and place Man 
43ibid. 
44ibid., p. 340. My emphasis. 
45fhis process of subjectification will be explored in Part II of this dissertation. 
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within an epistemological space; essentially a group of knowledges which seek out and de-
fine consciousness. Indeed, the very task of The Order of Things was to show how fragile 
such a system is. While the central task of the human sciences is "bringing man's con-
sciousness back to its real conditions," Foucault wishes to show that such "conditions" are 
established within history and discourse, and that these might be problematized and over-
turned. The death of Man which Foucault describes in The Order of Things entails work 
on the limits which enclose a thought process about Man. 
However, Foucault offers a dismal picture if an alternative can not be found to our 
present systems of knowledge. If it can be shown that Foucault's work depicts all of real-
ity as pre-determined, then humankind is destined to a nihilistic despair. In fact, many of 
his critics make these very statements as we shall see in Part III. But, as I will argue in the 
ensuing chapters of this dissertation, innate to Foucault's work is the prospect of rebellion 
and the ability to overturn knowledge impositions. We have explored the limits of thought 
given the structure of the modem episteme; as a result of such boundaries to thought and 
the way in which human nature has been "invented" within discourse, there exists the abil-
ity for thought to critically examine itself. This self-criticism would take place from the 
Outside, from the region of the Unthought, that nebulous, critical space from which 
thought can gaze back upon itself and upset its very own structures. It is here that we find 
a radical political project within Foucault's work, and hope for the future. Before we move 
on to a more detailed exploration of Foucault's politics and his description of the possibility 
for overcoming the liminal frontiers which enclose ~d restrict modem thought and subjec-
tivity, we need to investigate his second period. Here Foucault outlines a theory of power 
to explain the process whereby knowledge and power intersect in the process of subjectify-




In Part I of this dissertation, we have explored the early stages of Foucault's work into the 
nature of structures which have worked to form the modern subject. Madness and 
Civilization explored the way in which people are divided from one another according to 
knowledge of their mental health; The Birth of the Clinic was written as an archaeology of 
modern medicine, and the historical emergence of the clinic as a place in which knowledge 
of the human body was used to constitute Man as a medical subject as well as an object 
within a population; The Order of Things, a fundamental text in which Foucault investi-
gates modern knowledge, and traces his first work on the constitution of the modern sub-
ject, both as an entity within society and, more importantly, as an object positively de-
scribed within discourse. I have labeled this initial period his Knowledge phase, because 
his central concern here is how human consciousness is constituted within discourse. 
Missing from Foucault's early work, however, was a clear theory outlining the way in 
which discourse informed social practice, the way in which knowledge found root within 
the social fabric or was internalized by human subjects as Truth. This investigation will be 
the subject matter of the second part of this thesis, where we find Foucault, from the early 
1970's, outlining a unique theory of power, the way in which bodies of knowledge are in-
teriorized in the constitution of Man as a human subject. This is what I would like to call 
his Power period, perhaps the most fundamental of Foucault's invaluable contributions to 
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contemporary philosophy, and intrinsic to his attempt to help modern subjects "think dif-






The plague-stricken town, traversed throughout with hierar-
chy, surveillance, observation, writing; the town immobi-
lized by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a 
distinct way over all individual bodies--this is the utopia of 
the perfectly governed city. 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 
If it is true that the leper gave rise to rituals of exclusion, 
which to a certain extent provided the model for and general 
form of the great Confinement, then the plague gave rise to 
disciplinary projects. Rather than the massive, binary divi-
sion between one set of people and another, it called for 
multiple separations, individualizing distributions, an orga-
nization in depth of surveillance and control, an intensifica-
tion and a ramification of power. 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 
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In the first part of this dissertation, we explored ways in which the subject is objectified 
within knowledge systems; with the application of an empirical gaze upon the body of the 
modem subject, Man is born for Foucault, and a positive account of his consciousness in-
scribed within discourse. Notwithstanding the enthusiastic reception which Foucault's 
early texts enjoyed, his Knowledge period could not provide a conception of the way in 
which discourse moved within society, or the way in which knowledge impinged itself 
upon the human subject and populations at large. In his first period, Foucault only showed 
us how information was gathered.from the subject, not imposed upon it. Part II of this 
dissertation will seek to define Foucault's definition of power, and to introduce his under-
standing of the way in which the modem episteme has shifted the focus of state involve-
ment with the lives of individuals away from ritual and the imposition of fear to ensure so-
cial order, towards the formulation of an entirely new technique of power centred around 
normalization. In this process of normalization, (or what I feel could better be termed sub-
jectification ), various practices are applied to the bodies and interiors of human subjects in a 
process of rectifying or rehabilitating various human functions or actions deemed economi-
cally or politically either inadequate or deviant. 
, Before we explore Discipline and Punish and The Hist01y of Sexuality (Volume 1 ), 
the central texts in this section, there is an important theoretical question which needs clari-
fication. I refer here to Foucault's formulation of genealogy as method, and his new-found 
concerns around the way in which knowledge circulates in society. Here we will find more 
clarity on Foucault's central concerns during his second, or Power, period, and the link 
which he was able to forge between discourse on the one hand, and social institutions on 
the other. Out of this, a powerful and highly political critique of modernity will emerge, 
something which I believe is extremely difficult to dispute. 
GENEALOGY AS METHOD 
DisciplineandPunish and The History of Sexuality (Volume 1) remain studies within his-
tory, attempts to thresh out the conditions which make possible a certain practice of thought 
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and action. Instead of a narrow definition of what is commonly known as discourse, 
Foucault describes knowledge as something which · 
"takes shape not only in theoretical texts or experimental in-
struments, but in a whole system of practices and institu-- · 
tions .. .lt comprises ... rules that are its own, and that thus 
characterize its existence, its functioning, and its history. 
Certain of these rules are specific to a single domain; others 
are shared by several...Finally, the development of this 
knowledge and its transformations brings into play complex 
causal relations ... "1 
In this, we see a new depth added to Foucault's work as he begins to explore knowledge as 
intrinsically linked to practice, as action on bodies and space. 
"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" stands as the definitive article by Foucault on ge-. 
nealogy, the new method which he introduced in the 1970's.2 He describes genealogy as 
"gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and con-
fused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times. "3 
Genealogy is a method linked to the study of various documents, to discourses which plot 
the flow of history, moulding reality, and hereby creating history. The fundamental differ-
ence between archaeology as method and genealogy as method is that while the former 
concerns itself with the rules of formation governing discourse, genealogy addresses itself 
to the interaction between knowledge and power relations, the way in which discursive 
practices work to create particular conditions within which people act. While archaeology 
describes the way in which people are forced to think truth, genealogy outlines the way in 
which truth is acted out, the way in which actions are deemed truthful or not, and the way 
in which people are forced to put truth (as epistemologically defined knowledge) into prac-
tice. 
lThis is an extract from a pamphlet Foucault published on applying to fill the chair of philosophy at 
the College de France in November 1969. Quoted in Didier Eribon's biography of Foucault, 
Michel Foucault, p. 2~6. My emphasis. .· 
2Found in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, pp. 76-100. 
3Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," p. 76. 
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In Foucault's genealogies, (and by this I mean all of his work after The Order of 
Things), the subject is intrinsically linked to social, political and economic practices; the 
knowledge conditions which interact with a particular conception of power force the subject 
to act in a particular way, in accordance with particular social rules and within particular 
social institutions (whether schools, the family, asylums, and prisons, or within a moral 
system related to their sexuality, etc.). Essentially this process limits actions or the per-
ceived range of options within a field of choices, whether in epistemological, ontological, 
or political terms. We have moved from analyses concerned primarily with the limits of 
thought, to works which direct their attention to the limits of action imposed upon the mod-
em subject. It should be understood that knowledge and the ability to make people act in a 
particular way (power) support one another; indeed, they are intrinsic to the existence of 
one another: 
"These 'power-knowledge relations' are to be analysed ... not 
on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free 
·in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the 
subject who knows, the objects to be known and the 
modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many ef-
fects of these fundamental implication of power-knowledge 
and their historical transformations .. .it is not the activity of 
the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowl-
edge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, 
the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is 
made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of 
knowledge." 4 
Power and knowledge intersect one another's path, and define the existence of one another 
in a mutually reinforcing manner. Foucault has always categorically rejected the subject as 
the central agent in the formation of knowledge, as outlined in the previous chapter. His 
second period sets out to show instead how particular relations of power and knowledge 
which "traverse" particular actions, (or "processes and struggles"), are the real causal fac-
tors behind the production of reality. 






In The Order of Things, Foucault writes an archaeology of modern knowledge, 
particularly that section of knowledge which attempts to describe Man's being: the human 
sciences. With Discipline and Punish, Foucault refines and extends this method to include 
the way in which these formations of thought intersect with social action; in other words, in 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault presents his theory of power for the first time as a catalyst 
for activity in society. Genealogy is the exploration of the way in which knowledge struc-
tures find actuality through history. Of most importance is genealogy's primary objective: 
to show that modern action, just like modern thought, is contingent, and based on the false 
premiss of the universal and transcendental "origin" as we explored in the previous chapter. 
The origin can be described as the basis or fundamental premiss for action or thought, and 
, works as an essential construct within modern knowledge; the notion of "original" truth or 
knowledge is at the heart of Michel Foucault's philosophic concerns which he wished to 
expose in all of its historical vagary and contingency: 
"Where the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a 
coherent identity, the genealogist sets out to study the be-
ginning [the origin]--numberless beginnings, whose faint 
traces and hints of color are readily seen by a historical eye. 
The analysis of descent [from an essential origin] permits the 
dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as 
an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost 
events."5 
In this, we see two important developments: first, that the subject and its identity, however 
these may be constructed, is created through history, and "synthesized" by a series of his-
torical events; second, in his allusion to "lost events", Foucault makes reference to a num-
ber of discourses that might have been excluded or prohibited from the process of creating 
history, or of being allowed to shed light on human experience and reality. We are familiar 
with the first development, the subject as .a constructed entity; I would like to expand on 
this second task of genealogical method, the "resurrection" oflost knowledge. 
5"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," p. 81. My emphasis. 
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Foucault's most interesting assertion in the quote above is the way in which he alludes to 
certain knowledges which exist and yet have no epistemological coherence in terms of their 
intellectual soundness; this knowledge exists as "differential", "incapable of unanimity and 
which owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything sur-
rounding it." IO Foucault thus raises the ability to think and critique above unanimity and 
conformity, to a place where knowledge is respected at times for its immediate specificity. 
Ultimately, genealogical criticism works on two levels: first, exposing the contingency of 
systematized (or formally accepted) knowledge through an investigation of "local" knowl-
edges; second, revealing through the restoration of the latter the way in which identity and 
being has been imposed upon individuals. 
These two ideas form the theoretical core of Foucault's work; his genealogies serve 
as a support for his theory of power, which itself finds place alongside his archaeological 
escavation of knowledge. On the one hand, he reveals the underlying rules which govern 
discourse and which work to include or exclude particular knowledges; more importantly 
for his Power period, we find Foucault introducing a theory of power and normalization, 
the effects of dominant discursive practices upon the bodies of individuals, and the emer-
gence of a new system of discipline and conduct which it is the task of this part of the dis-
sertation to investigate. Let us move straight into that work, with a discussion of the im-
portant ideas discussed in Discipline and Punish. This fourth chapter is primarily con-
cerned with genealogy used as a method to uncover either suppressed or marginalized 
knowledges as well as the forms of modern power and knowledge that exist co-extensive 





This book [Discipline and Punish] is intended as a correla-
tive history of the modem soul and of a new power to judge; 
a genealogy of the present scientifico-legal complex from 
which the power to punish derives its bases, justifications 
and rules, from which it extends its effects and by which it 
masks its exorbitant singularity. 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 
At this point I end a book that must serve as a historical 
background to various studies of the power of normalization 
and the formation of knowledge in modem society. 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 
Discipline and Punish ( 1975) opens with the detailed description of the torturing to death of 
Damiens, a man accused and convicted in 1757 France of regicide. Mutilating punishment 
of this nature was the norm from the time of the Inquisition until the nineteenth century re-
form of the penal code throughout Europe and the United States. Pre-modem punishment 
existed as spectacle, and an important part of the functioning of the legal system for two 
reasons. The first was that the criminal was seen up to the eighteenth century and the 
Enlightenment as having committed a crime against the body of the king or queen. The 
matter was rectified and justice meted out fairly in the process of the regal body inflicting 
106 
equal pain to the body of the transgressor, hereby neutralizing the wrong and reasserting 
the divine and absolute authority of the throne. 
"Besides its immediate v1ct1m, the crime attacks the 
sovereign: it attacks him personally, since the law represents 
the will of the sovereign; it attacks him physically, since the 
force of the law is the force of the prince ... [punishment] re-
quires that the king take revenge for an affront to his very 
person ... The public execution, then, has ajuridico-political 
function. It is a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured 
sovereignty is reconstituted." 1 
Through punishment, sovereignty is reinstated; the sovereign's power, viewed in Classical 
terms as a physical construct, is reaffirmed and acknowledged by spectators of the cere-
mony as all-powerful: "the punishment is carried out in such a way as to give a spectacle 
not of measure, but of imbalance and excess; in this liturgy of punishment, there must be 
an emphatic affirmation of power and of its intrinsic superiority."2 
The second political motive for the public spectacle of torture was to actively engage 
commoners in the application of sovereign law on the body of the condemned. This served 
to both legitimize the actions taken by the legal authorities and, more importantly, to co~opt 
the crowd as the final voice of the necessity and legality of the act to be committed. 
However, as the crowd became an accomplice to this horror, they too condoned any future 
and equal action on their own being should they be found guilty of similar crimes. The 
public, in condemning another to death, expressed their complicity in the act committed, 
but more fundamentally, asserted their loyalty and faith in the system that watched their ac-
tions as closely as those of the fated Damiens. Thus, 
"[n]ot only must people know, they must see with their own 
eyes. Because they must be made to be afraid; but also be-
cause they must be the witnesses, the guarantors, of the 
punishment ... The right to be witnesses was one that they 
possessed and claimed; a hidden execution was a privileged 
1 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 47, 48. 
2jbid., p. 49. 
107 
execution, and in such cases it was often suspected that it 
had not taken place with all its customary severity."3 
The irony of this passage is staggering and yet epitomizes pre-Enlightenment jurisprudence 
and criminal punishment: within the then-retributive system of justice, it was the body and 
its senses that were targeted. 
The central task of this chapter is to explore the differences which Foucault delin-
eates between the seemingly barbaric medieval system of which Damiens was a victim, and 
our own, conceived as principally humane; as such, I seek to address the following pages 
to Foucault's genealogy of punishment. Far more importantly, however, I seek to explore 
the power-knowledge formations which Foucault describes as coextensive with, and fun-
damentally constitutive of, the modern penal paradigm. Foucault wished to show the gap 
which exists between the two systems, (one purely juridical, the other described with more 
difficulty as rehabilitative), a discontinuity within the order of thought as well as within 
social action and practice with regards modern penology. In Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault will seek to answer questions related to the causes as well as to the effects of 
modem disciplinary systems. The first part of this chapter will discuss changing concep-
tions of punishment from the Enlightenment; thereafter we will be in a position to investi-
gate the implications of Foucault's work in Discipline and Punish, both in terms of the in-
troduction of his theory of power, as well as the effects thereof in the constitution of the 
human subject. 
THE HUMAN BODY REDEFINED 
From the end of the eighteenth century, public spectacle ceased and heralded the age of pri-
vate execution and a legislated justice system. The secular judge was appointed to sit over 
an independent and non-partial court-room, loyal not to a central throne but strictly to a le-
gal code that was carefully established and rigorously applied. No longer was punishment 
3jbid., p. 58. My emphasis. 
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given the primary place within the legal system as it had previously: payment for one's 
crimes was pronounced only after a lengthy tribu,nal into the nature and reasons behind a 
deviant act; in this way, punishment is subordinated (at least initially) to the form and na-
ture of the crime, and remains ancillary to the justice process until the crime and the crimi-
nal are precisely understood. 
The effects of this change from medieval times are massive and permeate the entire 
penal system. From the Enlightenment, and what might be called the "liberal revolution", 
penality concentrated its punative efforts on the suspension of newly-entrenched rights, a 
disciplinary system Foucault describes as an "economy of suspended rights."4 This pro-
cess describes the degree to which the modern body has been reconceived in a radically 
new way. No longer the target of punishment, the human body serves as the vessel of that 
which the penal system seeks to deny the criminal; no longer an object of pain, the body in 
modernity "serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, 
or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both 
as a right and as property."5 
Here Foucault begins to emerge at his most brilliant in this text on punishment, as 
he outlines a particular "change of objective" on the part of the penal system. 6 He links this 
not only to a change in the juridical system as the autonomous structure it is usually per-
J 
ceived as, but rather in the type of power and knowledge relations which underscore its 
very existence. No longer is punishment linked only to changing the deviant behaviour of 
certain individuals or even entire groups within society, but rather with an organizing prin-
ciple, that of the norm. Modern punishment took on an economic slant, and was not only 
concerned with the offense committed, or only with punishing the offence; instead, it 
sought primarily 
4ibid., p. 11. 
5ibid. 
6ibid., p. 16. 
.. 
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"to supervise the individual, to neutralize his dangerous state 
of mind, to alter his criminal tendencies, and to continue 
even when this change has been achieved ... the systems of 
punishment are to be situated in a certain 'political economy' 
of the body ... the body and its forces, their utility and their 
docility, their distribution and their submission. "7 
The body is still the focus of penal attention, but in a more subtle way. The prison reform 
movement of the nineteenth century heralded the age of a reasoned address of illegalities, 
an age of the "slackening of the hold on the body."8 The body was no longer addressed as 
an object for manipulation through pain and discomfort, but rather as an "instrument or in-
termediary," and this as a result of crucial political events.9 
The French Revolution brought with it the demise of centralized monarchy, and the 
birth of institutions of political rights and social liberties. Adjacent to, and reinforcing of, 
the emergence of a social contract, an emerging capitalist economy engendered the need for 
docile political subjects and for subjects who were economically utile. In turn, this rede-
fined the way in which the justice system approached the body itself, in a move away from 
the waste and possible political turmoil associated with public torture, to a new-found em-
phasis on disciplining an anomalous body. The human body is thus the target of power-
knowledge relations with particular functions. Modem power does not seek to break the 
body, as was Damiens fate; while still maintaining "an immediate hold upon [the body]," 
power relations instead 
"invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out 
tasks, to petform ceremonies, to emit signs. This political 
investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with 
complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use .. .its 
constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught 
up in a system of subjection."10 
7jbid., pp. 18, 25. My emphasis. 
8jbid., p. 10. 
9ibid., p. 11. 
1 Ojbid., pp. 25-26. 
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The cross-over between a political and economic subjection of the body occurs when it is 
sufficiently normalized or encapsulated within the economic system so as to prevent crime 
and simultaneously ensure political docility: "the body becomes a useful force only if it is 
both a productive body and a subjected body." 11 This "political investment of the [human] 
body" emerged as the focus of the modern legal system. ·A citizen who breaks the law is 
open to having the rights, liberties, and the protection which is normally guaranteed by the 
state, withdrawn. An "economy of suspended rights" is the driving force behind the mod-
em legal system; with it came a far more sinister role--that of correction.12 
The modern state has an intrinsic responsibility to ensure the security and prosperity 
of its citizens: "[prisoners] are punished by means of a punishment that has the function of 
making the offender 'not only desirous, but also capable, of living within the law and of 
providing for his own needs' ." 13 The citizen is seen as only having transgressed tern-
porarily given an altercation in his or her past which could now be patched over given the 
right rehabilitation and treatment. The underlying ethic here, however, is that any person is 
capable of reform and that the state has the responsibility in providing this service. Where 
the process of correction (above and beyond mere payment to society for crimes commit-
ted) emerges sinister, is in the practices used to intensely analyze individuals within the pe-
nal system--here background, upbringing, past activities, and past offences are carefully 
recorded. The justification used for this is that it is necessary to know all the relevant facts 
surrounding a particular case for the correct application of treatment. This "knowledge", 
however, is intrinsically tied to the ability and capacity of the modern penal system to pun-
ish. While modern punishment might at first appear more humane or lenient, upon closer 
genealogical investigation 
1 ljbid., p. 26. 
12jbid., p. 11. 
13ibid., p. 18. 
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"one may map a displacement of its point of application; and 
through this displacement, a whole field of recent objects, a 
whole new system of truth and a mass of roles hitherto un-
known in the exercise of criminal justice. A corpus of 
knowledge, techniques, 'scientific' discourses is formed and 
becomes entangled with the practice of the power to pun-
ish."14 
A body of knowledge is assembled to explain deviant actions, a discourse and a series of 
modem practices which Foucault calls the disciplines. Immediately linked to the disciplines 
are the human sciences which we explored in the first part of this dissertation. The modern 
penal structure, as a result of its overlap with "scientists" who are employed outside of the 
penal system, introduces a number of hitherto unknown influences on penology and crimi-
nology: "Throughout the penal procedure and the implementation of the sentence there 
swarms a whole series of subsidiary authorities."15 The modern judge is unable to pass 
sentence without careful analysis of a number of subsidiary psychological factors which 
human scientists provide in the courtroom; the knowledge and guidance of the psycholo-
gist, the doctor, and the sociologist is indispensable to the modem penal system. A colla-
tion of seemingly disparate discourses on the "human condition" takes place through a pro-
cess of mutual collaboration between the human sciences and the courts; human nature and 
its Other, deviance, emerge as central problems linked in the penal system, and the science 
of criminology is born. With modernity, and a new agenda for the court system and its al-
lies, 
"[s]mall-scale legal systems and parallel judges have multi-
plied around the principal judgement: psychiatric or psycho-
logical experts, magistrates concerned with the implementa-
tion of sentences, educationalists, members of the prison 
&yrvice, all fragment the legal power to punish."16 
14ibid., pp. 22-23. 
15ibid., p. 21. 
16ibid. 
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To better understand this change in the effects of modem penality, Foucault traces the his-
tory of modern prisons. This "history" takes the specific form of a genealogy as it explores 
particular ideas and practices which are born within discourse and eventually come to affect 
social practices. 
In 1789, the prison reform movement sought to regularize and systematize all legal 
procedures. A comprehensive legal code was instituted, with crimes and their accompany-
ing penalties carefully coded and publicly distributed. The population was made aware of 
the way in which the law was to be conducted, and the system became self-governing. No 
longer did the legal system need reinforcement on the part of the general populace, nor was 
their consent needed as seen during the time of public display of justice. A police force 
emerged and the law became respected as a force both visible and invisible: the "primary 
objectives [of the power to punish were] to make of the punishment and repression of ille-
galities a regular function, coextensive with society; not to punish less, but to punish bet-
ter ... to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body."17 The object of 
punishment was to rectify wrongs so that they would presumably not occur again. 
On a more fundamental level, however, Foucault shows the law as seeking to infil-
trate all areas of the society and maintain peace and stability. Those who committed crimes 
were to be rehabilitated so that upon release would become self-governing in some sense, 
once they had undergone a programme of normalization and education in expected social 
conduct. What eventually emerged by the end of the nineteenth century was a strictly de-
fined legal code and, alongside this, a strictly defined code of ethics, to be incorporated in 
the conduct of everyday life. This system exists as a negative dialectic, whereby any be-
haviour that is not in strict accordance with the normalized and defined ethics is declared a 
violation of the law. The degree of the infraction and the ability on the part of the individ-
ual to rectify the problem privately will ultimately decide whether the public legal body will 
17ibid., p. 82. 
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step in to begin a process of normalization. "The laws that define the crime and lay down 
the penalties must be perfectly clear, 'so that each member of society may distinguish 
criminal actions from virtuous actions' ."18 In this, we see the perfect merger within a sin-
gle penal system of retribution as well as correction: modern penality is a system of disci-
plines which operates throughout the social fabric, seeking to normalize and correct be-
haviour, hereby constantly working towards sameness. 
THE PANOPTIC SOCIETY 
Foucault uses Jeremy Bentham's "Panopticon" as a powerful metaphor in describing a 
disciplinary society. The Panopticon is a circular construction, of many floors in height 
and with a central observation tower in the middle courtyard area. Bentham initially 
planned it as the perfect prison, but it could be applied to any structure housing a large 
number of people. The power of the Panopticon is that any person occupying one of the 
peripheral cells can be seen without obstruction, while the reverse is not the case. The 
warden might or might not be present: a prisoner therefore has no idea of whether he is 
being observed at any given moment. 
Over a period of time, the inmate becomes self-disciplining. With no ability to 
know whether the guard is present or not, there is no way of knowing whether the chance 
to escape is at hand and even the thought of such action becomes futile. The power relation 
becomes "automatic" and immediate, a situation in which the "inmates should be caught up 
in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers."19 This idea is directly 
transferable to the citizen. With the functioning of the legal system after a certain point be-
corning opaque, and the individual never quite sure if he or she is being watched or ob-
served, actions are carefully engaged within a "safe" perimeter. In Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault makes the point that, in the twentieth century, discipline no longer forces itself 
I 8ibid., p. 95. 
19jbid., p. 201. 
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upon the human body. It rests within the self, a relation of subjection given knowledge of 
the self on a personal and societal level. 
Where in Madness and Civilization Foucault writes on the knowledge structures 
which were set up from the eighteenth century to allow human scientists understand the 
human body in its objective workings, in Discipline and Punish he describes the work of 
social scientists to understand the group, the latter a massive interchange between individ-
uals whose actions could be impinged upon through "correct training" and repetitive prac-
tice: "Discipline makes individuals."20 To continue in Foucault's words: "A sort of 
anatomo-chronological schema of behaviour is defined. The act is broken down into its el-
ements; the position of the body, limbs, articulations is defined; to each movement are as-
signed a direction, an aptitude, a duration; their order of succession is prescribed. Time 
penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power."21 Where madness 
was defined in chemical terms in Madness and Civilization, and centered on individual 
delusions, Discipline and Punish explores modem observation of the group to better un-
derstand interactions between individuals. 
The objective of punishment is clearly very different in the modem era; no longer 
addressed to the body, modern punishment centres on the soul, this interior space which 
has been created or "discovered" by the human sciences: "The expiation that once rained 
down upon the body must be replaced by a punishment that acts in depth on the heart, the 
thoughts, the will, the inclinations."22 The important shift which Foucault seeks to eluci-
date is a changing conception of the body and the lessening degree of overt power which 
the state now has over this entity. Where discipline had once taken the form of a coercive 
destruction of the body, with the French Revolution and Romanticism as it swept through 
20jbid., p. 170. 
2ljbid., p. 152. My emphasis. 
22jbid., p. 16. 
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Europe in the eighteenth century, the political body was redefined in terms of a populace 
vested with inalienable rights and thus subject to a commonly-applicable legal code. 
Human beings in the modem era are thus subject to two metanarratives: first, a ju-
ridical discourse which judges actions in a political sense, and works to create law-abiding 
subjects; second, and more importantly, the modem human being is subjected within a 
moral system which is deeply imbedded within the social fabric of society, working to en-
sure correct and beneficial conduct on the part of all citizens. This understanding of the 
mechanisms of the self and how best to "guide" these, Foucault calls the "political tech-
nologies of the body", a "microphysics" of human coercion which 
"presupposes that the power exercised on the body is con-
ceived not as a property, but as a strategy, that its effects of 
domination are attributed not to 'appropriation' ... one should 
decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in 
activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess ... a 
perpetual battle rather than a contract."23 
By the end of Foucault's second period, we are left with a rather bleak picture of the law-
abiding and socially acceptable individual. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault illustrates 
how knowledge has gradually been accumulated by empirical observation and careful study 
of the individual. The discursive formations which emerge with modernity and have as 
their central concern Man's behaviour and his internal "nature" (i.e., the human sciences), 
are accepted as universally valid and applicable; the main thrust of Foucault's work is to 
render these assumptions problematic. More importantly, Foucault attempts to show the 
effects of such empirical sciences--the insidious modern relationship between knowledge 
and power. We have explored the knowledge and the effects of this in soine detail; let us 
now spend some time discussing the Foucauldian notion of power. 
FOUCAULT'S DEFINITION OF POWER 
23ibid., p. 26. 
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Foucault defines Power as the ability to use knowledge towards a desired end, in a social 
setting. Crucial to his definition of power is the presence of freedom. Foucault wished to 
overturn juridical and political definitions of power which are dominantly defined in terms 
of the ability to control absolutely. His paradigm allows for a resistance; liberation, how-
ever, as a total freedom from imposing systems, does not enter the equation for Foucault. 
He describes power as present in all relationships however these may be defined and within 
parameters that need only be defined in terms of two parties each seeking specific objec-
tives. In his words: 
"The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of 
conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. Basically 
power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the 
linking of one to the other than a question of govern-
ment ... To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible 
field of action of others. "24 
Very important here is Foucault's linking of power, as a modification of outcomes, to gov-
ernment. In this, he brings together what initially appears to be a purely social form of or-
ganization, and a purely political mechanism of control. However, and this is where 
Foucault is most unconventional in his definition of power, he links political and social 
practices to the ontological construction of the subject as an individual and within the 
group: "'Government' [does] not refer only to political structures or to the management of 
states; rather it designate[s] the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might 
be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the 
sick."25 Within such a relationship, because Foucault assures either side of at least the 
nominal freedom to act, if either party is subjected to a point of being unable to question or 
resist this imposition, then Foucault would no longer define this as a power relationship but 
24''The Subject and Power,'' p. 221. 
25ibid. It must be understood that each of the examples which Foucault lists here are areas in 
which he is personally interested, and are directly related to his investigations into the self-
consciousness which defines the personal identity of each of these groups, these the result of 
the social practices an~ mechanisms which lead them to be categorized as they are (i.e., as 
either sane or mad, healthy or sick, sexually normal or deviant, etc.). 
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rather one of domination. From a relationship which originally consisted of two subjects, 
what emerges, when one party no longer has the ability to move within the defined bound-
aries of that relationship, is slavery. 
In addition, Foucault problematizes the theory of power as right or sovereignty, the 
ability to constrain or overwhelm.26 He introduces a radically new conception of power as 
constructive of being, as a relation which strives towards goals pre-determined within 
knowledge structures. The empirical sciences create a discourse of Man in modernity 
which defines his essence, or origin, and it is against this background that actions can be 
deemed normal or anomalous and thus subject to correction. He writes: 
"Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or 
rather as something which only functions in the form of a 
chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody's 
hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of 
wealth ... And not only do individuals circulate between its 
threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its 
inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements 
.of its articulation ... The individual is an effect of power, and 
at the same time, or precisely to the extent which it is that ef-
fect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual 
which power has constituted is at the same time its vehi-
cfe. "27 
Implicit in this new formulation are two crucial elements which we need to discuss further: 
first, that human subjects are constituted within a matrix of power and knowledge relations, 
and yet who simultaneously exist as the vehicles or embodiment of this power; second, that 
power circulates and is not possessed in any real form, which ultimately leads Foucault to 
26Jn 'Two Lectures," Foucault defines a traditional conception of power as follows: 
"in the· case of the classic, juridical theory, power is taken to 
27ibid., p. 98. 
be a right, which one is able to possess like a commodity, and 
which one can in consequence transfer or alienate ... Power is 
that concrete power which every individual holds, and whose 
partial or total cession enables political power or sovereignty 
to be established ... Power is essentially that which 
represses ... nature, the instincts, a class, individuals." (pp. 88, 
89-90) 
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reject a theory of liberation similar to that which liberals or marxists would endorse. We 
will explore this first point below; the latter will be discussed in Part III. 
In considering a new conception of power as something that is not fixed or con-
tained within bodies or structures, we need to understand Foucault's explanation of power 
as something that acts as a force, which creates movement, change, and flux; Foucault de-
scribes power as an energy which constantly attracts and repels. Power exists within a 
paradigm of strategies and resistance, across a field or "net-like organisation" laced with 
discursive practices and the individuals and things that come into contact with them.28 It is 
at the point where modem knowledge and power intersect in a relation of subjection, that 
the battle for constitution of the human subject occurs. Foucault merges the ontological re- . 
lationship of power and knowledge precisely at the point where such construction of hu-
man Being takes place. In Foucault's work, knowledge is not a passive, neutral, entity; 
similarly, power is not conceived as solely responsible for action. The two forces work 
together in constructing reality, and, as a result, Foucault writes that 
"we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to 
imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power 
relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only 
outside its injunctions, its demand and its interests ... We 
should admit rather that power produces knowledge ... that 
power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there 
is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a 
field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations. "29 
Essentially, knowledge mediates the formulation of truth statements, and power mediates 
the way in which these statements are actualized in social practice. The two work in a mu-
tually reinforcing relationship. 
The Foucauldian subject, the centre of conscious modem knowledge, is first objec-
tified within the empirical research conducted by the human sciences; this ~owledge is 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid., p. 27. My emphasis:· 
----~--~---------~---------------~ 
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consolidated within discourse, providing a norm as introduced in The Order of Things. 
The human being is then subjectified in the process of applying knowledge to the interior or 
soul of the subject; this process is surrounded by a power relationship, between the sub-
.,, 
jected individual, and discursive practices. For the rest of our investigation into power re-
lationships, I wish to investigate the way in which Foucault describes the modern disci-
plinary society, and the way in which a norm or aggregate is imposed upon the body of the 
individual and interiorized as acceptable and expected conduct. In the paragraphs which 
follow, I wish to link Foucault's first two periods: first, knowledge with power; and sec-
ond, the human subject as a constructed entity within power-knowledge relations. 
A DESCRIPTION OF THE FOUCA ULDIAN SUBJECT 
With reference to the humanist subject, conscious of himself as possessing an interior 
cognitive space, or "soul", Foucault writes: 
"Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of 
an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a 
certain technology of power over the body. It would be 
wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological ef-
fect...it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently 
around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power 
that is exercised on those punished ... [it is born] out of 
methods of punishment, supervision and constraint."30 
The soul, as an intricate part of the humanist description of modem man, is shown by 
Foucault to not only be constructed, but linked in some fundamental sense to the power to 
punish, and specifically to the methods used to punish, "methods of punishment, supervi-
sion and constraint."31 In describing a penal process interested in the manipulation of the 
human individual, Foucault makes a direct link to the process of identity and subjectifica-
tion. In short, Foucault links a particular practice of power with the formation of interiority 
or consciousness. In Discipline and Punish, in the astonishing quote which follows and 
30ibid., p. 29. 
3 ljbid. 
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others similar to it, Foucault describes the "soul" or what is traditionally conceived as the 
seat of humanity, human consciousness, or morality, to be directly linked in its formation 
to the intersection of modern systems of knowledge and power. While Foucault makes 
clear that this "soul" does exist, he simultaneously denies its plasticity, its innate existence, 
or its being independent of the social forces that bring it into existence: 
"This real, non-corporal soul is not a substance; it is the ele-
ment in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of 
power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the 
machinery by which the power relations give rise to a pos-
sible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and rein-
forces the effects of this power."32 
Foucault will describe this "soul" or inner place of reference as the foundation for all of the 
human sciences, all the various ideologies, religions, discourses and references to the soul 
as the seat of humanity. Knowledge provides the rationale for a depiction of the soul as a 
constant and verifiable reality, that which is responsible for that which is known as 
"human". 
Foucault destroys this illusion by describing anything remotely linked to human 
consciousness or reflexivity as constructed within a particular (modern) epistemological 
tradition which, in one of its many forms, is based on penality and the correct training of 
individuals. Foucault refers below to the soul as a "reality-reference", a source from which 
reality can be mapped and understood, both as an objective fact which exists outside of 
ourselves, and, perhaps most importantly, that which exists as a subjective place of refer-
ence for the individual: that "place" which provides us with identity. This is a description 
of the modern psyche, a place from which one's own unique understanding of the world 
might authentically be interpreted.33 The world is thus interpreted for the modem subject 
32jbid. 
331 must make reference here to Charles Taylor, whose work within the liberal tradition has 
touched on many of the points raised here. Words like "authenticity" should therefore be 
credited to him and his influences. 
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from this particular point of reference, something which the modern has come to blindly 
accept as unproblematic. From this acceptance of "the soul", understood by the modern 
individual as a place from which sense is made of the world, Foucault is convinced that 
"various concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, sub-
jectivity, personality, consciousness etc.; on it have been built scientific techniques and dis-
courses and the moral claims of humanism."34 Modern Man's interior is thus a consti-
tuted, non-constant illusion, and yet, as we have already seen in The Order of Things, 
upon this construction a modern "science of Man" has been created. 
Just as Foucault rejects the notion of a unified self, so he rejects what might be un-
derstood as an internal essence which in some way might be freed or liberated, as would.be 
the case with marxism: 
"[L]et there be no misunderstanding: it is not that a real man, 
the object of knowledge, philosophical reflection or techno-
logical intervention, has been substituted for the soul, the il-
lusion of the theologians. The man described for us, whom 
we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a 
subjection much more profound than himseif."35 
Offering us no solace in a soul of Man, or even his liberation from whatever it is that might 
be inhibiting him from his true being, modem Man is offered two seemingly nihilistic 
choices by Foucault: either he is to accept his death, and is intellectually murdered as 
Foucault predicted at the conclusion of The Order of Things; or he is shown the prison 
within which he finds himself locked forever--deep within himself, from the place called 
the soul, Foucault shows modern Man as controlled within a humanist conception of him-
self and the world. Caught within a disciplinary matrix, which is itself supported by 
power-knowledge relations, Man is simultaneously a prisoner of his knowledge, and the 
effects of that knowledge. Thus, a "'soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence, which 
34 Discipline and Punish, p. 29-30. 
35 ibid., p. 30. My emphasis. 
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is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect 
and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body. "36 
In this, we see reference again to the constitution of the subject within kriowledge. 
relations. Normalization occurs when this new discourse on the right way to conduct one-
self is introduced with modernity and holds all citizens accountable for their actions. As a 
genealogy, Discipline arui Punish traces modem penality as operating with a particular on-
tological conception of human consciousness: an "interiority" innate to the human subject 
which is conceived as substance. This soul, or depth, is open to scrutiny towards rendering 
within knowledge structures, as well as open to rectification in the case of delinquency. 
Normalization as a process serves the purpose both of correcting illicit behaviour, as well 
as ensuring that values and norms that emerge in a modem discourse on penality are un-
derstood and internalized by all citizens: 
"the art of punishing, in the regime of disciplinary power, is 
aimed neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repres-
sion ... The perpetual penality that traverses all points and su-
pervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions com-
pares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. 
In short, it nonnalizes."37 
Asdescribed in The OrderofThings, modem epistemology, given its internal construction 
and the various rules governing the creation of truth statements, tends towards sameness, 
towards normalizing knowledge. A similar conception of the normalization of reality is 
outlined in this later work. 
Discipline arui Punish introduces two fundamentally important concepts in the ge-
nealogy of the modem subject: first, Foucault's conception of power as something diamet-
rically opposed to traditional conceptions of this force; second, the notion of modem disci-
pline and normalization, the work of the modern episteme towards Sameness, and the con-
36ibid. My emphasis. 
37 ibid., pp. 182-3. 
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solidation within discourse of a particular way of being or conduct which serves as an 
aggregate against which Other behaviour is judged. This process of judging incorporates 
far more than just the courts, but all of the human sciences, concerned as they are with the 
human species and investigations into the interior of this creature. The subject is thus 
caught up within a complex set of relations, on the one hand objectified with the empirical 
sciences concerned with determining the essence or origin of the human interior; on the 
other, subject to a particular definition of power which incorporates these knowledges 
within a disciplinary code imposed on the individual. A process of normalization is care-
fully constructed to deal with anomalous cases, this a process of human subjectification. 
From a genealogy of the disciplined individual, Foucault moved on to investigate 
the development of systems of governance for populations. The History of Sexuality 
(Volume 1) introduces the powerful thesis of "bio-power", a particular form of discipline. 
Bio-power describes the concerns which modern states have with the maintenance of politi-
cal efficacy and economic productivity. It is an extension of systems of governance which 
centre themselves on individuals actions and utility, and the word which Foucault uses to 
theorize a conception of discipline on a national state level. Let us move into this study of 
the discipline of populations, in order to link modern systems of discipline, political and 
economic concerns of the modern state, and the ontological constitution of the human sci-
ences (and thus Man) as a result of these processes. 
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Chapter Five: 
THE SUBJECT OF LIFE 
Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given 
which power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain 
which knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the name 
that can be given to a historical construct...sexuality is the 
set of effects produced in bodies, behaviors, and social rela-
tions by a certain deployment deriving.from a complex polit-
ical technology .. 
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Volume 1) 
[B]io-power was without question an indispensable element 
in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have 
been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into 
the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phe-
nomenon of population to economic processes. But this 
was not all it required; it also needed the growth of both 
these factors, their reinforcement as well as their availability 
and dodlity; it had to have methods of power capable of op-
timizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the 
same time making them more difficult to govern. 
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Volume 1) 
... how is it that in a society like ours, sexuality was not 
simply a means of reproducing the species, the family, and 
the individual? Not simply a means to obtain pleasure and 
enjoyment? How has sexuality come to be considered the 
privileged place where our deepest 'truth' is read and ex-
pressed ... 'To know who you are, know what your sexuality 
is.' Sex has always been the forum where both the future of 
our species and our 'truth' as human subjects are decided. 
Michel Foucault, inte:rview 
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In The History of Sexuality (Volume 1) (1976), Foucault furthers his study of modern 
systems of discipline as introduced in Discipline and Punish; in this later text, however, 
instead of investigating prison systems, he explores the concept of "sexuality", and 
expands his interest away from the discipline of individual subjects to focus instead on 
populations. Closely linked to the political and economic problems posed by demographic 
growth, sexuality is a1so important to Foucault's study in ontological terms. His work 
. seeks to explain the growth of human interiority, with particular reference here to sexuality, 
as well as the connection between a specifically modern discourse on human "nature" and 
the effects of sexual desire on political and economic considerations. This chapter seeks to 
link the notion of human interiority (introduced in Part I of this dissertation) to particular 
political and social practices which work to divide subjects one from another, and also 
within themselves. 
In Foucault's introduction to his series on sex, desire, and population classification; 
he explains how a discourse of interiority became widely accepted in nineteenth century 
Eurnpe,.as research was encouraged within the newly-formed human sciences; at this time, 
\ 
and~ a resultof theJ:ednvestigations, human interiority or consciousness came to be 
wL,4e1y accepted as desctjptive of Ma:q.~s being. Linked to this idea of a{luman conscious-
,.,. ''Y 
ness was the idea that Man had a sexual nature which in some sense has been denied actual-;) ,, ~ ' 
ization. Foucault, however, rejects a normalized approach to sexuality as a reprl!!ised part 
of the human physiology or consciousness, and instead q_v.scribes a particular relationship 
between modern knowledge and power which produces the very notion of sexuality itself. 
Rather than a restriction on sex and discursive formations describing or including it, "far 
from undergoing a process of restriction," modern sexuality 
"on the contrary has been subjected to a mechanism of in-
creasing incitement ... the techniques of power exercised over 
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sex have not obeyed a principle of rigorous selection, but 
rather one of dissemination and implantation of polymor-
phous sexualities ... "1 
Instead of a repressive environment, Foucault shows that modernity has in fact not only _ 
"invented" (or epistemologically constructed) sexuality, but in doing so has established a 
discourse on its supposedly intrinsic "nature". This chapter will first seek to define the 
modern move to create the sexual entity, (or Man as a being with an ontologically signifi-
cant "sexuality"), an intrinsic part of the human psyche; second, and more importantly, this 
chapter will seek to trace Foucault's description of a modern politics which centres its con-
cerns around population: the point at which knowledge of the human capacity for repro-
duction, and attempts to contain this perceived political and economic problem for the mod- . 
em state, merge in a relationship of subjection. 
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SEXUAL DESIRE 
Foucauldian power works not to repress sexuality, but instead to render to knowledge what 
exists as the multifarious ways in which sexuality exhibits itself. Rather than a repression 
or covering up of sex within discourse, modern power works in a positive way to render 
sexuality as something problematic, something worthy of being spoken about and ex-
plored. Indeed, an injunction emerges which not only encourages the subject to speak of 
his desires, but demands it in "a veritable discursive explosion" of research material in the 
human sciences.2 While we identify too readily with a Victorian ethic which is perceived to 
have repressed sexual acts in modernity, Foucault ~escribes knowledge and power as hav-
ing in fact reinforced one another to produce a massive discourse about sexuality and hu-
man sexual impulses. Foucault is not so much concerned with social responses to this 
"bourgeoisie morality", as much as he is about a formal knowledge system which works, 
as we will see, to normalize a particular set of desires, "the multiplication of discourses 
lMichel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Volume 1), p. 12. My emphasis. 
2ibid., p. 17. ' 
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concerning sex in the field of exercise of power itself: an institutional incitement to speak 
about it, and to do so more and more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power 
to hear it spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit articulation and endlessly 
accumulateddetaiI."3 Foucault is thus not so much concerned with moral codes and "rules 
of decorum", as he is with modernity's interest in sex as an intrinsic part of human 
"nature".4 
Continuing with a central theme of Discipline and Punish, which emphasizes a 
uniquely modern disciplinary interest in the correct insertion of bodies within spaces to en-
sure economic efficiency and political control, in the realm of the sexual Foucault describes 
modern society as obsessed with a "will to know" vis a vis sexuality, obsessed with "the 
origin'', or the place from which threatening sexual desires spring. Because of the very 
nature of these internal forces or impulses, a careful knowledge of desire is necessary in 
order to describe them within knowledge, which in turn provides a normative account of 
sexuality. A modern knowledge of human sexuality is linked to the creation of a subject 
geared towards maximization of output and potential. Sex as the act of reproducing is 
political to precisely the degree to which it requires state support or intervention (child 
welfare, abortion services, family planning clinics, etc.). Because economic productivity is 
so intricately linked to demographic growth and additionally the degree to which state funds 
will be required to fund a pre- or post-work force, it is linked to a "public potential", either 
latent or already used, and thus requires correct management: "it [has] to be taken charge of 
by analytical discourses."5 
In this precise ordering of the state's population, Foucault describes the police as 
playing a central role; not, however, as a force which sought solely to bring an end to 
delinquency or "the repression of disorder, but an ordered maximization of collective and 
3jbid., p. 18. 
4ibid. 
5ibid., p. 24. 
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individual forces ... "6 In this way, individuals come to be seen as intrinsically valuable; a 
primary and formidable task of the modern state is utilizing its various available resources, 
labour of course being a primary part of this. However, in their work, public officials are 
helped by a well-established civil service, in particular, Foucault writes, the police. Part of 
the work of this surveillance body is the collection and collation of information on society, 
and keeping a close eye on the way in which individuals interact with one another. In this 
way, the police "consolidate and augment, through the wisdom of its regulations, the inter-
nal power of the state ... the police must concern themselves with these means and make 
them serve the public welfare. And they can only obtain this result through the knowledge 
they have of those different assets."7 
As Foucault explores the notion of a population, (a group of individual subjects 
caught up within a social and political space which requires careful attention and guidance), 
he makes reference to a new economic system (industrial capitalism), and new political im-
peratives (the size of populations and newly-emerging forms of crime and delinquency) as 
causal factors for the development of demography as a modern science. Essential too, I 
believe, is the nature of the modern episteme itself, concerned primarily with essence or the 
internal nature of a thing, and the way in which it interacts with similar social, economic, or 
political organs around itself. We have seen this type of interest emerging in relation to the 
mad, modern nosology, and delinquency; The History of Sexuality (Volume 1) concerns 
itself with desire, and the concern of the state to exploit the result of such desires in a man-
aged fashion: population control, the maximum use of a population's energy, and, of 
course, the political will of increasing numbers. 
The central focus of state intervention into the realm of the sexual is the question of 
demography. Modern state intervention into the growth of the bodies within the state 
Foucault calls"[ o ]ne of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth 
6jbid., pp. 24-25. 
7ibid., p. 25. 
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century ... the emergence of 'population' as an economic and political problem. "8 
"Population" in this respect is both political and economic in nature. What concerns mod-
em governments is not purely the number of people available as a work-force, but 
"population as wealth, population as manpower or labour 
capacity, population balanced between its own growth and 
the resources it commanded. Governments perceived that 
they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a 
'people,' but with a 'population,' with its specific phenom-
ena and its peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life ex-
pectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illnesses, 
patterns of diet and habitation ... At the heart of this economic 
and political problem of population was sex: it was neces-
sary to analyze the birthrate, the age of marriage, the legiti-
mate and illegitimate births, the precocity and frequency of 
sexual relations, the ways of making them fertile or sterile, 
the effects of unmarried life or of the prohibitions, the impact 
of contraceptive practices ... "9 
Foucault describes two primary forces at work in modern society: first, a concern with the 
population as a space which multiplies itself: this is the field of demography concerned with 
numbers and the economic and political implications thereof; secondly, and more impor-
tautly for this dissertation, is the creation of a subject aware of him or herself as a sexual 
being, a being who is capable of reproduction as a result of this desire, and is therefore 
subject to a normalizing discourse with regards these impulses. The first reveals 
Foucault's new concerns with governance, or "governmentality" in his words; IO the sec-
8ibid. 
9ibid., pp. 25-26. 
lOFoucault became increasingly interested in the concept of government and 
"govemmentality" towards the end of his life, with studies into the "reason of government". 
In The Foucault Effect, he describes the latter as 
"(1) The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow 
the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of 
power, which has as its target population, as its principal form 
of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical 
means apparatuses of security. (2) ... the formation of a whole 
series of specific governmental apparatuses, and ... the 
development of a whole complex of savoirs [knowledges]. 
(3) ... the ·result of the process, through which the state of 
justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative 
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ond is a more advanced conception of power in constituting the sexually active human 
subject. I wish first to conclude the foregoing investigation of Foucault's thoughts on the 
political and economic implications of demography and its place within a newly emerging 
system of discipline on a macro-scale; in the final section of this chapter, I will move on to 
the ontological and epistemological problems which Foucault reveals of the subject caught 
up within a limiting discourse and system of normalizing power which determines identity 
and being. 
THE HUMAN SUBJECT AND EUGENICS 
The political question related to demography and population growth centres around eugen-
ics, the maximization and improvement of the human species. We have already seen in-
depth analysis in Discipline and Punish of new systems within factories, schools, prisons, 
etc., towards facilitating the creation of the economically efficient subject. However, 
Foucault does not offer a simplistic, reductionist theory here. He shows that a new em-
phasis on life and its forces was not an ethic applied alone by the ruling classes upon the 
working class. In fact, a concern with life concentrated itself within the ruling class first, 
with a new-found desire on their part to live and rule longer: 
"It seems in fact that what was involved was not an asceti-
cism, in any case not a renunciation of pleasure or a disqual-
ification of the flesh, but on the contrary an intensification of 
the body, a problematization of health and its operational 
terms: it was a question of techniques for maximizing life. 
The primary concern was not repression of the sex of the 
classes to be exploited, but rather the body, vigor, longevity, 
progeniture, and descent of the classes that 'ruled'." 11 
Foucault describes a modem emphasis on "life" for all of the population, either towards en-
suring more effective rule, or increased productivity. Foucault relates this not to class for-
state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually 
becomes 'governmentalized' ." (pp. 102-103) 
11· . ' 1b1d., pp. 122-123. 
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mations, even though both classes were affected by its force, but to a new political and so-
cial system which emerged with modernity, as we explored in Discipline and Punish: 
"Since the classical age, the West has undergone a very pro-
found transformation of these mechanisms of power. 
'Deduction' has tended to be no longer the major form of 
power but merely one element among others, working to 
incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize 
the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, mak-
ing them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated 
to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying 
them."12 
Given the nature of an entirely new conception of the political polity and the forces con-
tained within it, since the advent of modernity, social forces at whatever level are equally 
caught up within a field of power which has as its emphasis life forces and their maximiza-
tion. Foucault calls this a "life-administering power", a force which seeks to make human 
beings utile, effective, and productive.13 
Around this newly formulated conception of sovereignty, caught up within a politi-
cal system focused on rights granted by a social contract, life is defined differently, affect-
ing both the way in which an individual is conceived within the mass, as well as the un-
derstanding an entire population has of its existence and well-being. Foucault points to the 
problematization of the death penalty, or capital punishment, as elucidative of the first 
point, (the place of the individual within the state); as illustrative of the second, Foucault 
points to the modern ability to annihilate entire countries with the use of nuclear weapons. 
For Foucault, death is completely redefined in modernity, as the subject is judged in 
term.s of harm caused to society and possible future harm in terms of intentions, not prior 
actions alone. The emphasis in a trial which might include a judgement of death is not only 
upon the crime itself, but the extent to which an individual is capable of committing a simi-
lar offence in the future. Foucault ties this directly to the social contract, as well as the 
l 2ibid., p. 136. 
13ibid. 
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modem emphasis on confession and a delving into the human psyche to determine the ex-
tent to which actions are motivated by the soul or interior desires: "capital punishment could 
not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the mon-
strosity of the criminal, his incorrigibility, and the safeguard of society. One had the right 
to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others." 14 
As we have seen in Discipline and Punish, the modem subject is caught in a para-
doxical relationship between discursive practices and a particular notion of power: on the 
one hand, the modem requirement to foster life on a macro scale; on the other, the need to 
kill those who, as individuals, threaten this group. Ultimately, the test becomes the degree 
to which society as a whole can ensure its citizens' well-being, with the individual subject 
caught within this rubric. Juxtaposed to a classical conception of life and its ability to "take 
life or let live", modernity replaces this paradigm with "a power to foster life or disallow it 
to the point to death."15 Just as the place and power of the classical sovereign changed in 
relation to justice, so in modernity do new rules and ethics circumscribe the way in which 
life is ordered, encouraged, managed, and disallowed. 
But what of a macro-conception of life and its Other? Foucault offers a startling de-
scription of his ideas around the ability to kill on a mass scale. Where war was once fought 
to defend a sovereign and single body, war in modernity is fought to protect an entire 
population, and yet, ironically, threatens to destroy this body entirely: 
14ibid., p. 138. 
lSibid. 
"the power to expose a whole population to death is the un-
derside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued 
existence ... But the existence in question is no longer the ju-
ridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological ex-
istence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of 
modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the 
ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exer-
cised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-
scale phenomenon of population."16 
16ibid., p. 137. My emphasis. 
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In an incredible paradox, modernity condones the killing of hundreds and sometimes hun-
dreds of thousands so that the larger group may live. Through this process, modem life 
takes on a dual problematic: first, life is that which might bankrupt the nation in coming to 
be, or that which, in dying, saves that same nation. 
FOUCAULT'S THEORY OF BIO-POWER 
I want to move on and look at the more important ontological and epistemological questions 
attached to the Foucauldian notion of life in modernity, and the effects of this upon the 
. 
constitution of a subject within these new discursive practices and relations of power. 
Foucault defines "bio-power," (or "bio-politics"), as a politics concerned with life and its 
forces.17 He breaks the modem problematic of the body and its existence into two poles 
"around which the organization of power over life was deployed," "two poles of develop-
ment linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations."18 The first of these 
"poles" is the disciplines, as we explored in the previous chapter. This is a process which 
centres on individuals and their performance: 
"One of these poles ... centred on the body as a machine: its 
disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion 
of it forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its 
docility, its integration into systems of efficient and eco-
nomic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of 
power that characterized the disciplines: an anatomo-politics 
of the human body.19 
On a macroscopic scale, Foucault outlines a politi~al process connected to entire popula-
tions. This second "pole" focuses on the entire 
"species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life 
and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propa-
gation, births and mortality, the level of health, life ex-
pectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that cause 
17 ibid., pp. 139, 140. 
18 ibid., p. 139. 
19 ibid .. 
134 
these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an 
entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-
politics of the population. "20 
Foucault is primarily concerned with sketching the way in which modern discipline of the 
human body,emerged. We have already investigated the first in Discipline and Punish; the 
second we explored above in Foucault's description of a new definition of "life" in 
modernity and a new set of sciences concerned with population numbers and their man-
agement. What remains to be investigated are the implications of bio-power on the subject, 
which is constituted as an empirical constant within discourse, and monitored not only in 
terms ofhis existence as a population figure, but more importantly in relation to his desires, 
and the implications thereof. In other words, what we seek to discover are the implications 
of bio-power on the subject of modern man, "an animal whose politics places his existence 
as a living being in question."21 
The crux of Foucault's work in his Power period, and what emerges as most dis-
concerting as a result of this, is his emphasis on knowledge and power relationships which 
exist exterior to the subject, and yet find their birth and existence within him. It is through 
empirical research, as we have seen with The Order of Things, and through the establish-
ment of an essence which is constant and definable over time, as well as the position of the 
subject as the vehicle of power relationships which reinforce this paradigm, that seems to 
suggest that Foucault offers an impossible political project. It leads to a sense that the sub-
jected individual is powerless, bereft of agency or the capacity to act, against such an im-
posing system; the Foucauldian paradigm suggests that life is without meaning where this 
is Man-made, that reality is a construct governed by rules and statements that Foucault can-
not ascribe causal factors for, which have come into existence two hundred years ago, and 
which his work does not seem sure can be overcome. In other words, in addition to a 
20jbid. 
21ibid., p. 143. 
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sense of a lack of agency of the part of the subject, a reasonable argument can be made, it 
seems that his work presents a picture of despair, a reality of political quietism; in other 
words, Foucault can aptly be described, at least intellectually, as a nihilist. It is the task of 
Part III of this dissertation to present these arguments: I will use Charles Taylor to outline 
an argument against truth and freedom, and Martin Jay, among others, to argue from a 




Foucault's "middle'' period, or the years in which he theorized on the nature and effects of 
modern power, were essential in providing a theoretical coherence to his work on the hu-
man subject. After his books which primarily focused on knowledge, Foucault was forced 
to provide an explanation for ways in which discursive formations interacted with society 
and brought about changes in the daily lives of individuals. This he managed to achieve 
with Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality (Volume 1). In these books, he 
introduces a unique theory of power to modern philosophy, and provides his genealogical 
method of investigating the modern relationship of knowledge and power. 
In this chapter, I have investigated both texts in terms of their genealogical content 
and, more importantly, in terms of their theoretical significance. At this point it should be 
understoop that Foucault describes power as something which circulates within and be-
tween bodies, is not invested within individual sovereign bodies, and which does not exist 
as something which might be toppled in the passion of revolution. Power is the mediating 
force which governs all relationships for Foucault, and which determines the parameters 
within which knowledge ofthings is perceived and applied to bodies and spaces. 
Important to note is the link between knowledge and power in ontological terms. 
Knowledge and power, intersecting and constitutive of one another as they are, are also 
constitutive of modern ontological consciousness. Given the close relationship between the 
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epistemic structure which determines the way in which truth might be conceived and de-
scribed, and the ways in which the modem episteme dictates the ways in which the human 
sciences conduct investigations into human interiority, knowledge of the human subject and 
the way in which this is accepted by society at large, exist as constitutive of modem ontol-
ogy. 
The constitution of modem ontology is the most important concept for this disserta-
tion to explore, for two reasons: first, an ontology of Man is central to Foucault's descrip-
tion of his birth within knowledge, and we need to critically examine the way in which he 
describes such a constitution occurring; and second, because Foucault suggests that Man as 
an epistemological problem might be surpassed, we need to understand the way in which 
he describes this process and still allows for the formation of identity and truth structures. 
Now that we have thoroughly explored the ways in which Foucault describes both the na-
ture and form of modem knowledge and power, we might move on to explore some of the 
central critiques of his work. I have mentioned some of the central weaknesses in his for-
mulations in both the periods which we have thus-far explored, but what remains to be 
done is a thorough investigation of critiques offered by very different and opposing tradi-
tions. The degree to which Foucault can successfully answer these critics will determine 
whether in fact his work is coherent and does contain a positive political project. 
There are two central questions "'.'hich might be addressed to Foucault's work: first, 
given the way in which he describes modem knowledge being constructed, how might he 
allow for a meaningful human truth. In other Words, his work appears to deny the ability 
I . 
for human beings to establish constructive and stable truth structures, which in tum inhibits 
the formulation of coherent and meaningful identities. This is primarily a liberal critique, 
and we will use the work of Charles Taylor to pose this line of argument. The second, and 
more difficult question, relates to the degree to which Foucault's work allows for human 
agency, or political action. Posed predominantly by marxists, concerned as they are with 
the potential for revolutionary struggle, the argument here revolves around the seeming ni-
138 
hilism contained in Foucault's work, the inability for the human subject to struggle in a 
positive way against power relations which are not vested within surmountable institutions 
or bodies. 
·· Part III of this dissertation is thus primarily interested in introducing both of these 
arguments, exploring these, and then attempting to vindicate Foucault's theoretical posi-
tion. I will also use the following two chapters as sites to further expand on his theory of 
the relationship between the human subject and power, as well as the ontological results of 
such a position. Now that I have provided a solid introduction to Foucault's work, let us 
turn our attention directly to the concerns of philosophical traditions which criticize his 
work. In this way I hope to focus the primary concerns of this dissertation:. Foucault's 







For his part, Foucault has still not completely come to terms 
with the problem of subjectivity, in that he has been unable 
to theorize the production of meaning by subjects or account 
for resistance to domination. 
Mark Poster, Foucault, Marxism & History 
Given Foucault's theory of the constitution of the human subject, and the oppressive rela-
tionships which the latter experiences as a result of modem power/knowledge relations, 
Part III of this dissertation seeks to investigate important liberal and marxist critiques of his 
work. Both ideologies find Foucault's theory of power problematic, but for distinctly dif-
ferentreasons: in light of Foucault's theory of power which supposedly is constitutive of 
reality, liberals would generally concern themselves more with the ability of the 
Foucauldian subject to establish a meaningful truth or identity; marxists, on the other hand, 
would be far more concerned with the ability of the Foucauldian subject to challenge such 
power-knowledge relations politically. The first criticism is of more interest to us at this 
point, as we attempt to affirm what I have described as the political project inherent in 
Foucault's work. While I believe it only possible to give a full account of this political vi-
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sion once we have explored his final two books, The History of Sexuality (Volumes 2 and 
3), at this point we are in a position to investigate Charles Taylor's argument in relation to 
questions of truth and freedom as presented in his article "Foucault on Freedom and 
Truth". After we have explored a liberal critique of Foucault's oeuvre, I wish to look at the 
work of Martin Jay (Marxism and Totality) and other marxists, with specific reference to 
their concerns with human agency and the potential for revolt, which they find apparently 
absent in Foucault's work. Let us tum our attentions immediately to Taylor's criticisms. 
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Chapter Six: 
AGENCY AND TRUTH 
'Power' without 'freedom' or 'truth': can there really be an 
analysis which uses the notion of power, and which leaves 
no place for freedom, or truth? 
Charles Taylor, "On Freedom and Truth" 
In Charles Taylor's introduction to "Foucault on Freedom and Truth", he offers Foucault's 
work as alluding to "some notion of a good unrealized or repressed in history," and yet, in 
doing so, falling into a terrible trap.I Following on this, a Foucauldian scholar would in-
variably think of the Repressive Hypothesis which we have explored in the previous chap-
ter, in which Foucault rejects a repressed human "nature" as explanatory of the modern 
subject's dilemma; Taylor correctly continues with the assertion that Foucault is not inter-
ested in the act of a "rescue" .2 In "Foucault on Freedom and Truth", a fairly lengthy and 
comprehensive article, it is obvious that Foucault's work irritates or "disconcerts" Taylor.3 
Foucault exposes ills inherent in the modern project, and yet does not offer an alternative, a 
goal to strive for, or "some good we [sf. Taylor himself] can affirm."4 
lcharles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Philosophy of the Human Sciences: 





I will concede that it is true that Foucault does not offer explicit solutions to the 
problems he lays bare in his oeuvre; it might also be that this deserves criticism. Yet it is at 
a still deeper level that Taylor's critique seems to work: he seems, quite implicitly and al-
most surreptitiously, to portray Foucault as an anti-rationalist, a man willing to "bring evils 
to light" (note Taylor's emphasis), and yet also simultaneously unwilling or unable to pro-. 
vide any answers. If the latter case is true, Foucault is what Taylor probably suspected all 
along: yet another continental poet with little of importance to say between big words and 
complex texts, metaphors, images, and signs--the expected confused collage of Franco~ 
European intellectual irrationalism. Either this, a pretentious position, or Foucault is will-
ing to allow the situation which his work outlines to remain in place: Foucault is thus either 
a pretentious pseudo-academic, and indicative of the overdone style which Anglo-Saxon 
theorists have come to expect from the French since Sartre, or he takes the position of a 
nihilist, a sectarian pagan. Foucault the barbarian, with a genre already studded with filthy 
references to insane asylums, deranged criminality, and sexual desire; or Foucault the 
moral disgrace, the harlot, the corrupting menace to be exorcised if not physically, then at 
least intellectually. "The negation or overcoming of these evils" does not necessarily pro-
mote "a good", and Foucault "distances" himself from such a position.5 Either all the 
world is sin, or things don't get any better than they are. Taylor's article thus opens with a 
number of interesting propositions and allusions, and sets the tone for a fairly expansive 
and deeply critical look at Foucault's work. 
TRUTH AND FREEDOM 
The main thrust of Taylor's piece is a reading of Foucault's conception of power as "all-
' 
penetrating and much more insidious than previous forms" and yet simultaneously "as sci-




tive reading of Foucauldian power by Taylor: simultaneously more intrepid than ever be-
fore while offering freedom or liberation in a positive sense. What Taylor goes on to say is 
the cor~ of his argument. After correctly defining Foucauldian power as something 
"positive", he outlines "two goods" "which need rescuing."7 The first of these is freedom; 
the second truth.8 Taylor immediately ties these two notions to the Enlightenment ideals of 
which he is such a strong contender. We are now "back on familiar terrain" for Taylor, 
able to argue within familiar liberal paradigms, and a little safer now distanced from the 
howls of Foucault's asylums.9 
Taylor is shocked out of his temporary satisfaction, however, upon discovering that 
in fact Foucault is not interested in rescuing the above, fighting for a defensible Truth, or 
an inalienable Freedom, both indispensable to modern liberalism. Taylor writes: 
"The idea of a liberating truth [for Foucault] is a profound 
illusion. There is no truth which can be espoused, de-
fended, rescued against systems of power. On the contrary, 
each such system defines its own variant of truth. And there 
is no escape from power into freedom, for such systems of 
power are co-extensive with human society."10 
In this quote Taylor implies two crucial things, which make up the core of his concerns 
with Foucault as I outlined in the introduction to this chapter. First, and explicit in the 
quote above, is the idea that truth does not exist for Foucault, or at the very least, truth does 
not adopt the form we usually conceive it in. Foucauldian truth seems to be, the passage 
states, something no longer located within a safe, universal point of reference and accessi-
ble to all, as a "horizon" towards which we might all equally strive. This idealism, Taylor 
suggests, disappears with Foucault's work, and seems to be the primary source of his 




lOibid., pp. 152-153. 
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the text in its entirety, is that Foucault's work lacks the notion of human agency. What 
emerges at the end of such a critique is a description of Foucault's work which not only 
contains no essential definition of truth, and no horizon against which identity might be un-
derstood or created but, additionally, that denies the ability for the subject to free himself 
from this aJI-embracing power; ultimately, Taylor's article implicitly suggests, Foucault's 
work presents a nihilist picture of the world, in dire contrast to his own understanding. 
What I wish to explore in this chapter is the question of human agency alone. The question 
of nihilism is an extremely important one, an issue which we will return to briefly in a latter 
portion of this chapter, and again in a more formal way in the following chapter. 
THE NATURE OF FOUCAULDIAN POWER 
Taylor's critique centres around a concern about the apparent absence of "truth" and human 
agency within Foucault's theory of power and his description of the way in which the rela-
tionship between knowledge and power has come to define modern disciplinary society. 
The way in which Foucault escapes such criticism is two-fold. First, Taylor does not take 
. into account Foucault's whole project, the reason that I placed so much emphasis on the 
latter's knowledge period in this dissertation. The second is that he did not have access to 
Foucault's final two works in which the latter outlines a programme within which the indi-
vidual can critically address modern power-knowledge relations in the constitution of the 
subject. I am not as concerned with using Foucault's last works against Taylor's critique at 
this point: first, that would be unfair scholastically (even though the article was re-pub-
lished in 1986 with no additions); second, and more importantly, I don't feel it necessary to 
do so, and will use Foucault's last works in the final chapter of this paper when we address 
charges of nihilism against Foucault's oeuvre. 
Taylor correctly understands Foucault's work to rotate on two axes: power, on the 
one hand, and the creation of truth on the other, on 
"power/domination, and on disguise/illusion. He [sf. 
Foucault] lays bare a modern system of power, which is 
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both more all-penetrating and much more insidious than 
previous forms. Its strength lies partly in the fact that it is 
not seen as power, but as science, or fulfillment, even 
'liberation'. Foucault's work is thus partly an unmask-
ing." 11 
In this quote Taylor is partly right, which we will discuss in more detail below. He goes 
on to describe what seems to him to be an "implicit" notion of freedom and truth which can 
be uncovered through Foucault's analyses.12 While commending Foucault's description of 
modem disciplinary structures and its negative effects upon the human subject, Taylor re-
mains convinced that beneath or adjacent to this theory must be the ability to affirm some-
thing new. He correctly assumes, however, that both these concepts are absent from 
Foucault's work; nonetheless, he does so only within a model that Foucault firmly rejects: 
a liberal, humanist assumption of a deep interior from which identity and a sense of pur-
pose can emerge. 
In this chapter, my critique of Taylor will revolve around three central points: first, 
that Taylor misunderstands Foucault's conception of power, particularly in terms of 
sovereignty, or is unwilling to give it credence; second, that Taylor does not understand the 
way in which Foucault has outlined "a way out" of power-knowledge relations; third, and 
most important, that Taylor does not understand Foucault's theory of the subject consti-
tuted w~thin discursive formations--it is only at the level of the episteme that Foucault's 
theory of the subject, knowledge, power, and the implications of all three of these, can be 
understood. By ignoring the texts which I have encompassed within Foucault's 
Knowledge period, Taylor sets himself parameters which are out of line with the essence of 
Foucault's project, and thus argues against the implications of knowledge systems and not 
at the root from which they spring. In addition, by not understanding Foucault's theory of 
discourse, Taylor is unable to see the full political and social aspects of the relationship 
l ljbid., p. 152. 
12jbid. 
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between knowledge and social action, and hereby misses Foucault's final work on ethics 
and a politics which works on the epistemological, and thus ontological, limits within 
which the modem subject is constructed and conceived. Taylor not only misses large parts 
of Foucault's intellectual theory, but as a result of this, fails to conceive of the innately po-
litical result of such work. In the rest of this chapter, I wish to bring these points more 
clearly to light, not only to show the theoretical weaknesses in Taylor's critique of 
Foucault, but also to bring the latter's work in this area more clearly to light. First, how-
ever, I wish to take a closer look at Taylor's critique.13 
TAYLOR'S FIRST LINE OF ANALYSIS: MODERN INTERIORITY 
In the first part of his paper, Taylor lays out "three lines of analysis" with which to ap-
proach Foucault's thought. 14 In his first line of analysis, Taylor applauds Foucault for his 
work in Discipline and Punish to reveal the epistemological move from a Classical sense of 
order based on a cosmology, and the implications thereof on sovereignty and the way in 
which people were ruled, to a modern conception of "ordinary life'', in which monarchical 
hierarchy is stripped away, and people find their place within society given their day-to-day 
activities. Taylor couples this with a new-found emphasis on interiority, with emotions 
being the keystone in determining one's degree of success, happiness, and sense of be-
longing, "a new notion of the good ... a concern for the preservation of life, for the fulfilling 
of human need, and above all for the relief of suffering, which gives us an utterly different 
set of priorities from our forbears."15 
Alongside both of these modem goods is a new emphasis on ''.ordinary life" and the 
affirmation of human existence, which Taylor calls "humanitarianism", connected to "the 
13r believe it important to note that Taylor's paper is based only on Discipline and Punish, 
Power/Knowledge, and The History of Sexuality (Volume 1). Given what I have set out as a 
central thesis for this paper, regarding the close and essential relationship between Foucault's 
first period and those which follow it, Taylor's preparation for the critique presented in this 
article is immediately placed upon shaky ground. It should be noted too that this article was 
re-printed in 1986, without revisions. 
l 4"Foucault on Freedom and Truth," p. 153. 
15ibid., p. 155. 
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modem identity, the sense we have of ourselves as free, self-defining subjects, whose un-
derstanding of their own essence or of their paradigm purposes is drawn from 'within', 
and no longer from a supposed cosmic order in which they are set."16 "Ordinary life" is 
what we live on a daily basis towards fulfilling this internal reality, and affirming our place 
within the modem order. In modernity, the good life is no longer defined as one filled with 
contemplation of a higher order, but rather is the ability to actualize the self through actions 
which have been accepted as "true" for the self. The "good life" can also be perceived in 
modernity as the space in which one practices the innate freedom to choose. Within a so-
ciety based on rights, freedom is defined in terms of the degree to which this will to choose 
is ensured. It appears, however, as if "the Enlightenment valuation" is not part of 
Foucault's concern, (he takes "a stance of neutrality"), and this for Taylor is alarming.17 
Contained in Foucault's work 
"are just two systems of power, classical and modern. But 
at first blush, there seems to be a value reason for refusing 
the Enlightenment valuation. This lies in a reading of mod-
ern humanitarianism as the reflection of a new system of 
domination, directed towards the maintenance and increase 
of 'bio-mass'."18 
And so we move into the second of Taylor's concerns, which mount as we go along. At 
this point, Foucault seeins to propose an alternative, even while remaining uninterested in 
the Enlightenment-inspired ideals which Taylor holds in high regard. 
TAYLOR'S SECOND LINE OF ANALYSIS: POWER 
Taylor's second line of analysis focuses on Foucault's definition of power. This formula-
tion Taylor describes as "(a) ... not concerned with law but with normalization,"19 
16ibid. 
17"Foucault on Freedom and Truth," p. 156. 
18ibid., pp. 156-157. 
19ibid., p. 158. 
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"(b) ... productive,"20 and "(c) ... not wielded by a subject."21 Taylor is of course right on 
all three counts; these three conceptions are the core of Foucault's theory of power as we 
have already seen. How, then, does Taylor respond? 
He invokes the critiques of both Schiller and the Frankfurt School in a "central 
theme" of critical theory, that of the contrast between nature and instrumental reason.22 
Foucauldian power seems to run concurrent with this, in that human reason is applied to 
some internal substance in a way to alter it negatively. However, Taylor writes that 
Foucault adds to this formulation, or "seems to offer to the Schillerian perspective another 
connection (supplementing, not replacing the first)": 
"The objectifying and domination of inner nature comes 
about in fact not just through a change of attitude [not 
through some means of consensus or coercion between 
subjects] but through training in an interiorization of certain 
disciplines. The disciplines of organized bodily movement, 
of the employment of time, of ordered dispositions of liv-
ing/working space; these are the paths by which objectifica-
tion [for Foucault] really takes place ... and takes on the di-
mensions of a mass phenomenon. "23 
Taylor praises Foucault's account thus far, even commending it as "more detailed and more 
convincing than what they (sf. The Frankfurt School) came up with themselves."24 
However, while Taylor is prepared to go along with Foucault to this point, he is to reject 
Foucault's place of rest, for while Taylor would seek liberty from such an imposition, 
Foucault offers no such hope; the latter "will have nothing to do with this Romantic-derived 
view of the oppression of nature and our 'liberation' from it. Once again, this seems ulti-
mately to be a matter of his Nietzschean refusal of the notion of truth as having any mean-
ing outside a given order of power."25 Thus far, Foucault has disappointed Taylor on two 
20ibid., p. 159. 
21ibid. 
22ibid. 




counts: first, he rejects the freedom inherent in the values and ordinary life passed down to 
us from the Enlightenment; second, Foucault refuses a liberation from d1e imposition of 
modem disciplines on the subject. To this point, Taylor agrees with Foucault's analysis, 
indeed applauds his thorough rendition of the negative effects of the changes in society 
since the Enlightenment, but is stymied when he seeks some consensus with Foucault on 
how to resolve these problems. 
TAYLOR'S THIRD LINE OF ANALYSIS: HUMAN NATURE 
In his third and final line of analysis, Taylor returns to the Romantic notion of an inner na-
ture which must be fulfilled, in an attempt to formulate some positive notion of human na-
ture or essence within Foucault's work. His discussion revolves around Foucault's analy-
sis of sexuality in modernity as illustrated in The History of Sexuality (Volume 1). 
Ironically, in his desire to affirm an innate human quality related to love, compassion, and 
desire, an "inner nature which must be articulated in our nature as sexual beings," Taylor 
outlines a theory of human nature which Foucault rejects outright in his Repressive 
Hypothesis. 26 
Taylor writes that while this essential human nature might have been "distorted" or 
impaired from reaching actualization or fruition as a result of modem society, "the capitalist 
work-ethic, or the disciplines of a bureaucratic society," there does exist a true way to ex-
press and to feel emotion; despite the pressures upon us in modernity, there exists as a uni-
versal fact "an authentic way for each of us to love," and this authenticity must be in some 
sense freed or liberated.27 Foucault, however, denies this chance to feel objectively and, 
more importantly than this, denies the opportunity for liberation of these essential and in-
nately human desires: 
26jbid., p. 161. 
27jbid. 
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"whatever the distorting agent [of our "inner nature"], it 
needs to be liberated, and coming to true expression is both a 
means and a fruit of this liberation. Foucault aims to dis-
mantle this whole conception, and show it to be a thorough-
going illusion."28 
Taylor goes on to outlin~ Foucault's work on the role of early Christianity (particularly 
Augustinianism) in defining an inner being, or essence. He correctly links an inner human 
self with truth structures which first dictate that modern human beings subject themselves 
to a process of confession, thus feeding a knowledge structure intent on knowing the hu-
man condition thoroughly; simultaneously, they submit themselves to individual inquiry 
through a process which is linked to subjectification and normalization. 
What particularly frustrates Taylor is the seeming tautology of the situation: 
"The whole idea that we are generally too sexually re-
pressed, and need above all liberation; that we need to be 
able to talk more freely, that we need to throw off tab us and 
enjoy our sexual nature: this is not just another of those illu-
sions which makes us see power always in terms of prohibi-
tions. In fact the self experience whereby we have a sexual 
nature which is held down or confined by rules and tabus is 
itself a creation of the new kind of power/control. In going 
for liberation, we see ourselves as escaping a power under-
stood on the old model. But in fact we live under a power of 
the new kind, and this we are not escaping; far from it, we 
are playing its game, we are assuming the shape it has 
moulded for us."29 
After three lines of analysis, with Taylor and Foucault seemingly close in their critique of 
modernity, they fail to reach consensus in three crucial areas: first, Foucault is not prepared 
to affirm the humanist tradition and the good life described by the Enlightenment; second, 
Foucault will not affirm the chance for liberation from external impositions on the self 
which hinder its actualization, in line with a Romantic notion of self-fulfillment; third, and 
perhaps most startling, Foucault rejects a humanist conception of the self as something 
28ibid. 
29ibid., p. 162. 
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stable and constant and does not allow for the affirmation of this entity. Ultimately 
Foucault seems to present a paradigm of modernity in which we have strayed from the ini-
tially intended path, and yet are powerless, to either act against this force, and, worse still, 
are unable or incapacitated, given the nature of modem power, to redefine the good life, to 
put ourselves back on track. Here Taylor has reached a point at which Foucault's work 
both frustrates and disconcerts him beyond redemption, "where he (sf. Foucault] adopts a 
Nietzschean-derived stance of neutrality between the different historical system (sic] of 
power, and thus seems to neutralize the evaluations which arise out of his analyses."30 In 
other words, for Taylor, Foucault puts forward a solid and commendable critique of 
modernity, but is unable to affirm solutions to these "evaluations", these wrongs which 
somehow must, (and for Taylor can) be put right.31 I wish to go on and explore Taylor's 
response to Foucault's work, and the reason why he ultimately rejects a Foucauldian defi-
nition of power in modernity. From there I will go on to outline the weaknesses in 
Taylor's argument, and, hopefully, will be able to vindicate Foucault's position. 
Taylor's critique is threefold: first, he does not accept Foucault's notion of power 
relations "without a subject;"32 second, Taylor rejects power "without 'freedom' or 
'truth';"33 third, an extension of point two, and the concept that most bothers Taylor is the 
Foucauldian notion of "truth as subordinated to power."34 What we have in essence is a 
gradual move away from all of the liberal conceptions that Taylor holds true and which in-
creasingly baffle and frustrate him when reading Foucault's work. The central concern 
here is the way in which Foucault constructs a paradigm within which power moves, unin-
vested within an individual or institution and which thus negates the possibility of libera-
tion. Further to this is Foucault's concept of power as constitutive of truth, which denies 
30ibid., p. 163. 
3 libid. 
32jbid., p. _167. 
33ibid., p. 174. See the quote which heads this chapter. 
34jbid., p. 177. 
152 
the human ability to provide comer-stones to mark morality or ethics. Taylor doesn't ex-
tend his argument, as he might, to accuse Foucault of nihilism, but this is certainly implicit 
in his argument. While Taylor is certainly sympathetic to, and grateful for, Foucault's cri-
tiques of modernity, the two men do not appear able to reach consensus on a position, and 
Taylor ultimately rejects Foucault's work, hoping that the latter's forthcoming books would 
clear up certain discrepancies.35 Let us look at where Taylor goes astray, as far as I am 
concerned, in his critique of Foucault. Instead of answering each of his points in tum, I 
would like to approach all three head-on, because I believe they are fundamentally con-
pected to one another. 
A CRITIQUE OF TAYLOR 
The single-most weakness of Taylor's argument is that he ignores Foucault's Knowledge 
period. With a single brief mention of The Order of Things in name alone, Taylor fails to 
see the essential connection for Foucault between knowledge and power. In fact, it is dis-
cursive practices which lie at the heart of Foucault's intellectual interests, and not power. 
The latter is only introduced in order to show how knowledge is mediated within society as 
we have previously discussed. Central for Foucault is the notion that modem epistemology 
is underpinned by a particular type of episteme, this directed towards rendering objects in 
their true essence and establishing, alongside these entities, those that are deemed anoma-
lous. 
It is out of this body of knowledge, then, that the modern subject emerges. As a 
result, Foucault rejects all notions of an essential or grounded self, in dire contrast to 
Taylor, who writes: 
35jbid., p. 183. 
"Our humanitarianism, our notions of freedom--both per-
sonal independence and collective self-rule--have helped to 
define a political identity we share; and one which is deeply 
rooted in our more basic, seemingly infra-political under-
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standings: of what it is to be an individual; of the person as a 
being with 'inner' depths--all the features which seem to us 
to be rock-bottom, almost biological properties of human 
beings ... "36 
Foucault would reject this liberal perspective just as he rejected a similar structuralist posi-
tion which Chomsky put forward. Human interiority and epistemological truth are both 
created in discourse and in history, and are thus contingent. 
I stress the word "contingent" because not only does this imply that modernity and 
its self-knowledge is fleeting, or at leasttentative and susceptible to being undermined, but 
that knowledge within modernity does offer certain guidelines within which human sub-
jects operate. There is a paradigm within which to move, there is a reality which exists; the 
notions of identity, truth, and self-understanding do exist for Foucault. The emphasis, 
however, should be on the fact that these truths, which people can choose to accept or re-
ject, have been created through history, so they are not Truths in a stable or atemporal 
sense. This does not necessarily invoke a counter-argument of relativism: we might attach 
labels to objects (an essential part of the language process), and yet problematize the essen-
tial qualities of each of these, realizing that the "truth" attached to each of them in terms of 
these identifying labels is constituted through time and might be replaced by a fliture and 
different exercise of thought. 
I do not want to preempt the forthcoming section of this dissertation, but if knowl-
edge structures are indeed the spaces in which reality is constructed, and if these spaces are 
indeed driven by a particular set of rules which qetermine what might and might not be 
thought, then this implies limits which might equally be challenged and overcome. We are 
back to concepts raised in The Order ofThings: the "limits" of thought; the "origin" of on-
tological labels which define human identity; and the "unthought" (as a space outside of that 
which is defined as truth) from which criticism might be directed. Taylor is thus unable to 
36ibid., p. 181. My emphasis. Note how close Taylor's formulation of human nature is to that of 
Noam Chomsky's, as quoted in Chapter 3. 
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come to terms with the basis of Foucault's project. I think the following quote emphasizes 
this well, and I would like to use it as a springboard to look more closely at where Taylor 
strays from this: 
" ... truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary 
to a myth whose history and functions would repay further 
study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of pro-
tracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have suc-
ceeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this 
world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of 
constraint. "3 7 
Foucault describes truth as something which exists and yet is contingent within time and 
space; in time as determined by history, and space as determined by epistemic configura-
tions which structure knowledge within a particular period of history: 
"Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of 
truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and 
·makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the 
means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and pro-
cedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status 
of those who are charged with saying what counts as 
true."38 
In this passage, we find four vital clues to what constitutes Foucault's most press-
ing philosophical concerns. First, the fact that truth is "of this world" contradicts all tradi-
tional conceptions of truth or morality as something timeless, transcendental or objectively 
(scientifically for marxists) embedded in nature, whether human or otherwise. Second, 
Foucault shows here that knowledge is something that constitutes truth, and forms the 
foundation from which various practices are put into operation which distinguish truth from 
falsehood. Knowledge, then, is constitutive of reality as well as being grounded in reality. 
Third, the subject, or Man, is similarly a creature created within knowledge formations, 
and constituted within the subjectifying disciplines, or through the process of normaliza-
37Foucault, 'Truth and Power" in The Foucault Reader, pp. 72-73. My emphasis. 
38ibid., p. 73. My emphasis. 
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tion. There is no such thing as internal essence for Foucault: it is a direct product of an 
epistemological configuration which is particular to modernity. Fourth, and perhaps most 
importantly, because truth is created, and the subject remains for Foucault a product of this 
knowledge, there is no escape into an alternative reality; nor is there any innate truth to be 
uncovered as Taylor would so desperately like to see. For Foucault, liberation as a concept 
is a non-sequitur (or a non-possibility), if this is defined in terms of the uncovering of 
some deeper truth or hidden reality which is either as yet unknown or has until now been 
quashed or repressed in some way. Foucault has lucidly illustrated this point in The 
History of Sexuality (Volume 1) under his discussion of the Repressive Hypothesis. What 
is extremely important to note, however, and this will be more clearly defined in our dis-
cussion of Foucault's overall political project, is that we are not faced with a situation of 
hopelessness. Humankind is not to despair at the indulgence of Foucault's theories as out-
lined above. While he has not explicitly provided a programme for overturning present 
knowledge systems, at the heart of his project is the theoretical possibility of doing so. 
FOUCAULT'S HOPE FOR THE FUTURE 
Taylor strays in his argument by not encompassing Foucault's earlier works in his article. 
The core of the latter's project is a problematization of the production of truth statements, of 
the way in which we accept knowledge as progressive and scientific, especially in relation 
to the human sciences and knowledge of Man. Taylor takes for granted that human essence 
exists, and that through this an objective order of "goods" can be established for all human 
beings; Taylor takes for granted that justice and progress exist beyond space and time. 
~ 
Taylor and Foucault will continue at loggerheads unless a central question is addressed: that 
of the subject and its nature. It is thus not surprising that Foucault, as he does in "The 
Subject and Power", explicitly states his central concern as being the constitution of the 
subject within the "objectifying sciences". "[T]he fog emanating from Paris" might clear 
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for Taylor if he thought more deeply on Foucault's total project.39 The latter's work on the 
human subject is coherent and is powerful when read as a continuum, a factor which I be-
lieve critical in examining the work of Foucault. 
From Taylor, we have a critique centred primarily on his conception of the way in 
which power and the subject interact. If we extend this argument to look primarily at the 
nature of power for Foucault, we might be confronted with a question of political quietism, 
a Foucauldian project which seems to deny political activity. If we distance ourselves from 
Foucault's theory and attempt to discuss the implications thereof for resistance, we might 
find a problem in understanding the ability for human subjects to challenge oppressive 
power-knowledge relations. In the following chapter, I wish to introduce a broadly marx-
ist critique, using a number of theorists who might accept his theory as theory, but reject it 
in practice. I want to look specifically at the question of whether Foucault's definition of 
the subject and power allows for a political resistance against imposing power-knowledge 
relations; I will place this critique not so much in the lap of a particular theorist (I will 
mention central criticisms), but rather focus on the concepts introduced in this debate, and 
attempt to describe how Foucault's paradigm does in fact find restitution from such 
criticisms. Following on this, I will use Part IV of this dissertation to illustrate the way in 
which Foucault describes a particular type of ethical practice, to my mind innately political, 
which will vindicate his position. 
39"Foucault on Freedom and Truth," p. 173. 
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Chapter Seven: 
POWER AND POLITICAL WILL 
Devoid of subject and strategic direction, Foucault's dis-
-courses offer no exist from the dominations and subjuga-
tions of successive regimes of power. They construct a 
history without a center, beyond meaning save that of the 
constant motion of the revolving door in which all of hu-
manity is forever trapped in the repetitive linkage of dis-
course/power/knowledge. 
Brian Palmer, Descent into Discourse 
The central focus of this chapter will be the supposed inability for political action on the 
part of the Foucauldian subject. In the previous chapter, we explored Taylor's concerns 
about the degree to which the Foucauldian subject can establish an ontological truth of the 
world by which to form an identity (this is a question primarily connected to truth); this 
argument can be extended to look at the political implications of a Foucauldian definition of 
power which apparently denies human agency, or the ability to act in a situation of 
coercion. There have been a number of critiques along these lines, especially from marx-
ists who would like to hold on to some totalizing theory of history, consciousness, and the 
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end of class oppression through revolution. I Their concerns are closely tied to theoretical 
totalities, and are directly challenged by Foucault's rejection of teleology or objective truth. 
Most important is the marxist concern with the supposed effect of Foucault's work to en-
courage political quietism, a rejection of all forms of political activity, or a theoretical im-
possibility for meaningful humaµ agency. I would first like to use this chapter as a site to 
outline these concerns, in many ways similar to Taylor's above; the central question raised 
in this chapter--as to whether Foucault's work carries the capacity for political action--will 
be carried forward to Section IV and answered there. 
Martin Jay, in his Marxism and Totality, writes that while originally the "political 
implications of post-structuralism [where he fits Foucault] were themselves not very clear," 
" .. .its nihilistic or anarchistic impulses soon came to the 
fore. Criticizing the search for origins (arches) implied, an-
archically, the impossibility of plenitude in the future as 
well...if post-structuralism revealed a nihilist or anarchist 
potential, as well as a neo-Marxist one, it also paradoxically 
contained the seeds of a quietistic politics as well."2 
Not only, then, does Foucault offer a paradigm which prohibits or denies the ontological 
ability of human beings to overcome economic and social alienation in the classical marxist 
sense of the word, but his theory also denies their ability to work against these modem 
forces of power and knowledge in order to recapture their true being, or more humane way 
of living, presumably through revolutionary struggle. The foremost theoretical quandary 
which Foucault's work presents for liberals is his rejection of a grounded, objective self 
and a negation of the possibility to attain a true freedom, or to liberate an authentic human 
interior. For the marxists, Foucault will deny the ability for a people or class to liberate 
1 I am primarily interested in using the following articles and texts for this section, pulling out 
pieces at random to suit the discussion: Peter Dews, 'The Nouvelle Philosophe and Foucault" 
in Economy and Society, 1979 (Vol. 8); Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic; 
Jurgen Habermas, "Modernity: An Incomplete Project" in The Anti-Aesthetic (ed. Hal . 
Forster); Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity; Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality; 
Brian Palmer, Descent into Discourse. 
2Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality, pp. 516, 517. 
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themselves through the overthrow of a sovereign power; marxism at its core is thus fate-
fully (perhaps fatally) challenged when Foucault rejects a theory of political "liberation", or 
the opportunity for "true" political and economic freedom resulting from violent revolt. 
Jay and other marxists are primarily concerned with Foucault's supposed inability 
to provide for a theory of revolt and liberation, particularly in light of his seemingly nihilis-
tic definition of power. Regardless of their specific approach to marxism, marxists are 
primarily concerned with the ability of the proletariat to overthrow an innately oppressive 
capitalist system, or at least with conceptualizing of society as being made up of two dis-
tinct groups, vying for access to resources and political power. For marxists, this theoreti-
cal necessity seems impossible within Foucault's work because "[p]ower is never locatable 
but is relentlessly complex and overlapping, residing always in the determinations of dis-
course, which spins itself in a never-ending and analytically and politically impenetrable 
Lacaniancircularity."3 Palmer recognizes, and is frustrated by, Foucault's description of 
reality as constructed by the relationship between discursive formations and power rela-
tions. Foucauldian power is not located within a single body or institution, as would be the 
understanding within a marxist critique; instead power circulates continually through vari-
ous structures, creating them in history while simultaneously using them as vehicles for its 
own perpetuation. This theoretical impasse, involving the political implications of 
Foucault's work, is directly related to his definition of power. If we understand the marx-
ist concerns introduced by Jay and Palmer to particularly centre around the prospect of a 
liberation from Foucauldian power, then I wish to explore this in the following paragraphs 
in order to explain Foucault's position. 
THE QUESTION OF A "LIBERATION" FROM POWER 
Foucault clearly outlines the importance of strategies of power, and counter-strategies of 
the subject, which ensure that power is never a figment of domination, at least in the classi-
3Brian Palmer, Descent into Discourse, p. 170. 
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cal sense of the word. Power seeks to modulate conduct, rather than impose a particular 
type of relationship or mode of action which excludes any place for freedom: 
"one may call- power strategy the totality of the means put 
into operation to implement power effectively or to maintain 
it. One may also speak of a strategy proper to power rela-
tions insofar as they constitute modes of action upon possi-
ble action, the action of others ... Every power relationship 
implies, at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle, in which 
the two forces are not superimposed, do not lose their spe-
cific nature, or do not finally become confused. Each consti-
tutes for the other a kind of permanent limit, a point of pos-
sible reversal. "4 
In this quote, we see two crucial factors: first, that power relates itself to actions on the part 
of individuals, and makes its object a transformation of the way in which human subjects 
conduct or perceive themselves; second, that these- relations of power find themselves 
deeply enmeshed within struggles which encompass strategic confrontations, a situation of 
battle, not so much for domination, or the snuffing out of freedom, but for the imposition 
of a particular way of Being. Simply, power for Foucault is the process of rendering a 
' 
particular conception of the world hegemonic, a foisting of a particular knowledge upon 
bodies and their actions. It is a process not of crushing, breaking, or doing violence to 
bodies, so much as it is a process of subtle transformation, the process of influencing the 
interiorization of a particular set of actions or beliefs upon the Other. 
Foucault not only affirms his conception of power as a process which takes place 
between things, but in fact as crucial to the running of a society. He describes power as 
"a way in which certain actions might structure the field of 
another possible actions. What therefore would be proper to 
a relationship of power is that it be a mode of action upon 
actions. That is to say, power relations are rooted deep in 
the social nexus, not reconstituted 'above' society as a sup-
plementary structure whose radical effacement one could 
perhaps dream of .. A society without power relations would 
only be an abstraction ... [Therefore] I would say that the 
4'The Subject and Power," p. 225. My emphasis. 
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analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power 
relations and the 'agonism' between power relations and the 
intransitivity of freedom is a permanent political task inherent 
in all social existence."5 
Foucault links power to the circulation of truth, the latter something which is created in 
history and upon contingent knowledge formations. The critique of knowledge acquires an 
innately political nature once this paradigm is understood. Foucault does not negate the 
need for political and social challenges being posed to power/knowledge relations as he 
outlines them. In fact, he implicitly affirms such a position in the quote above. What he is 
unable to accept, and which puts Foucault and the marxists on a dialectical path, is the no-
ti on of an overriding source of imposing oppression, what Foucault refers to as power re-
lations constituted '"above' society"; Foucault rejects the destruction of such a force to 
bring about the "dream" of some utopia.6 For Foucault, the marxist critique centred around 
class relations, or oppression linked innately to the accumulation of capital by a small group 
of individuals to the detriment of the rest of society, is profoundly simplistic. In order to 
more fully explain his position on the nature of disciplinary power, and the reasons that he 
gives to reject a liberation from this force, in the following paragraphs I wish to look at the 
"forms of resistance"7 which Foucault writes are indicative of modem political activity, and 
which are primarily centred around the subject, in "opposition ... to the power of adminis-
tration over the ways people live": "they are struggles against the 'government of individ-
ualization. '"8 
Foucault comes to loggerheads with the marxists because he problematizes two no-
tions which are essential to their project: first, he rejects a totalizing theory of modem op-
pression as well as a "liberation" from this; second, he provides a far more complex un-
derstanding of the way in which modem domination or oppression takes place, this centred 
5ibid., pp. 222-223. My emphasis. 
6jbid., p. 222. 
7ibid., p. 211. 
8jbid., pp. 211, 212. 
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around the question of identity, rather than class. In "The Subject and Power" Foucault 
outlines six characteristics of these "series of oppositions" that define struggles in moder-
nity .9 First, he writes that modern struggles are "transversal", (or international), in nature, 
no longer "limited to one country" --these struggles define for Foucault an opposition to a 
particular practice of power in modernity, rather than objective factors which exist on a 
global scale;lO second, these struggles are aimed against the "effects" of such practices 
upon the lives of individuals, rather than at a particular group which is unilaterally respon-
sible for all systems of oppression; third, these struggles are "immediate", "they do not 
look for the 'chief enemy'." 11 In other words, and this follows from the second point 
above, modern struggles do not strive towards neutralizing power relations within a revo-
lutionary paradigm; fourth, these are struggles innately caught up with questions surround-
ing the constitution and "status" of the individual, the way in which the subject is defined 
next to and against his community, or an alternative source of identity: the way in which an 
individual is "tie[d] to his own identity in a constraining way."12 This relates directly to 
Foucault's understanding of the way in which epistemology works to define identity next 
to a perfect model of the Self or the Same, and thus restores subjects to this original posi-
tion (the "origin") through a political and social process of normalization; fifth, these· 
struggles are waged against the "privileges of knowledge", not only in their epistemological 
sense, as above, but in terms of the way knowled'ge circulates, and is given status in the 
' hands of particular individuals--those deemed qualified as "experts", (for example, the 
doctor or the psychiatrist as an expert who holds privileged knowledge in a specialized 
f1'id~s, we saw in The Birth of the Clinic and Madness and Civilization); sixth, these 
struggles work to positively acknowledge an individual's status as perhaps different from 
the norm, in other words, to affirm individuality. 
9ibid., p. 211. 
lOibid. 
J 1 ibid. 
l~ibid., p. 212. 
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Foucault defines modern struggles in relation to forms of knowledge, and_ a form of 
power which distributes this knowledge across a social space. In opposing the way in 
which certain knowledge is privileged, and the way in which certain individuals are privi-
leged in holding and applying such forms of knowledge, Foucault simultaneously eluci-
dates a struggle against a particular form of power, as this reveals itself in a practice upon 
bodies within social spaces. However, 
"there is nothing 'scientistic' in this (that is, a dogmatic be-
lief in the value of scientific knowledge), but neither is it a 
skeptical or relativistic refusal of all verified truth. What is 
questioned is the way in which knowledge circulates and 
functions, it relations to power ... the main objective of these 
struggles is to attack not so much 'such and such' an institu-
tion of power, or group, or elite, or class, but rather a tech-
nique, aform ofpower."13 
Simply, what Foucault rejects in marxism, and the central point around which they fail to 
reach consensus or common vision, is the notion of class as a single causal factor delineat-
ing oppression or exploitation in modernity. Where Jay seeks to affirm a totality which 
defines modern society in terms of its ills, and in terms of its solution, Foucault would re-
ject these efforts, and show instead that regardless of a particular economic system which 
exists as exploitative, unless we critically address the way in which the subject is conceived 
(and constituted) in modern discourse and practice, we have not the core issue which sur-
rounds this oppression: that of human ontological oppression. Thus, these modern strug-
gles (which Foucault describes as primarily centred around subjectivity, or the ontological 
status of the subject) are not limited to one country, just as "they are not confined to a par-
ticular political or economic form of government."14 
Jay correctly defines the "post-structuralist category" as a group of people who, re-
gardless of theoretical, political or personal disagreements, are bound by "their unremitting 
.13ibid. My emphasis. 
l 4jbid., p. 211. 
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hostility towards totality."15 His primary concern with Foucault is the latter's (apparently 
incongruous) conception of power, which renders a marxist project sterile. Foucault re-
jects totality, but now on political terms, this in an effort "to escape from the predominantly 
linguistic preoccupations of many post-structuralists into an analysis of power that exposed 
the dangers of totalism in political as well as intellectual terms."16 Put simply, Foucault 
rejects marxism in practice, and only uses the work of Marx as a theoretical tool in describ-
ing modern labour relations. 
FOUCAULT, THE SUBJECT, AND TRUTH 
I would like to conclude this section with a discussion of Foucault's understanding of 
truth, and then move on into the final chapter of this thesis. Whether an epistemological or 
a teleological conception of unity and progression, truth defines a course of action which 
concurs with history and nature. In relation to power, Jay correctly describes Foucault's 
work in the following manner: 
"There was no way to overcome power, Foucault argued, 
because it did not emanate from a central source which could 
be challenged and overthrown. The traditional concept of 
sovereignty was fallacious in assuming that a single locus of 
power could be identified. A microphysics of power, prob-
ing its multiple and diverse manifestations, would show oth-
erwise. Marxism, therefore, was deluded in believing that a 
revolutionary seizure of power or a change in the mode of 
production would radically alter the nature of society."17 
Like Taylor, Jay interestingly enough makes a similar point that Foucault "invites compari-
son with the classical Frankfurt School's analysis of the 'administered society'." 18 He 
goes on, however, to express his understanding of this paradigm for Foucault, as "the fully 
realized disciplinary society that Marcuse, from his more Hegelian perspective, had called 
I 5Marxism and Totality, p. 515. 
16ibid., p. 516. 
J 7jbid., p. 525. 
18jbid., p. 526. 
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completely one-dimensional." 19 While Foucault acknowledges that "total discipline could 
never be achieved,"20 given his theory of power and resistance, Jay does not display con-
fidence in the ability of the subject to do "battle for bodies and pleasure.~'21 
For Jay, Foucault's theory offers little in the way of hope or constructive challenge 
to power, for the very reason that the battle seems ongoing: "[Foucault's] insistence on the 
inevitability of power in the coercive sense suggested that resistance could never hope to 
diminish in very significant ways the grip of domination."22 In terms of this line of cri-
tique, I disagree strongly with Jay, who obviously does not understand Foucault's' concep-
tion of power as positive rather than "coercive", the latter couched in terms of the traditional 
model of sovereignty which we have discussed in depth as being exactly what Foucault re-
jects. Like Taylor, the two theorists diverge intellectually when Jay displays his inability to 
understand Foucault's chief concern with subjectivity and truth in modernity, and not with 
rendering a totalizing picture of society and its innate system of oppression. Regardless of 
Jay's inability to understand the Foucauldian conception of power, the question of political 
quietism in Foucault's work is an important one. I wish to use Part IV of this dissertation 
to answer the question of political agency from Foucault's perspective; ultimately I wish to 
affirm his position, and vindicate his work from such criticism in substantive terms and not 
just in terms of a debate on the nature of the subject and the power which Foucault believes 
constitutes this entity. I ask my reader to consider the following quote, which picks up on 
some of the concerns raised in the previous sentence, and show both a weakness with 
Foucault's work and that of the marxists posing such a question. 
19ibid., p. 528. 
20ibid., p. 527. 
21 ibid., p. 528. 
22jbid. 
"Foucault was clearly outraged at certain forms of that domi-
nation [sf. within power relations], but is was never very 
clear from what normative vantagepoint, aside from his own 
personal preferences. If the humanist notion of a subject 
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whose true needs could be repressed was merely a myth, in 
w~ose name did Foucault so heatedly criticize the blight of 
increasing panoptic normalization? If there were no truth, 
but only 'truth effects' expressing certain power relations, 
then how could one be confident that his call for a 'general 
economy of pleasure not based on sexual norms' would not 
- lead to a new form of oppressive power ... lf truth was 
merely an effect of power, what was the place within the 
network of power relations that allowed him to see through 
the illusions of his age?"23 
I would like to concentrate on the last two questions raised here by Jay. First, what is the 
nature of truth for Foucault, and if he is not to be accused of over-relativism or super-sub-
jectivity, how does he explain the ability to speak of truth at all?; second, if Foucault criti-
cizes reason in modernity, how does he himself apply his own mind to the present around 
him? In more simple words, how does Foucault, if critical of knowledge systems in· 
modernity, think critically on the world around himself towards constituting a dif!erent re-
ality in the future. 
The theoretical rift which exists between Foucault and the marxist tradition is pri-
marily based upon the status of the individual subject, and more importantly I think, 
whether or not this subject can engage in political activity vis d vis Foucault's description of 
the power-knowledge relations which constitute this entity. To answer these queries, in the 
final section of this dissertation, I wish to explore the politics which Foucault offers in his 
work, especially the way in which Foucault describes the status and effects of modem 
truth, and how the human subject might engage in critique. Put simply, I seek to describe 
how it is that Foucault affirms the human subject:s ability to reason critically, and in this 
way transform both the epistemological and ontological constraints which a modem theory 
of Man forces upon itself. I leave it to Section IV to discuss Foucault's final two books, 
the relationship which he paints between · truth and politics, and his work on self-
23 ibid. 
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reflexivity and political activity in light of his understanding of power-knowledge relations,· 
and their imposition on the human subject. 
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CONCLUSION: 
IN DEFENCE OF FOUCAULT 
Part III of this dissertation has served a two-fold purpose: while primarily concerned with 
introducing two important criticisms of Foucault's work, I have also used this section as an 
opportunity to expose more general cleavages between Foucault's theories and those of the 
humanist liberals and marxists, used here as examples of a much larger tradition. Not 
merely a site to elucidate a criticism of Foucault's work, it has been important to expose in 
clear detail the important and far-reaching contradictions in thought between the humanists, 
who place great emphasis on a vested human self and the ability to actualize this entity in 
one way or another, and Foucault, who categorically rejects such a position, and in fact 
uses all of his intellectual time and energy to dispute this. In addition, it has been very im-
portant to draw a sharp distinction in the theories of power and liberation which separate 
these two theoretical camps. The liberals and marxists place great emphasis on a vested 
and sovereign conception of power, which equally carries the potential for revolution and 
liberation from an oppression of whatever form; Foucault again fundamentally rejects such 
a position. 
It is not my desire to necessarily investigate the positions which are taken by either 
the liberals or the marxists; instead what is important is to provide an alternative body of 
theoretical material which might be used to critique modern social and human relations. 
Similarly, in the section which follows I do not wish to necessarily prove Foucault's theory 
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"above" that of the others; rather, I wish to tackle the substantive and legitimate questions 
which I have introduced in the section, and pose these directly to Foucault's work as philo-
sophical and not ideological queries. Ultimately, I wish to test the strength of Foucault's 
theory first, and not attempt to discredit a contesting tradition. This might occur as a con-
sequence of the study underway here, but this is not my immediate intention. 
The central question which remains outstanding is as follows: given Foucault's de-
scription of the subject and power, how might the former critically address the position in 
which he finds himself, and embark on a politics which is in some sense resistant to 
power-knowledge relations as Foucault describes them? We are primarily concerned with a 
political question here, posed so succinctly by the marxists. Regardless of whether 
Foucault does not affirm the possibility of a liberation of the human subject, we would seek 
clarity as how he accounts for his "politics of the self'. Further, we would seek to know 
what such a politics entails, and whether it provide hope for the Foucauldian subject in the 
future? If it can be shown that Foucault indeed provides for a degree of agency and a criti-
cal response to the forces which are apparently constitutive of the humfln subject, then his 
theory and my thesis will be vindicated. Let us move straight into these lengthy and com-
plex investigations, with a critical look at Foucault's Ethics, the final period which he was 





THE RE-CREATION OF SELVES 
I was saying just now that philosophy was a way of reflect-
ing on our relationship to truth. It should also be added that 
it is a way of interrogating ourselves: if this is the relation-
ship that we have with truth, how must we behave? I be-
lieve that a considerable and varied amount of work has been 
done and is still being done that alters both our relation to 
truth and our way of behaving. And this has taken place in a 
complex situation, between a whole series of investigations 
and a whole set of social movements. It's the very life of 
philosophy. 
Michel Foucault, interview 1980 
In Section III of this dissertation, we explored important criticisms brought to bear on 
Foucault's oeuvre by liberal and marxist thinkers. These concerns are primarily linked to 
theoretical understandings of power, human subjectivity and truth, both ontologically, in 
terms of conflicting descriptions of Being and the way in which identity and meaning is 
construed; and politically, in terms of the way in which a subject might overcome 
power/knowledge impositions. In the previous two chapters, I introduced and resolved 
questions related to Foucault's conception of the subject and identity, or truth, but have yet 
to explore the parallels he draws between truth and politics, and the way in which political 
activity might be affirmed in his work. This is the central problem posed in this disserta-
171 
tion for resolution. In the following chapters, we will turn to Foucault's final two complete 
and published books, The History of Sexuality (Volumes 2 and 3), in an attempt to bring 
closure to this paper and show Foucault's work to be coherent 
Michel Foucault's final work, contained in the final two volumes which he was able 
to complete and publish, as well as a wide selection of articles, lectures, and interviews, 
make up a compendium of studies into sexuality and the political consequences of this 
construct. In these books, Foucault will link sexuality, as an ancient ethical problem, to 
modern bio-politics, and the ensuing disciplines within which the human being is subjected 
as a result of this political agenda. More importantly, Foucault explores ancient Stoic 
"techniques of the self' which might be brought to bear on the modern self towards over-
coming the oppressive effects of power and knowledge relations. He describes these 
techniques as "those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set them-
selves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in 
their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values 
and meets certain stylistic criteria."l This is Foucault's most fascinating, and perhaps his 
most original and scholastically brilliant, work. However, much of the History of 
Sexuality (Volumes 2 and 3) are complex genealogies of sexuality and its problematization 
during Greek, Early Roman, and Early Christian times, and I do not want to delve too 
deeply here. Instead, Part IV of this dissertation will focus on a relationship to the self 
which is inspired by Ancient Greco-Roman philosophy and which Foucault seemingly 
wants to resurrect in modernity as a practice. 
In the proceeding chapter, I explore Volumes 2 and 3 of Foucault's trilogy on sex-
uality simultaneously. The reason for this is that Foucault does not provide material that is 
very different in one book or the other. The final part of this dissertation seeks not to cri-
tique two books with different concerns, but rather to describe ethical and philosophical 
1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Volume 2), pp. 11, 10-11. My emphasis. 
I 
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constructs that were part of ancient concerns around sexuality and which Foucault seeks to 
apply in the modern context. In the chapters ahead I seek to bring closure to Foucault's 
oeuvre, successfully linking his ethics for thought with the constitution of the modern hu-
man subject within power-knowledge relations. Foucault thus presents philosophy and 
reason as innately political tasks which have the ability to undermine epistemological, and 
thus ontological, constraints on the subject. 
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Chapter Eight: 
CARE OF THE SELF 
My problem is the relation of self to self and of telling the 
truth ... the relation between 'telling the truth' and forms of 
reflexivity, of self upon self. 
Michel Foucault, interview· 
My aim is not to write the social history of prohibition but 
the political history of the production of 'truth.' 
Michel Foucault, interview 
If I wanted to pose and drape myself in a slightly fictional 
style, I would say that this has always been my problem: the 
effects of power and the production of 'truth' ... My problem 
is the politics of truth. 
Michel Foucault, interview 
In his final period, Foucault is primarily interested in ethics, this understood as a practice 
on the body, and the exploration of forms of comportment which are tied to a particular 
code of living. In the History of Sexuality (Volumes 2 and 3) (1984), Foucault looks back 
to the Greeks for a model which might serve modem philosophical criticism. In the Stoics 
he finds the notion of the agon, the internal struggle against desire. He writes: "For the 
Stoics, it was primarily a matter of preparing oneself for possible privations by discovering 
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how easy it was, finally, to dispense with everything to which habit, opinion, education, 
attention to reputation, and the taste for ostentation have attached us."1 He adopts this for 
his own work, but with an important difference. 
The Stoics were centrally concerned with overcoming internal emotions or desire in 
an attempt to master the self. "To master the self' meant to bring emotion into line with 
reason, or to render Desire subject to Reason; the former was thus denigrated in light of the 
trustworthy and useful latter. However, while Foucault certainly affirms reason as a cen-
tral and essential feature of human existence in modernity, he is not prepared to place trust 
in this part of our beings at the expense of desire. Foucault uses the basic premise of the 
agon, then, while seeking a very different end. This critical examination of the self which 
the agon entails 
"is not established so much in the form of a judicial relation-
ship in which the accused faces the judge; it is more like an 
act of inspection in which the inspector aims to evaluate a 
piece of work, an accomplished task ... This inspection is a 
test of power and a guarantee of freedom: a way of always 
making sure that one will not become attached to that which 
does not come under our control. "2 
The subject is thus challenged to contest pre-established and unquestioned truths in order to 
gain a greater awareness of self. The agon involves a deep caring of the self, not in the 
Greek tradition so much (which strove to better the self towards civic participation), but 
rather within a process towards knowing the self. When the subject reaches this position it 
4 
might be said that he enjoys a freedom to think as an individual and remain in a constant 
and critical dialogue with accepted norms and values. This self-knowledge involves dis-
covering which truths are imposed upon the self, and deciding how one would incorporate 
such impositions within the self, or attempt to alter them in some way. In Foucault's 
words: 
1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Volume 3), p. 59. 
2jbid., pp. 62, 64. My emphasis. 
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"One cannot care for self without knowledge. The care for 
self is of course knowledge of self--that is the Socratic-
Platonic aspect--but it is also the knowledge of a certain 
number of rules of conduct or of principles which are at the 
same time truths and regulations. To care for self is to fit 
one's self out with these truths. This is where ethics is 
linked to the game of truth. "3 
While Foucault does not affirm an authentic self, he does give credence to a process of self-
making, or a struggle for subjective truth towards establishing a personal set of ethics. 
Foucauldian ethics consists primarily of a critical and suspicious stance taken vis-a-vis 
"games of truth", or the point at which power and knowledge intersect in the creation of an 
epistemological or ontological truth statement which is imposed upon the subject. It is this 
chapter's central task to investigate the relationship which Foucault describes between 
modern truth and subjectivity. Once this is understood, we will be in a position to explore 
the link between Foucault's critique of such truth and his "politics of the self'. 
The notion of "games of truth" is of vital importance in Foucault's work. While he 
would not wish to label himself as such, Foucault fits within the Poststructuralist philo-
sophic tradition, which rejects universal truth statements. For Foucault, freedom is sought 
and gained in the process of questioning totalizing and inherently oppressive discourses. 
Freedom, and the ethics practiced as a result of such freedom is intricately tied to a working 
on the self as an art form, an entity which is understood to be transformahle. In this way, 
"the experience of self that forms itself in this possession [of 
a self-formed relationship with self] is not simply that of a 
force overcome, or a rule exercised over a power that is on 
the point of rebelling; it is the experience of a pleasure that 
one takes in oneself. The individual who has finally suc-
ceeded in gaining access to himself is, for himself, an object 
of pleasure."4 
3Foucault, "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interview with 
Michel Foucault on January 20, 1984," in The Final Foucault, p. 5. My emphasis. 
4The History of Sexuality (Volume 3), p. 66. 
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The free subject for Foucault is the person who has been able to question that which has 
been imposed, and work on the self towards creating something new or different. 
This practice is ethical in that the subject practices a personal credo which seeks to 
clarify a subjective truth. This is a constant struggle, a resistance, which takes place on a 
continuous basis. Foucault calls this process "practices of the self', which involves the 
critical application of reason on knowledge systems (and resultant truths) which have 
emerged in modernity as constitutive of subjectivity.5 In his words, 
"criticism--understood as analysis of the historical conditions 
which bear on the creation of links to truth, to rules, and to 
the self--does not mark out impassable boundaries or de-
scribe closed systems; it brings to light transformable singu-
larities. These transformations could not take place except 
by means of a working of thought upon itself, that is the 
principle of the history of thought as critical activity."6 
This is an innately political task on the part of reason and reinforces Foucault's description 
of the self as created through history. I wish to explore how Foucault links his genealogies 
of ancient desire apd the ways in which such desire was philosophica,lly problematized. 
Foucault will use this model to produce a modem and innately political ethics which might 
be brought to bear on the knowledge structures which constitute identity and experience in 
modernity. Important to remember is that Foucault describes the human self as a mere 
construction within discourse and history. As far as an innate human essence is concerned, 
Foucault 
"refused [to] first of all set up a theory of the subject... What 
I wanted to know was how the subject constituted himself, 
in such and such a determined form, as a mad subject or as a 
normal subject, through a certain number of practices which 
were games of truth, applications of power, etc. I had to 
reject a certain a priori theory of the subject in order to make 
this analysis of the relationships which can exist between the 
SThe History of Sexuality (Volume 2), p. 30. 
6foucault, "Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume 2," in The Foucault Reader, pp. 
335-336. 
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constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject 
and games of truth, practices of power and so forth."7 
Foucault thus rejects a "truth" of the self, wishing instead to problematize how it is such 
truth is constructed within a discourse and through a history. 
The History of Sexuality trilogy serves as a genealogy of desire, and investigates 
the way in which human beings have been constructed as desiring objects, and subjectified 
within socially acceptable and modulated norms. Foucault asks the following questions in 
order to intellectually position himself before studying modern ontological systems and 
their affects on human subjects: "[H]ow, why and in what forms was sexuality constituted 
as a moral domain? Why this ethical concern that was so persistent despite .its varying 
forms and intensity? Why this 'problematization'?"8 In other words, Foucault seeks to 
answer how it was that sexuality came to exist as of intellectual, moral, social and political 
interest. He is interested in what took place in societies, going as far back as the Greeks, 
around the notion of sexuality and the act of engaging in sex, to define a role proper to such 
acts. 
GRECO-ROMAN DESIRE 
Foucault writes that, in antiquity, emphasis was not placed on aligning oneself with a strict 
moral code, but rather on an ethical practice which could induce a desired change in the 
self. Ultimately, desire was conceptualized as a problem of aphrodisia, the appetites, and 
the way in which these would necessarily have to be controlled in order to ensur~ a healthy, 
balanced life. However, this was far more related to a process of self-formation than denial 
(as would be common within Christian practice since St. Augustine), much more "oriented 
toward practices of the self and the question of askesis9 than toward codifications of con-
7'The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom," p. 10. 
8Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Volume 2), p. 10. 
91n The History of Sexuality (Volu~e 2), Foucault describes askesis as "an exercise of 
oneself in the activity of thought." (p. 9) 
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ducts and the strict definition of what is permitted and what is forbidden."10 Foucault 
makes a clear distinction here between two radically opposed spiritual practices. On the 
one hand, those (Christian) practices which have as their focal point the actualization of a 
saintly state, or a morality, the practicing of a strictly.:.defined dogma; on the other, a Greco-
Roman relationship to the body which was not so much concerned with morality as with a 
personal self-mastery, or an ethics: 
"The [Greco-Roman] accent was placed on the relationship 
with the self that enabled a person to keep from being carried 
away by the appetites and pleasures, to maintain a mastery 
and superiority over them, to keep his senses in a state of 
tranquillity, to remain free from interior bondage to the pas-
sions, and to achieve a mode of being that could be defined 
by the full enjoyment of oneself, or the perfect supremacy of 
oneself over oneself."11 
Foucault shows in The History of Sexuality (Volume 2) that desire was certainly prob-
lematized by these early civilizations, but through a very different process and with a dif-
ferent intention. While St. Augustine and early Christianity would introduce themes of 
austerity and self-denial similar to the Greek tradition, with a view of the world similar to 
the cosmology of the middle ages--or at least a pantheistic conception of the world and 
those who ruled it--Stoics sought the good life above and beyond what Taylor calls 
"ordinary life". The ancient sense of "the good life" was a striving for the immortal by a 
select few. Running through the various schools of philosophic thought at the time were 
themes of moderation, contemplation, and pacification of desires. The latter could be 
problematized, not in terms of a social theme and morality that would be imposed later in 
history, but as a theme of the self, part of the process of a conscious self-making, or aske-
sis. 
1077ze History of Sexuality (Volume 2), p. 30. 
llibid., p. 31. 
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What formed a moral problem for the ancients was not the source of one's desire, 
nor the way in which it was carried out, 
"not exactly the act itself (considered in its different modali-
ties), or desire (viewed from the standpoint of its origin or 
its aims), or even pleasure .. .it was more the dynamics that 
joined all three in a circular fashion ... The ethical question 
that was raised was not: what desires? which acts? which 
pleasures? but rather: with what force is one transported 'by 
the pleasures and desires'?"l2 
The Greeks thus problematized aphrodisia (the desires) and simultaneously affirmed a self-
working through the process of askesis (or asceticism), but not in the Christian sense of the 
word. It was more of a self-imposed discipline than a rigidly defined and external moral 
credo. They conceived of themselves as moral agents, and their moral reflection was cen-
tred on the degree to which the pleasures "transported" or moved the self either towards or 
away from true connection with the "good life".13 Foucault goes on to describe the ways 
in which different types of sexual activities were dealt with in the ancient world: homosex-
uality, adultery, sleeping with servants etc.14 For the purposes of this dissertation I don't 
feel it important to delve too deeply here, but rather, now that we have a basic introduction 
to the central themes of these later works, I wish to go on and see how Foucault relates this 
to the present. 
The Foucauldian triad of knowledge-power-ethics relations serves as the core of his 
work into the systems of truth production and their application in modern society. In his 
final works, Foucault investigates these notions within the realm of sexuality, problematiz-
ing the word itself, and coming to show how the word has historically been constructed as 
a concept. Foucault's genealogies investigating sexuality are aimed at understanding the 
"experience of the sexuality," 
12jbid., p. 43. 
I3ibid. 
14cf. The History of Sexuality (Volume 3), Parts 4-6. 
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"where experience is understood as the correlation between 
fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of 
subjectivity in a particular culture ... to analyze the practices 
by which individuals were led to focus their attention on 
themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge them-
selves as subjects of desire, bringing into play between 
themselves and themselves, a certain relationship that allows 
them to discover, in desire, the truth of their being, be it nat-
ural or fallen ... the idea was to investigate how individuals 
were led to practice, on themselves and others, a hermeneu-
tics of desire, a hermeneutics of which their sexual be-
haviour was doubtless the occasion, but certainly not the 
exclusive domain."15 
The genealogy presented in the History of Sexuality trilogy focuses on the experience of 
sexuality, as this has come to have meaning for us in modernity as a concept which springs 
forth from an inner self, but only in order to problematize the role of desire, and the way in 
which the modem has come to be recognized in himself an interior space which can be ex-
plored and defined scientifically. " .. .I felt obliged to study the games of truth in the rela-
tionship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject, taking as my domain of 
reference and field of investigation what might be called 'the history of desiring man'. "16 
A "THEORETICAL SHIFT" 
"Sexuality" is a complex theoretical construct, and I would like to explore this notion fur-
ther and link it to ancient ethical practices which Foucault is interested in resurrecting in 
modernity. I have thus far described two periods in Foucault's work, each reinforcing one 
another to render a critique of modernity which ce~tres around commonly-held (but prob-
lematic) notions of the subject. -Tue central problem for Foucault is the humanist tradition, 
which does not only include the liberal tradition, but has been used by a number of differ-
ent ideologies as a prop.17 He wished to problematize the types of "truth" that emerge out 
15Tue History of Sexuality (Volume 2), pp. 4, 5. My emphasis. 
16 "b"d 6 · I I ., p. . 
17 Consider the following quite, as a matter of interest: 
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of such a paradigm, once a seemingly coherent and sustainable theory of the subject is es-
tablished. In the first two parts of this dissertation,· we covered two periods of Foucault's 
theory of the modem subject: first, his work concerned with the production of knowledge 
around the subject (in particular those human sciences which have as their central concern 
the exploration of "human nature"), and second, his work which dealt with the implemen-
tation of these knowledges within the social fabric through power relations. 
Towards the end of his life, Foucault describes his work as having undergone a 
"theoretical shift", "in order to analyze what is termed 'the subject.' It seemed appropriate 
to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual consti-
tutes and recognizes himself qua subject." 18 What we are left with is a genealogy of the 
truth surrounding the modem subject, the way in which we conceive of this entity, the way 
in which statements are rendered true not only in an archaeological sense, but within the 
network of power relations which run through society. Foucault's project, overall, then, is 
"the effort to isolate some of the elements which might be 
useful for a history of truth. Not a history that would be 
concerned with what might be true in the fields of learning, 
but an analysis of the 'games of truth,' the games of truth 
and error through which being is historically constituted 
"Through ... different practices--psychological, medical, 
penitential, educational-a certain idea or model of humanity was 
developed, and now this idea of man has become normative, self-
evident, and is supposed to be universal. Humanism may not be 
universal but may be quite relative to a certain situation. What we 
call humanism has been used by Marxists, liberals, Nazis, 
Catholics. This does not mean that we have to get rid of what we 
call human rights or freedom, but that we can't say that freedom 
or human rights has to be limited to certain frontiers ... What I am 
afraid of about humanism is that it presents a certain form of our 
ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom. I think that 
there are more secrets, more possible freedoms, and more inven-
tions in our future than we can imagine in humani.sm as it is 
dogmatically represented on every side of the political rainbow: 
the Left, the Center, the Right." (From "Truth, Power, Self: An 
Interview" in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel 
Foucault, p. 15. My emphasis.) 
18The History of Sexuality (Volume 2), p. 6. 
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experience; that 1s, as something that can and must be 
thought." 19 
The work in his final period is the intersection between a genealogy of desire which is con-
tinued from his work started in The History of Sexuality (Volume 1), and his investigations 
into ways in which sexuality was problematized in the ancient Roman and Greek empires; 
additionally, and more importantly for our purposes, Foucault's final work introduces his 
interest in exploring the notion of truth and the subject, the ways in which truth is both ac-
cepted by the subject, but also how truth might be problematized and overturned by the 
philosophically critical subject. Philosophy for Foucault is ultimately a criticism, a suspi-
cious application of reason on thought. It is here that his politics around the self emerges, 
as he presents the ability for the modern subject to critique and problematize present truth 
formations and relations, and reconstruct the self on lines other than the norm. 
I would like to delve deeper into Foucault's work on truth, by introducing the new 
ideas he presents in the final two volumes of The History of Sexuality. The most central of 
these is the notion of an "aesthetics of the self' which is not based upon an essential human 
core from which objective human meaning might be derived. I would like to investigate 
how Foucault explains this process theoretically, and what it entails. This can only be 
properly understood, however, in addressing two fundamental aspects of Foucault's work: 
first, his understanding of truth, meaning, or identity (this is the ontological question relat-
ing to the subject as defined by Taylor); second, given the accusations of political quietism 
directed at his work by the marxists, we need to describe Foucault's understanding of the 
production of the subject within power relations--these questions direct themselves simul-
taneously to the ways in which power and knowledge intersect to produce a subject, as 
well as to the political options and alternatives open to this constituted subject which 
Foucault provides in his final publications. 
l 9ibid., pp. 6-7. My emphasis. 
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ETHICAL SELF-MAKING AND TRUTH 
Foucault recognizes his project, especially as presented within this final works, as an in-
nately politically one. It involves a critique of the relationship between knowledge and 
practice, and specifically of the relationship between truth and the constitution of the sub-
ject. Ultimately, Foucault wished to problematize a limiting truth of Man which is imposed 
through power-knowledge relations. He writes: 
"I conceived of a rather odd project: not the evolution of 
sexual behaviour but the projection of a history of the link 
between the obligation to tell the truth and the prohibitions 
against sexuality. I asked: How had the subject been com-
pelled to decipher himself in regard to what was forbidden? 
It is a question of the relation between asceticism and 
truth."20 
This space between truth on the one hand, and prohibitions on the other is exactly where a 
problematization occurs. The politics of how one responds to this paradigm is what inter-
ests Foucault, not only in terms of the subject and his sexuality, but in the relationship of 
the self to any set of moral codes or socially reinforced behaviour. In other words, 
Foucault is interested in how it is that the subject is brought to bear a particular practice 
upon his own body, to effect various changes to the self. Similarly, he is interested in the 
degree to which the subject can effectively challenge socially imposed norms, through this 
process of askesis, or self-making. 
It is important to discuss Foucault's conception of truth, especially in relation to the 
humanist conception of "desiring man", this the theoretical and epistemological result of a 
modem discourse on Man, which emphasises essence and origin as we have seen in The 
Order of Things. Foucault's project is not so much a rejection of truth, as it is a problema-
tization of those forms of knowledge and their social practice which we take for granted, 
which are accepted as natural, ahistorical, or scientifically certain. Truth, as explored pre-
20Foucault, 'Technologies of the Self," iQ, Technologies of the Self, p. 17. MY emphasis .. 
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viously in "The Subject and Power", is intrinsically linked to the production and circulation 
of knowledge, with specific reference to the birth of Man as a known entity. Foucault 
states his theoretical objective as having been 
"to sketch out a history of the different ways in our culture 
that humans develop knowledge about themselves: eco-
nomics, biology, psychiatry, medicine, and penology. The 
main point is not to accept this knowledge at face value but 
to analyze the so-called sciences as very specific 'truth 
games' related to spec~fic techniques that human beings use 
to understand themse Ives. "21 
He is interested in defining the way in which the subject is constituted within knowledge, 
as an object of knowledge, and secondly, the way in which this knowledge is internalized 
in the process of subject¢cation. In other words, how is it that modem subjects under-
stand themselves, both within knowledge (epistemologically), and as conscious beings 
(ontologically)? We have seen in The Order of Things that Foucault rejects the notion of a 
grounded, unified subject; in this book, he shows that knowledge of this entity emerged at 
a particular time in history, and is thus contingent and subject to transformation. 
In his "ethics" period, Foucault investigates the ways in which subjects come to 
problematize or accept identities which have been forced upon them, and begins to outline 
the innately political activity which results from thought (or philosophy) being critical of 
self-evident and accepted knowledge structures. When asked in a late interview (January 
1984) whether his work at the time still revolved around the relationship between subjec-
tivity and truth, Foucault replied: 
·"I have tried to discover how the human subject entered into 
games of truth, whether they be games of truth which tqke 
on the form of science or which refer to a scientific model, 
or games of truth like those which can be found in institU-
tions or practices of control. That is the theme of my book 
TheOrdero/Things, where I've tried to see how, in scien-
2l•Technologies of the Self," pp. 17-18. My emphasis. 
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tific creation, the human subject will be defined as an indi-
vidual who talks, who works, who lives."22 
In the ext emely informative interview from which the above is taken, Foucault outlines 
quite clea ly the way in which he links reason as a critical tool with a certain practice upon 
the self, a ethics, this an inherently political project and which, I believe, will answer the 
criticism evelled at his work by the marxists in Part III of this dissertation. Once we have 
understood the way in which Foucault defines truth, the relationship between knowledge 
and powe , and the way in which the latter circulates, we can begin to look at Foucault's 
work as a otality: an ethics of thought. Let us move right into the way in which Foucault 
defines th s ethics, and the way in which this interacts with power relations as he has pre-
viously d scribed them. 
" thics" is an apt word to describe Foucault's final period, precisely for the reason 
that it deli eates the boundaries within which his thought works. With the subject and its 
relationsh p to knowledge and power as the central theme running throughout his work, in 
his final p riod Foucault turns from investigations into how these two forces intersect in the 
subject's onstitution, to an exploration of ways in which the subject forms itself in relation 
to these. rom here, Foucault can concentrate on the subject as constitutive of its own self 
against th impositions of knowledge and power. Ultimately, his project works to describe 
and probl matize the frontiers of truth, the limits within which modern thought operates, 
both in m dem epistemology's ability to know and construct truthful statements, the way 
in which articular actions within society are deemed truthful or normal, and also the way 
in which e subject ingests these norms and interiorizes them to form some understanding 
of the sel . Foucault writes that he shifted his theoretical focus away from knowledge and 
power to i vestigate ethics, to examine "the forms of discursive practices that articulated the 
human sc ences. A theoretical shift had also been required in order to analyze what is often 
22'The E hie of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom," p. l. 
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described a the manifestations of 'power'; it led me [sf. Foucault] to examine, rather, the 
manifold re tions, the open strategies, and the rational techniques that articulated the exer-
_ · - This new investigation Foucault describes as having as its focus "what is termed 
'the subject "'24 Foucault is interested in truth and the way in which this is constructed 
within socie y, with particular reference to the human subject. The way in which he con-
cludes these investigations is, in my opinion, innately political. The ethics which he offers 
entails a qu stioning of the constituted subject in terms of its particular construction in 
modernity a the centre of knowledge, and the ability for thought to re-examine its own 
omposition in a radically critical way. In this way, Foucault can conclude that 
there exist number of possible ways of living, of conceiving of politics and indeed of 
"It is experience which is the rationalization of a process, it-
self provisional, which results in a subject, or rather, in 
subjects. I [sf. Foucault] will call subjectivization the proce-
dure by which one obtains the constitution of the subject, or 
more precisely, of the subjectivity which is of course only 
one of the given possibilities of organiza.tion of a self-con-
sciousness."25 
This proces is innately political for Foucault, because in allowing ourselves to think dif-
ferently, or o conceive of another reality, we both question present forms of knowledge 
and truths ich are imposed upon us as normative and necessary, as well as provide the 
foundation within our minds to think Other than o~ present reality, to construe new politi-
cal systems and ways of being. In this way, philosophy exists as a political tool for 
Foucault to the degree that thought can both critique and reject present truths, as well as in-
23 The History of Sexuality (Volume 2), p. 6. 
24 ibid. 
25 Foucault, "The Return of Morality," interview by Gilles Barbadette and Andre Scala, in Politics, 
Philosophy, Culture, p. 253. My emphasis. 
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vent new realities for the future. Philosophy then is always "a way of reflecting on our re-
lationship to truth ... "26 
" .. .It should also be added that it is a way of interrogating 
ourselves: if this is the relationship that we have with truth, 
how must we behave? I [sf. Foucault] believe that a consid-
erable and varied amount of work has been done and is still 
being done that alters both our relation to truth and our way 
of behaving. And this has take place in a complex situation, 
between a whole series of investigations and a whole set of 
social movements. It's the very life of philosophy."27 
Two things contained in the above two quotes strike me as of fundamental importance to 
Foucault's overall project: first, the relationship which the modern subject enjoys with his 
rational faculty, or the ability which Foucault affirms for the modern to think critically of 
the world around himself; second, the tremendous freedom to bring about change which 
seems to be enjoyed by the subject conscious of such an ability. Both these factors, com-
bined in a freedom of thought to think Other than itself, delimits Foucault's politics, which 
we will investigate in more detail in the following chapter. In his description of reason as a 
critical and political tool, and the inherent freedom which this paradigm includes, Foucault 
provides the basis for vindicating his conceptions of both the human subject and power vis 
a vis the marxist critiques presented in Part III. 
26Foucault, 'The Masked Philosopher," interview by Christian Delacampagne, in Politics, 




AN ETHICS FOR THOUGHT 
From a strictly philosophical point of view the morality of 
Greek antiquity and contemporary morality have nothing in 
common. On the other hand, if one considers these respec-
tive moralities in terms of what they prescribe, intimate, and 
advise, they are extraordinarily close. It is important to point 
out the proximity and the difference, and, through their in-
terplay, to show how the same advice given by ancient 
morality can function differently in a contemporary style of 
morality. 
Michel Foucault, interview 
The History of Sexuality (Volumes 2 and 3) serve in the first place as genealogies of desir-
ing man, or a "hermeneutics of desire", in Foucault's words.1 In addition, and I think this 
is the most crucial point I would like to make in the final part of this dissertation, is that 
Foucault implies a type of action upon the self which works towards effecting an ontologi-
cal transformation within it, and an altered self-consciousness. Epistemologically, we have 
seen how Foucault rejects the notion of a centred, ahistorical subject, as well as any sem-
blance of an "interior" source of desire which could be called innately "human". In tum, 
and through this process, he obviously denies an ontological position for Man: being does 
not exist in any fixed sense, but is created through the interplay between knowledge and 
1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Volume 2), p. 5. 
189 
power. What I wish to argue, however, is that this situation does not lead to a state of ni-
hilism, ontologically or politically, for the very reason that Foucault uses ancient philoso-
phy to outline an askesis, a practice upon the self in light of power-knowledge relations. 
Instead of an ontology appropriate to modern man, however, he offers an ethics for 
thought with which to critically examine and modulate action. In this chapter, I seek to 
show that Foucault's work protects the three revered goods of the Enlightenment (freedom, 
truth, and reason); simultaneously, however, his ethics contains a political project which 
rejects a unified humanist conception of the subject and yet remains coherent and positive in 
its prospects for future change. 
In his work thus far, we have seen Foucault interested in the ways in which the 
subject is constituted. This process began with his exploration of knowledge structures 
which provide an epistemological understanding of the subject, as we saw in Part I. In the 
second phase of his work, Foucault began to explore ways in which social practices 
emerged out of this objectifying body of knowledge, to render a normative description of 
the Perfect Man. Here we see various processes at work whereby society, through various 
practices, imposes itself upon the individual. This is a two-fold approach: it involves first a 
judgement of the individual against an objective norm; second, it involves a bio-political 
knowledge of the individual as part of a population, and its integration int<? a state agenda. 
In this third phase, Foucault seeks to explore ways in which subjects understand them-
selves in light of the above processes. It seems to me that this is a two-fold project in itself: 
on the one hand, we have the creation of the desiring subject, who might accept social im-
positions and understand himself in light of the ontological truths that initially constructed 
him. The second part of this process is the creation of the political being, who critically 
analyzes power/knowledge relations and reconstitutes himself as a creature of art, who 
applied reason to the very thought processes which initially constituted the self, in order to 
render these problematic. 
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Foucault's ethics stands at the centre of his politics of the self and the key concern 
of this chapter. His ethics is presented as antagonistic in relation to the discursive bodies 
which constitute human subjectivity and which are responsible for the subjection implicit in 
this humanist knowledge. We have already outlined the humanist ontological understand-
ing of the modern subject as an entity with depth which is conceived as stable. What I 
wish to explore further is the political project inherent in the ethics which Foucault offers to 
the critical modern subject, and the degree to which the capacity for human freedom and 
political agency is not only provided for in Foucault's work on ethics, but also affirmed as 
a central responsibility of the modern subject, the heir of Enlightenment reason. 
What I would specifically like to examine are the ways in which the critical human 
being understands him- or herself against these games of truth and works to undermine 
socially accepted norms. I believe this to be an innately political task, undertaken at the 
core of what Foucault presents as a very new approach to an understanding of both the 
modern subject and ways in which this subject might engage himself politically. Foucault 
has already described modern politics as "a politics of ourselves", and I want to explore 
this in terms of the critiques levelled at his work. I wish first to look at the question of the 
politics of Foucault's project; second, the question of freedom in relation to this; thinl, and 
most important, the way in which reason and a critical understanding of the historical cre-
ation of knowledge of Man is central to Foucault's project and renders his oeuvre both 
theoretically complete and politically coherent. 
THE SELF AND POLITICAL PRACTICE 
Foucault draws a direct parallel between an ethics of self-conduct and behavior which con-
centrates on a care of the self, and a politics inherent in this process. We have seen 
Foucault look back to classical Greece and Rome for models on which to base his ethics. 
The notion of "care of the self', and the process of self-making or constructing the self 
along a particular ethical line of thought, the "'ascetics' that enabled one to make oneself 
into an ethical subject was an integral part--down to its very form--of the practice of a vir-
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tuous life, which was also the life of a 'free' man in the full, positive and political sense of 
the word."2 Why would this be so? We can only understand the relationship between in-
dividual ethics and a political activity inherent in this after examining the way in which the 
Greeks defined virtue and the qualities which were required of their rulers. 
In The History of Sexuality (Volume 3 ), Foucault charts the close relationship of an 
ethics of self and the power to govern, especially in relation to the Roman imperial advance 
on ancient Greece. Ancient ethics were directly tied to political activity for two reasons: 
first, this type of self-examination was usually reserved for free men of the elite; and sec-
ond, and more importantly, because this practice on the self publicly defined the degree to 
which one was capable of ruling a group: "this principle applies to anyone who governs: he 
must attend to himself, guide his own soul, establish his own ethos. "3 Under such condi-
tions, politics existed as a "practice" ,4 and "the art of governing oneself [as] a crucial politi-
cal factor"5: 
"A whole elaboration of the self by oneself was necessary 
for these [political] tasks, which would be accomplished all 
the better because one did not identify in an ostentatious way 
with the trappings of power .. .It is the modality of a rational 
being and not the qualification of a status that establishes and 
ought to determine, in their concrete form, relations between 
the governors and the governed."6 
In this, we see a closely-defined relationship between the way one conducts oneself, this 
influenced directly by the degree to which one is in "knowledge" of oneself, and the degree 
to which one is capable of holding high political office: "Self-mastery had implied a close 
connection between the superiority one exercised over oneself, the authority one exercised 
in the context of the household, and the power one exercised in the field of an agonistic 
2ibid., p. 77. 
3Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Volume 3), p. 89. 
4jbid., p. 87. 
5jbid., p. 89. 
6jbid., pp. 90, 91. 
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society. It was the practice of superiority over oneself that guaranteed the moderate and 
reasonable use that one could and ought to make of the two other superiorities."7 An 
"ascetics of the self', which required a careful mastering of the natural urges, (aphrodisia), 
was absolutely necessary for a mastering of the self towards attaining wisdom and the abil-
ity to lead. Implicit in this paradigm was the need for rational leaders who would not abuse 
public office. The way in which one related to the self was directly related to the way in 
which a leader, who was in control of himself, would govern a group. Ethos, and a ratio-
nal way of living, could only result in fair conduct within political office and ensure a 
commensurate care for the population at large. In this way, Foucault links ethics and polit-
ical practice: 
"I [sf. Foucault] think that the relationships between philos-
ophy and politics are permanent and fundamental. It is cer-
tain that if one takes the history of the care for self in Greek 
thought, the relationships to politics is obvious ... on the one 
hand, you see Socrates ... who calls out to the young people, 
'Hey, you, you want to become a political person, you want 
to govern the city, you therefore want to take care of others 
but you did not even take care of yourself, and if you do not 
take care of yourself, you will be a bad leader' ... the care for 
self appears like a pedagogical, moral and also ontological 
condition, for the constitution of a good leader."8 
Additionally, Foucault distinguishes this ethos, this care for the self, as a delimiting 
force on relationships of power. If one has control over one's emotions, and is able to 
make wise decisions regardless of "one's whims, one's appetites, one's desires," then one 
is in a position to resist the temptation to dominate those in less powerful social positions.9 
This positive ethical stance can work to convert power in a sense, away from a model of 
domination to one of mutual benefit; it is a "way of controlling and limiting" power: 1 O 
7ibid., pp. 94-95. 
8Foucault, "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interview with 
Michel Foucault on January 20, 1984," in The Final Foucault," p. 13. 
9ibid., p. 8. 
lOibid. 
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"the image of the tyrant or simply of the powerful and 
wealthy man who takes advantage of his power and his 
wealth to misuse others, to impose on them undue 
power ... this man is in reality a slave to his appetites. And 
the good ruler is precisely the one who exercises his power 
correctly, i.e., by exercising at the same time his power on 
himself. And it is the power over self which will regulate 
the power over others." 11 
Ethics in the Greek world, measured by the degree of mastery an individual exhibited over 
his self and it's desires, established whether one would be able to rule justly and with wis-
<lorn, hereby ensuring that domination over those governed would not ensue. Ethics is 
thus innately political, and in two essential ways. Not only is this ethics something applied 
to one's body and mind, but from this, to the social body at large; "it constituted, not an 
exercise in solitude, but a true social practice ... The care of the self--or the attention one de-
votes to the care that others should take of themselves--appears then as an intensification of 
socialrelations. "12 An ethical political existence served to foster relations within society. 
But what of freedom? How does Foucault link an ethical practice on the self with a liberty, 
the ability to act and think for oneself? This is the second question which I would like to 
address here. 
THE EXISTENCE AND ROLE OF FREEDOM IN FOUCAULT'S ETHICS 
Foucault describes the Greek ethics of self; or aesthetics of the self, as requiring an explic-
itly active role on the part of the subject, a task which required agency and intervention on 
the part of the self on the self. A moral action is such that it leads to a "self-formation as an 
'ethical subject'."13 This requires the self-constituting subject to 
"act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform 
himself There is no specific moral action that does not refer 
to a unified moral conduct; no moral conduct that does not 
1 libid. My emphasis. 
I 2The History of Sexuality (Volµme 3), pp. 51, 53. My emphasis. 
13The History of Sexuality (Volume 2), p. 28. 
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call for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no 
forming of the ethical subject without 'modes of subjectiva-
tion' and an 'ascetics' or 'practices of the self that support 
them. Moral action is indissociable from these fonns of 
self-activity, and they do not differ any less from one moral-
ity to another than do the systems of values, rules and inter- · 
dictions." 14 
How does Foucault describe the relation of human agency or freedom to this practice on the 
self, and how might this describe process begin to answer marxist concerns? Foucault in-
troduces two Greek words in The History of Sexuality (Volume 2), which I believe de-
scribe this relationship. First, s6phrosyne, which is a word used to describe actions which 
are deemed necessary or desired in social terms, versus enkrateia, which describes a per-
sonal activity in defining the self. In Foucault's words: "the term enkrateia in the classical 
vocabulary seems to refer in general to the dynamics of a domination of oneself by oneself 
and to the effort that this demands." l5 Enkrateia is thus defined more as "an active form of 
self-mastery [versus s6phrosyne which is chiefly concerned with choosing "what is fit-
ting"16 ], which enables one to resist or struggle, and to achieve domination in the area of 
desires or pleasures."17 It is the explicit task of producing a desired effect upon the body, 
the way of bringing the aphrodisia into line with a desired mode of action and conduct. It 
is an exercise which can be likened to a domination of self over self, or the battle of logos 
with thumos, the rational with the irrational or emotive faculties, which is the classical 
Platonic position and remains to inform the Roman approach to the divisions within the 
self. 
While enkrateia is the active forming of a desired self, s6phrosyne is the action of 
introducing this transformed self to public or social life. Implicit in this process too is the 
-
notion of a eentral requirement in agency; the ability to conduct oneself in the way of what 
14ibid. My emp'iiasis. 
15ibid., p. 65. 
16 ibid., p. 64. 
17ibid. 
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is deemed right or "fitting": "S6phrosyne was a state that could be approached through the 
exercise of self-mastery and through restraint in the practice of pleasures; it was character-
ized as a freedom." I 8 Between a practice of freedom on the self, and the practice of an ac-
quired wisdom in the governing of one's life publicly, we see the emergence of a two-fold 
practice of freedom: first, the ability to work upon the body, to be self-reflexive and self-
critical as implied in the striving towards a required personal goal; second, the practice of 
this acquired liberty within the public arena, as a political ethos or action. In classical 
Greece, "[t]he freedom that needed establishing and preserving was that of the citizens of a 
collectivity of course, but it was also, for each of them, a certain form of relationship of the 
individual with himself."19 
What emerges here is the possibility of a practice of freedom which is at one and the 
same time ethical and political, with liberty or the freedom to act as pivotal in defining this 
relationship. Innate to the process of enkrateia and s6phrosyne is freedom, a liberty which 
is at one and the same time political and ethical. Thus, one of Foucault's most important 
articles defining and clarifying his final work is aptly named "The Ethic of Care of the Self 
as a Practice of Freedom". Foucault describes freedom is an innate part of the process by 
which one works on the self and acquires the necessary skills and insight to serve within 
the public realm. For Foucault, in fact, there is little distinction to be made between ethics 
and liberty, or the condition within which t? practice a freedom: "[W]hat is morality 
[ethics], if not the practice ofliberty, the deliberate practice ofliberty? ... Liberty is the onto-
logical condition of ethics ... ethics is the deliberate form assumed by liberty."20 Foucault 
asserts that in order to practice an ethics or a morality (even though a distinction is made), 
the ontological condition of this practice is the presence of freedom. The subject resisting 
power-knowledge relations does so within a "cocoon" of freedom. Human agency, the 
18ibid., p. 78. 
] 9jbid., p. 79. . 
20'The Ethic of Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom," p. 4. 
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ability to act, is not only secured within Foucault's political paradigm as an necessary onto-
logical condition within which to practice an ethics of thought, but a responsibility as indi-
cated by Foucault in his affirmation in "What is Enlightenment" of the modem role of rea-
son. The modem subject has a responsibility and a duty to act, and does so with an ethics 
paradigm that innately affirms the ability to act freely. 
A personal ethics and social political activity were intrinsically linked for the an-
cients: implicated in, and essential for, such a relationship was the presence of freedom. 
This was the ontological condition and foundation for a political practice. In this way, the 
Greeks considered freedom in itself as a problem for political reflection and "as an ethical 
problem",21 
"But ethical in the sense that Greeks could understand. 
Ethos was the deportment and the way to behave 
[s6phrosyne]. It was the subject's mode of being and acer-
tain manner of acting visible to others. One's ethos was 
seen by his dress, by his bearing, by his gait, by the poise 
with which he reacts to events, etc. For them, that is the 
concrete expression of liberty. That is the way they 
'problematized' theirfreedom."22 
Liberty is directly tied to a political practice in that one is only free to practice a reflection on 
oneself in a particular political situation--as a free man. This is denied the slave and thus 
politically situates the subject who is engaged in a process of epimeleiaheauton: care of the 
self; in this way, and because 
21'b'd 6 I I ., p. . 
22jbid. 
"liberty signifies for the Greeks non-slavery ... the problem is 
already entirely political. It is political in the measure that 
non-slavery with respect to others is a condition: a slave bas 
no ethics. Liberty is then in itself political. And then, it bas 
a political model, in the measure where being free means not 
being a slave to one's self and to one's appetites, which 
supposes that one establishes over.one's self a certain rela-
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tion of domination, of mastery, which was called arche--
power, authority."23 
Ethics and freedom are both intertwined in a relationship to freedom and politics, with the 
latter reinforcing one another. Freedom is exercised both politically, as outlined above, by 
the free man, as well as ontologically, in the creation of a mastered self. Now that we un-
derstand the close and essential relationship between freedom, politics, and ethics, I wish 
to explore how Foucault relates freedom and the practice of an ethics of self to power. 
Most importantly, in order to complete a Foucauldian answer to the ma:rxist critique of his 
work, we resolve how truth related to politics. We seek to understand whether we can 
connect the work this dissertation has done on Foucault's first two periods which are con-
cerned with modern knowledge and its intersection with power in the constitution of the 
modem subject, and his work on a political ethics which he conducts in his final work to 
countervail such power-knowledge impositions. Further, we seek to understand the point 
at which Foucault's work on ethics can be used to provide answers to the philosophical and 
political dilemmas which he present in his first two periods. Answers to these questions 
will vindicate Foucault against marxist critiques; simultaneously, it will bring closure and a 
positive conclusion to my initial thesis regarding the coherent and political nature of 
Foucault's work. 
Foucault describes a power relationship first as containing within it free agents; 
second, power is described as a "relation between individuals," as the means to manipulate 
another's actions towards a desired outcome;24 third, as a relation which is manifested by 
the struggle of opposing forces for hegemony: "the characteristic feature of power is that 
some men can more or less entirely determine other men's conduct--but never exhaustively 
or coercively."25 Foucault uses the Greek work agon to describe the struggle which is in-
23jbid. 
24Foucault, "Politics and Reason," The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Oct 10 and 16, 
1979), in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, p. 83. My emphasis. 
25ibid. 
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dicative of this form of power, a word which I believe is fundamental to understanding his 
work on political ethics. He has described "agon" or "agonism" as "a relationship which is 
at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which 
paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation."26 This describes both his definition of 
power, and of the proposed ability of the subject to question and destabilize power relations 
and their effects on individuals. Foucault rejects the possibility of a total ontological (or 
political) liberation of the subject, but does allow in his theory, and I believe that this is the 
strength of it, for a resistance on the part of individuals and groups to impositions of 
power. In defining a "politics of ourselves", Foucault is primarily concerned with a critical 
rethinking of the notion of identity, and definitions of the normal or the right which are 
contained within epistemologies accepted as scientifically steadfast, and yet which suppress 
individuals. In the final part of this chapter, I would like to look at the way in which an 
ethics of thought, supported by liberty and the practice of agonistic struggle, define 
Foucault's political project in ontological and epistemological terms: I believe that the key 
to understanding his final work, and thus his work in totality, lies in being able to link his 
analysis of the human sciences and the birth of Man conducted in The Order of Things, 
with his definition of power in his middle period, and his ethics of thought and action of-
fered in the final works we have investigated. Let us turn our attention now to Foucault's 
ethics, which is based on problematizing systems of thought and their imposition on mod-
ern man. 
MODERN REASON AS A CRITICAL TOOL 
It is clear that Foucault's project rotates centrally around a question of the status of truth in 
modernity, and the degree to which thought is contingent as the result of being based on an 
episteme which is archaeologically definable. If we understand that Foucault relates epis-
temological and ontological truth to particular social and institutional practices that consti-
26Foucault, 'The Subject and Power," p. 222. 
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tute subjects, then we arrive at a point where modem knowledge is intricately tied to social 
practice and ontological experience. In thinking within a particular paradigm, we limit our-
selves to a particular structure of thought, a system of truths which are verifiable only 
within this particular structure and which by its very nature creates an Other, an anomalous 
entity within Unthought which falls outside of the rational or reasonable. Alternatively, if 
phiiosophy is adopted as a critical tool of analysis, which seeks to question and even un-
dermine the relationship between knowledge and social practice, then reason and its use as-
sumes an innately political junction and task. 
As far as the way in which truth interacts with power and knowledge in Foucault's 
work, and ultimately describes a particular form of politics, I would like to point to three 
fundamental points in his work: first, that thought is contingent and given to particular rules 
of formation as we have discovered in the Knowledge section of this paper; second, that 
these systems of knowledge work to delimit the types of activities and thoughts which are 
rendered permissible, valuable, and normal within a particular social field as outlined in 
Part II of this dissertation on power; third, that if we understand the relationship between 
the modem episteme and Foucault's definition of power as constitutive of reality, then the 
possibility of overturning these systems or struggling against them is a real possibility and 
provides the basis for an ethics of thought which is innately political. It is through this 
model that I believe Foucault answers his marxist critics, and, above and beyond this vic-
tory, affirms a new type of political action with radical implications for social practice. In 
the final part of this thesis, I wish to relate this ethics to a practice of reason on thought in a 
new type of political action. Additionally, I wish to show how this ethics provided by 
Foucault affirms my thesis that he does in fact provide a coherent and cogent political pro-
ject in his work, regardless of the fact it was tragically incomplete at the time of his death. 
Foucault's work centres around a "price" of knowing oneself, and I believe a fun-
damental part of his intellectual ethos rotates around the degree to which the modern subject 
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is free to problematize identity, or an ontological truth which is imposed upon him in a re-
strictive way:27 
"What interested me ... were precisely the forms of rationality 
applied by the human subject to itself. While historians of 
science in France were interested essentially in the problem 
of how a scientific object is constituted, the question I asked 
myself was this: how is it that the human subject took itself 
as the object of possible knowledge? Through what forms 
of rationality and historical conditions? And finally at what 
price? This is my question: at what price can subject speak 
the truth about themselves?"28 
Foucault's oeuvre thus investigates truth as it has come to be constituted in modernity; sec-
ond, and of equal if not more significant importance, his work is centrally concerned with 
"the price" individuals and society have had to pay as a result of modem truth systems, ex-
elusive and as intolerant of Difference as our investigations into Foucault's work has 
shown them to be. As a result, modem power/knowledge relations have stifled or op-
pressed subjects. Ultimately, the central question remains: What is the nature of modern 
truth, and what is its cost? I would answer that this cost lies on many levels: politically, 
intellectually,economically, and socially; perhaps most importantly, ontologically, as mod-
em Man was created in his singularity and solidity, defying the necessity for Difference in 
modern society. 
Foucault's political ethics problematizes and seeks to overturn a uniform and meta-
physical ontology of Man. If the modern subject does exist as epistemologically un-
grounded, then no concrete understanding of Being is possible, and to construct such a 
model would reinforce a limiting model as initially deconstructed. In The Order of Things, 
Foucault has clearly shown that the nature of modem knowledge is a movement towards 
the Same, given the structure and form of the epistemic configuration which shapes knowl-
27Foucault. "Critical Theory/Intellectual History," interview by Gerard Raulet, in Politics, 
Philosophy, Culture, p. 30. 
28jbid., pp. 29-30. 
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edge in this particular epoch; the price which individuals have to pay, and which Foucault 
would like to problematize and establish as a political problem, is the stifling within this 
paradigm of identity and Difference. 
Of fundamental importance to note here, and the core of his ethics as a political tool, 
is Foucault's stance toward Reason. In "Critical Theory/Intellectual History", he answers 
in the following way to a query regarding his claim that reason is created through history 
and within discourse: 
"I [sf. Foucault] do not believe in a kind of founding act 
whereby reason, in its essence, was discovered or estab-
lished and from which it was subsequently diverted by such 
and such an event. I think, in fact, that reason is self-cre-
ated, which is why I have tried to analyse forms of rational-
ity: different fouhdations, different creations, different mod-
ifications in which rationalities engender one another, op-
pose and pursue one another. Even so, you cannot assign a 
point at which reason would have lost sight of its fundamen-
tal project, or even a point at which the rational became the 
irrationaJ."29 
For Foucault reason does not only exist as a contingent and constructed entity, but it takes 
on a number of different forms; it can be moulded, or conceived as a tool towards different 
ends or realities. He is unwilling to affirm a totalized view of reality or a" grand narrative": 
" ... I [sf. Foucault] am not prepared to identify reason en-
tirely with the totality of rational forms which have come to 
dominate .. .in types of knowledge, forms of technique and 
modalities of government or domination: realms where we 
can see all the major applications of rationality ... For me, no 
given form of rationality is actually reason. So I do not see 
how we can say that the forms of rationality which have 
been dominant in the ... sectors I have mentioned are in the 
process of collapsing and disappearing .. .! can see multiple 
transformations, but I cannot see why we should call this 
transformation a collapse of reason. Other forms of ratio-
nality are created endlessly. So there is no sense at all to the 
proposition that reason is a long narrative which is now fin-
ished, and that another narrative is under way."30 
29ibid., pp. 28-29. 
30ibid., p. 35. My emphasis. 
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Foucault asserts here that not only does reason take on many forms through history as it is 
used to define particular truths, but also that no semblence of an Hegelian teleology exists 
to affirm a metanarrative of thought and action. Reason is a thing of history, created 
through time and within social space in the interplay of knowledge and power. In this 
game, truth is defined and imposed, with multiple players vying for hegemony. Of course, 
in Foucault's definition of power, this point is never reached in its entirety, and strategies 
and games are entered into, always underscored by the presence of a freedom to act and 
resist. Most importantly, what this paradigin presents is the ability for thought to think dif-
ferently, that other forms of reason and knowledge of the world are possible through a pro-
cess of challenging the limits of thought. In other words, and central to Foucault's politics, 
is the freedom inherent in Enlightened reason to think critically on Truth and transform the 
latter into Other knowledge. 
It is within this model of reason and philosophy being able to critically examine 
. thought and knowledge systems that Foucault is able to make the assertion (as he does at 
the end of The Order of Things) that the "death of Man" is possible through a challenging 
of existing thought structures. Reason is a tool for resistance, and I believe that it is here 
that he centres his political critique and possible modes of future action. While he is 
unwilling to provide a model, a theorem for resistance, and a theory for subsequent 
liberation, Foucault provides a coherent and powerful critique of present knowledge 
systems, and a theory of knowledge and power which affirms an ethics of reason, and thus 
an action upon the limits of thought. 
Intellectually, Foucault is fascinated with deciphering the nature of the present, the 
way in which we have constructed a truth which defines our reality, and the degree to 
which we work to either affirm this truth, or provoke a change in it. The historical moment 
is always contingent however, dependent on the structures which make up the knowledge 
systems of a particular epoch. · Important, however, is that history is the space in which 
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change occurs, and reason is the catalyst for this change; his "diagnosis concerning the 
present", and the political utility of reason and philosophy, Foucault can define as fol-
lows:31 
"It does not consist in a simple characterization of what we 
are but, instead--by following lines of fragility in the pre-
sent--in managing to grasp why and how that-which-is 
might not longer be that-which-is. In this sense, any de-
scription must always be made in accordance with these 
kinds of virtual fracture which open up the space of freedom 
understood as a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible 
transformation. "3 2 
Foucault's political project centrally entails the desire to problematize systems of thought in 
their historical coming-to-be, their innate contingency and their sense of flux; in other 
words, the vulnerability of thought to transformation. A vulnerability which opens up the 
possibility for critique and the affirmation of an ethics for thought and action which leads to 
a questioning of our present in relation to our past and our future. The central task 
Foucault sets philosophy is that of thinking d~fferently, of conceiving of the world Other 
than it presently is. In this way he affirms a conception of history no longer seen as a 
massive and singular movement towards completion, but rather as the pursuit of a future 
time which is less dominated by a thought process that oppresses, excludes, and denies 
certain groups of people. Reason serves as a catalyst for this process of change, linked as 
it is to an ancient ethical practice by which the self might critically examine itself towards a 
desired change. As a result, Foucault links Enlightenment reason, and the innately critical 
responsible of this tradition, with an ancient concern for critically examining one's actions 
and thoughts towards establishing a critical ethics for existence. For this, I believe we owe 
Michel Foucault a great deal; as a man, a thinker, a philosopher, and as someone who 
dared to think beyond the limits of thought, to provide a critique that is innately political 
31 ibid., p. 36. 
32ibid. 
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and transformative. Foucault's politics, while existing in contradistinction to a liberal or 
marxist project, not only ensures that these projects have their legitimate concerns met, but, 




'What is happening right now, and what are we, we who are 
perhaps nothing more than what is happening at this 
moment?' Philosophy's question therefore is the question as 
to what we ourselves are [in our historical creation]. That is 
why contemporary philosophy is entirely political and en-
tirely historical. It is the politics immanent in history and the 
history indispensable for politics. 
Michel Foucault, interview 1977 
In the final section of this dissertation, we have explored Foucault's work on ethics and 
how this interest in ethical conduct is linked to a modern politics which I believe, given his 
unique theories of the human subject and its relationship with power, is distinctly 
Foucauldian. Of most importance has been drawing links between this final period of his 
oeuvre, and the.work which preceded it; a link between his work on modern knowledge of 
Man and a modern askesis, or critical questioning of these truths. In the preceding chap-
ters, I have sought to link Foucault's description of philosophy as a critique of modern 
epistemology, with his political project which seeks to problematize the ontological limits 
which are placed on the modern subject. This process of limiting thought is the result of 
the particular forms which knowledge has taken in modernity. 
In addition, this Part IV of this dissertation has sought to answer marxist criticisms 
of Foucauldian power as preventing human political activity. Through his work on Greco-
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Roman ethics, and the ways in which human desire was problematized as a political prob-
lem for the ancient world, Foucault was able to describe a ethical practice which is similar 
to those practiced by the ancients, but is specifically modem in character. Introducing the 
notion of the agon, the internal struggle for hegemony over opposing forces, Foucault was 
able to provide an answer for those concerned about the seeming inability for an individual 
to oppose and resist external power/knowledge relations. In this way, his ethics encour-
ages an affirmation of Enlightenment reason as a critical tool to problematize and perhaps 
even overturn various knowledges which have come to define Man in modernity, and are 
held to be self-evident; this practice is innately political and invites the possibility of 
overturning the very conception of Man itself. Foucault thus presents philosophy as hav-
ing the crucial and ongoing task of providing a critique of modem systems of thought 
which are responsible for the constitution of Man, and yet which emerge as highly prob- 1 
lematic and susceptible to change when closely examined. 
Ultimately, Foucault's final period merges modem philosophy, with its roots in the 
Enlightenment, with ancient philosophy. The former provides for a critical application of 
reason, the responsibility of the modem to use reason critically and with a sense of duty; 
while the latter provides an ethical system for the human subject to critically examine and 
overturn modem epistemological and ontological impingements on itself. We are now in a 
position to conclude this dissertation, and look more closely at the ways in which 
Foucault's three periods come together as a coherent and innately political whole. If it can 
be shown that Michel Foucault's work is both coherent and politically valuable, something 
which has been vigorously contested by the humanist tradition, then the initial problems set 
out in the introduction to this dissertation will be answered satisfactorily, and indeed my 




THE POLITICS OF OURSELVES 
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, 
certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent 
body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be con-
ceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which 
the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an 
experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. 
Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" 
I would like to conclude this dissertation with some of the ideas raised in Foucault's "What 
is Enlightenment?" In that article, he introduced the important notion of philosopQ.y as cri-
tique; indeed, more than merely a means of providing a critical stance to something which 
is accumulative such as a "theory, a doctrine, [or a] permanent body of knowledge," 
Foucault affirms that modem philosophy and its task in critically examining our modern 
ontological constitution must be conceived of as an ethos, an intrinsic part of the 
Enlightenment tradition and the responsibility passed down to the modern subject.I Central 
to Foucault's project has been to describe the constitution of the modern human subject 
within particular games of truth, the bodies of knowledge that have coalesced around the 
subject in a process of naming it, and providing it with a stable and universalized nature. 
1 Michel Foucault, ''What is Enlightenment," in The Foucault Reader, p. 50. 
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In naming an object both epistemologically and ontologically, it is stifled both within the 
formal name given it, but more importantly, is subjectively oppressed by the imposition of 
a stable and grounded consciousness. It is precisely this modem epistemological desire to 
name and constitute Man that informs Foucault's foremost intellectual and political 
concerns. He is unwilling to affirm a unified, sovereign subject and as a result he is unable 
to provide for a politics which allows for a liberation of some repressed or unactualized 
"true" self. In this way, he rejects the entire humanist tradition and invokes the types of 
critiques we have explored. 
In rejecting the humanist tradition as explored in Part I of this dissertation, and the 
conceptions of the self which are central to this tradition, Foucault simultaneously opens 
himself up to extremely interesting work, as well as severe criticism; he is accused by lib-
erals of preventing the formation of truth or identity; similarly, by introducing a conception 
of power as a relationship between two opposing forces, rather than as the traditional un-
derstanding of power as law or sovereignty, Foucault invited criticism from marxists for 
his apparent negation of the possibility for revolt. As a result, this dissertation was faced 
. by two primary problems: first, whether Foucault offers a coherent theoretical paradigm 
that can be traced throughout his work; second, and more importantly, regardless of 
whether we answer in the affirmative to this first problem, we had to resolve whether the 
possibility for truth formation and political agency is provided for in Foucault's work. 
Ultimately, this dissertation was set the initial task of answering whether Michel Foucault's 
work could be followed as a coherent paradigm throughout what are generally accepted as 
the three periods which structure his oeuvre; second, a question had to be resolved 
pertaining to whether his work allowed for human action against the power/knowledge 
relations which he describes as constitutive of the modern human subject. First, does 
Foucault's work stand up in theoretical terms; second, can his theory be used politically. 
In the introduction, I proposed dividing this dissertation into four parts: the first 
part was to investigate Foucault's earliest archaeological period in which he focused on the 
209 
formation of knowledge systems around Man. Part II explored Foucault's middle period, 
where we investigated his controversial conception of power, which he first introduced in 
the 1970's to provide a theoretical explanation for ways in which knowledge is applied 
within society. Additionally, it was during his power period that Foucault provided an ex-
planatory model for the process whereby the subject was constituted ontologically. The 
third part of this dissertation provided a broadly liberal and marxist critique of Foucault's 
work, this to juxtapose his work to the humanist tradition of which he is so suspicious. In 
this way, I sought to show the contradistinction which fundamentally separates the tradition 
of philosophy to which Foucault belongs (which might loosely be called the poststructural-
ist tradition, even though he would reject such a label), from that which the former two ide-
ologies find themselves indebted to (which might generally be called the humanist tradi-
tion). After resolving liberal problems with Foucault's work which centred around his the-
ory allowing for the establishment of truth and identity, problems which are primarily onto-
logical in nature, I set out the central problem which marxists generally have with 
Foucault's work: his seeming denial of human agency which enforces a sense of political 
quietism in his work. The latter is primarily a political problem, and the fourth and final 
part of this dissertation sought to resolve this critical and very difficult dilemma presented 
to Foucault's work. Regardless of his work providing a unique theory of knowledge and 
of human subjectivity, if it was found not to contain the practical ability of the human sub-
ject to overturn imposing power-knowledge relations, then Foucault's work might de-
servedly be labeled as nihilistic, and oflittle use in offering his readers a positive response 
to his critique of modernity. 
After a careful reading of Foucault's initial three texts, (Madness and Civilization, 
The Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of Things), which are primarily archaeologies of 
various modem knowledge systems, his work was able to provide sufficient proof to show 
both that Man as a stable and uniform entity, and a supposedly human consciousness 
which is described in knowledge, are innately modern inventions. By the end of 
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Foucault's first period, we had been introduced to his conception of Man as an entity es-
tablished purely within knowledge and constituted within particular epistemological config-
urations, in this case unique to modernity. Additionally, his thesis provided for the pos-
sibility of this entity's demise as a result of its being undermined through a critical work on 
the part of philosophy or reason. The major weakness in his theory at this early stage, 
however, was Foucault's inability to provide an explanation to show how knowledge 
intersects with social practice. This would become the central focus of his subsequent 
period, which was centrally concerned with outlining a theory of power. 
In his middle period, (marked by the publication of Discipline and Punish, and The 
History of Sexuality, Volume 1) Foucault offered a newly-conceived definition of power 
which, following from his rejection of a unified subject, would not allow for the notion of 
a "liberation" from malevolent social forces. He rejected liberation understood both as an 
actualization of a innate human self which in some sense had been repressed, or liberation 
understood as a revolution, the toppling of a bourgeois or otherwise oppressive state and 
its replacement with a utopic vision of government; instead he introduced the ability and 
necessity for the human subject to resist and to engage in antagonistic relations with other 
relations of power. Foucault ultimately describes power as a relationship between two 
beings, both vying for hegemony, and yet always inclusive of freedom and the ability to 
resist. At the end of this period, a number of serious questions emerged as to the efficacy 
of his work, and the degree to which his conception of power really did contain a positive 
political vision. Part III of this dissertation provided the space to introduce two powerful 
arguments against Foucault's work, this the central task set for this dissertation to answer. 
Liberals present an important argument against Foucault's work in relation to truth 
and the ability of subjects to name things, or to provide identity to the world around them-
selves; the marxists which I chose to introduce in the third section of this dissertation 
questioned the seemingly nihilistic tendencies within Foucault's work, and his apparent 
inability to provide for human revolt against imposing power-knowledge relations. While 
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Charles Taylor is more easily answered, his central weakness being his misunderstanding 
Foucault's conception of the subject, the marxists presented a far more deep-seated and 
challenging argument against Foucault, which I used the entire fourth part of the 
dissertation to answer. At the conclusion of the third part, I had sufficiently dealt with 
Taylor's criticisms, but had yet to answer the concerns of Martin Jay and others, who 
admittedly presented a far more difficult critique of Foucault's work. The central question 
remained: regardless of whether Foucault's work is intellectually coherent, and regardless 
of whether in fact he does allow for the formation of identity, is his work politically 
coherent, i.e., does he provide a positive and meaningful political alternative to the rather 
bleak picture which his theories of the human subject and its relationship with modern 
knowledge and power presented. This question would have to be sufficiently answered for 
my initial thesis to be proven correct, and for Foucauldian scholars to claim that he offers 
the world of philosophy more than just theories of knowledge. 
As a result, I devoted all of Part IV to exploring Foucault's final period in which he 
explored ethics. Continuing with the studies into sexuality and human desire started with 
The History of Sexuality (Volume 1), in the subsequent two volumes Foucault went on to 
investigate how the ancient world problematized desire. Of particular importance here were 
his investigations into non- and pre-Christian ethics, moral or spiritual codes which were 
self-formulated and did not adhere to a strictly exterior and punative code of conduct. 
Central to these investigations were the Platonic and Stoic traditions, both interested in the 
close link between self-government and the ability to govern a group; hence Plato's appeal 
to the youth of Athens to master their own appetites if they wished to be successful political 
leaders, and the desire of the Stoics to master their various desires. Extremely important in 
these quests was not the seeking to fulfill a morality which was imposed by a 
transcendental Saviour, but rather a practice on the self in a highly personal way to change 
one's conduct or thoughts. Foucault would adopt the Greco-Roman concept of "aesthetics 
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of the self" in outlining a purely modem set of ethics which could assist his political 
concerns. 
His work emerges as political to the degree that he takes power-knowledge relations 
into account, problematizes these in relation to the subject, but then goes on to describe 
how this relationship could be critically addressed. Central to this dissertation and my 
thesis has been to show how Foucault's oeuvre works as a critique on two important 
levels. First, and introduced primarily in his first period, Foucault investigates the 
relationship between knowledge and the subject--here his chief concerns were the 
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epistemological limits which define modem thought. Second, and explored from his sec-
ond period, Foucault investigates the application of such knowledge to the human subject 
in a relationship of subjectification, this primarily an ontological question. Ultimately, his 
work exists as a critique and exploration of knowledge systems and their interaction with 
power relations which render a particular conception of the human subject. Foucault is 
thus interested in outlining the epistemological and ontological limits of modernity, and re-
lating these to the degree to which the subject is both the centre and object of such investi-
gations. In order to challenge such a system he must necessarily provide both an epistemo-
logical and an ontological critique. 
In order to challenge modern epistemological systems, Foucault introduces his 
method of archaeological investigation, which situates all modem knowledge within the 
epistemic configuration which informs the constitution of such knowledge, and which ex-
plains all knowledge as having been constructed w~thin history or through time. Once it is 
understood that all knowledge is contingent upon the epistemic configuration upon which it 
rests, then it becomes apparent that if such an episteme is reversed or superseded, then the 
forms of knowledge which are indicative of this episteme might also change. Following on 
from this, if Man is an epistemological construct unique to modernity, and thought is al-
lowed to think Other thari itself, this entity can also be reconceived or rejected completely. 
This process is inherently political to the degree that it threatens a modem bio--political 
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agenda centred around the constitution and manipulation of the human subject. In addition, 
and as a result of this complex model, it can be concluded that inherent in Foucault's early 
work is the prospect of resistance. 
To deal with ontological impositions on the subject, Foucault introduced his ge-
nealogical method, which provided a theoretical framework within which to investigate so-
cial practices and the ways in which knowledge intersects with power to produce reality. 
In this area of his work, Foucault wrote books on modem penal systems and sexuality, 
showing how modem systems of discipline and the control of populations is intrinsically 
linked to a problematization of the human ability to reproduce; these systems of control are 
also linked to the modem necessity to promote life and for citizens to contribute in an 
economically and politically efficient way. Foucault names this form of discipline and 
politics which pervades modernity and which enforces these social disciplines, bio-politics; 
this type of government is established on the conceptions we have of Man in this epoch, 
and a central task of the human sciences remains to produce knowledge of this entity in 
order to better actualize his potential and ensure his correct incorporation within the state. 
Within such a system of modern discipline, however, Foucault provides the space for 
resistance, and it is in his final work on ethics that he is able to bring his oeuvre full circle 
and answer his marxist critics. 
Taking modem knowledge and systems of discipline into account, Foucault both 
rejects a theory of liberation from such a system, and yet provides a two-fold strategy for 
resistance. First, his work provides for an episte~ological undermining of modem sys-
tems of knowledge. This is the first task of philosophy as critique, the ability for thought 
to think Other than itself, and to critically examine knowledge structures which might ap-
pear self-evident and universal, timeless in their application and not subject to change. The 
second task of philosophy is the critique of individual identity, the use of thought as a 
practice on the body. This is Foucault's most powerful thesis which is introduced in his 
final two books and right before his death. In thinking critically on himself, Foucault pro-
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vides for the subject to make the self as a work of art, as it were, to sculpt a self which is 
Other than its initial conception. While the subject will always be caught within knowl-
edge-power relations, and "liberation" is theoretically not possible, in his final works 
Foucault is able to provide the theoretical possibility for resistance, and a critical question-
ing of ontological constructs that have both constituted modern Man and given him a dis-
cernible consciousness. The core of the political project contained within Foucault's work 
is the ability to problematize and overturn such ontological impositions. The "politics of 
ourselves", then, is realizing the historical and contingent nature of knowledge systems 
which define Man, as well as the inherent potential to overturn these. The process of self-
making or askesis exists as a practice of reason upon the body and provides the basis for 
the modern subject to remake him- or herself as Other. 
From a critique of knowledge systems, through a unique theory of power, Michel 
Foucault has provided his readers with a fascinating, albeit highly controversial, critique of 
modernity. Inherent no doubt in his work is a coherent and constant concern with the 
constitution of the modern subject, as he outlined in "The Subject and Power", as well as a 
political concern with overturning such oppressive knowledge structures which limit 
thought epistemologically, and thus limit modern ontological and experiential boundaries. 
By denying the subject a liberation of an innate self towards the fulfillment of a future 
utopic vision, Foucault has taken us into a space that is hard to at first conceive of or begin 
to imagine: beyond the unified humanist subject, and beyond the subject of right and revolt. 
Tragically his oeuvre was left incomplete, and a brilliant career cut short. Regardless, and 
without needing to name him or his political theory, Foucault has taken us beyond the lim-
its of the Kantian subject and into a future of liminal politics and transgression. Because of 
the intensity and level of his thought, Foucault does disconcert and frustrate, resulting in 
the types of criticisms which we have explored in this dissertation; as a result of such 
frustration and perhaps at times a misinformed understanding of his work, I hope that 
future debates will not detract from what the name Michel Foucault stands for in the world 
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of theory, and only enhance his brilliant contribution to the world of intellectual research 
and the political consequence of such work. 
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